COMMENTS
PER CURIAM DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME
COURT: 1959 TERM
This third annual study of the per curiam decisions of the Supreme Court'
has several distinct purposes. Part I contains statistical tables comparing the
cases disposed of through per curiam decisions in the term just completed with
those of the prior two terms. The tables and accompanying textual discussion
are intended to direct attention to the Court's use of the per curiam disposition as a procedural device. In Parts II and III individual decisions are commented upon, not necessarily to facilitate generalizations about the Court's
per curiam practice, but rather because the substantive problems raised in
these cases are felt to be of particular interest. The cases discussed in Part II
were decided by the court with no explanation of the grounds for decision
other than an occasional citation of authority. These decisions are of the cryptic nature commonly associated with the per curiam label. The commentary
on them is intended both to provide an analysis of the substantive problems
involved and to serve the informative function of disclosing precedents created during the 1959 Term which would not otherwise be apparent to a reader
of the United States Reports. The decisions commented upon in Part III were
to some extent, explained by the Court. They differ in no material aspect from
cases decided in an opinion signed by an individual justice; the discussion in
Part III thus attempts merely to analyze Supreme Court decisions interesting
on their merits.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the 1959 Term, 135 cases were disposed of by per curiam decisions while
97 were decided in full, signed opinions. Of the 135 per curiam cases only 80
are included in the accompanying tables. These are the cases in which the
Court passed on the merits of the litigants' contentions or on controversial
problems of jurisdiction and procedure. Not included in the tables are the 55
per curiam decisions in which the Court did not pass on the merits of the case
and in which only routine application of jurisdictional or procedural rules was
involved. Although extended comment upon the data presented in the statistical tables would be superfluous, a few points deserve mention.
While the number of cases decided by signed opinions decreased only
slightly from the 1957 Term through that of 1959,2 a much more striking del The previous two studies appear in 26 U. Cm. L. R~v. 279 (1959) and 27 U. CHI. L.
REv. 128 (1959).
2 There were 109 cases decided in full opinions in the 1957 Term, 100 in the 1958 Term,
and 97 in the 1959 Term.

TABLE 1
SUBJECT MATTER
PER CURIAMS

1957

PRINCIPAL SUBJECT

1958

1

Adm iralty ..........................................
Arm ed Forces ......................................
Bill of Rights:
Freedom of Speech ................................
Self-incrim ination .................................
Federal Civil Jurisdiction and Procedure ...............
Federal Criminal Cases:
Procedure ........................................
Crim es ..........................................
Federal Habeas Corpus Procedure .....................
Federal Regulation under the Commerce Clause:
Agriculture .......................................
Antitrust ........................................
C arriers ..........................................
Communications ..................................
Compensation and Employer's Liability .............
L abor ...........................................
...............................
Securities ....
Trade Regulation .................................
Fourteenth Amendment:
Civil Jurisdiction and Procedure ....................
Criminal Procedure ...............................
Freedom of Speech, Press, Assembly, Religion ........
Segregation ......................................
State Statutes ....................................
Other ...................................
Immigration and Naturalization ......................
Impairment of Contract .............................
Land Laws .........................................
Patents, Copyrights, Trade Marks ....................
Power of State Courts ...............................
Review of Federal Administrative Agencies (not otherwise
classified) ....
............................
............
State Regulation of Commerce.
Statutes and Treaties (not otherwise classified):
Federal ..........................................
State ............................................
Taxation:
Federal ..........................................
.........................
State .............
Tort Claims against United States.................

4
5
2
3
16
5

7
3
25
1
6

2
3
1
1

2

129

Total ........................................

TABLE 2
ORIGIN OF CASES
1959

State Courts .................
Lower Federal Courts .........
Specialized Federal Courts .....

39
41

TABLE 3
JURISDICTIONAL BASIS
Certiorari ............
Appeal ..............

1957

1958

63
66

37
59

1959

38
42

TABLE 4
ORAL ARGUMENT
1957

1958

19
110

14
82

W ith ................
Without .............

1959

16
64

TABLE 5
TREATMENT OF CASES
1957

Orally
Argued
Without explanation or citation ....................
With citation only .........
With explanation ..........

1958

Total

2
6
11

Orally
Argued

68
34
27

4
2
8

1959

Total

Orally
Argued

Total

56
14
26

2
1
13

42
16
22

TABLE 6
DISPOSITION OF CASES
Appeal Dismissed for Want of Substantial Federal Question .............................................
Appeal Dismissed ...................................
Judment Affirmed by an Equally Divided Court ........
Judgment Affirmed ..................................
Judgment Vacated and Case Remanded for Reconsideration in Light of Authority Cited ....................
Judgment Vacated and Case Remanded with Instructions
Other than To Reconsider in Light of Authority Cited.
Judgment Reversed .................................
Judgment Reversed and Case Remanded ...............
Judgment Reversed on Confession of Error .............
Miscellaneous ......................................

1957

1958

1959

31
7
3
29

35
6
3
16

26

11

5

7

5
31

14
11
5

11
10
5

1

4

9
4

TABLE 7
Unaminous Court .............
Concurring Justice(s) ..........
Dissenting Justice(s) ..........
Both Concurring and Dissenting
Justices ....................
Equally Divided Court ........

1958

1959

73*
0
18t

59*
0
16t

2
3

3
2

* Each of these totals includes one case in which one Justice was

of the opinion that certiorari had been improvidently granted.
t Each of these totals includes five cases dismissing appeals in
which one or more of the Justices was of the opinion that probable

jurisdiction should be noted.
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dine is to be noted in the number of per curiam decisions. The reduction
in the volume of decisions does not appear to have been deliberately brought
about by the Court, since the decrease from the 1958 Term to the 1959 Term
is wholly a function of the reduction of the number of cases which arose on
appeal rather than on petition for certiorari. Whatever the cause of the reduction, it was accompanied by several other developments. The proportion of
the total number of per curiam decisions on which oral argument was heard
was higher in the term just completed than in either of the prior two terms.
Similarly, the proportion of decisions accompanied by either a citation of
authority or by a full explanation increased. As one would expect, it appears
that a lessening of the quantitative case burden on the Court has permitted a
greater expenditure of judicial time and care on individual cases.
The use of the per curiam device which may be of the greatest interest to
the bar is represented by an order granting a petition for certiorari accompanied by a simultaneous decision on the merits of the petitioner's claim.
Where the decision is conclusively adverse to the interests of the respondent,
this summary mode of disposition has been criticized on the ground that the
respondent is not adequately afforded an opportunity to present his arguments
to the Court.3 This objection would seem to apply with only slightly diminished force to decisions in which the Court grants certiorari and at the same
time modifies the lower court judgment or vacates the judgment and remands
the case for further proceedings. In each of these situations, a judgment favorable to the respondent has been impaired without oral argument and without
full briefs on the merits of the controversy. The Court reaches its decision
solely on the basis of a petition for certiorari, respondent's brief in opposition
and occasionally a reply brief on behalf of the petitioner. Counsel submitting
a brief in opposition to a petition for certiorari would appear to be under pressure to make an argument considerably different from that which he would
make in a brief on the merits of the case. 4 An examination of the incidence
in the last three terms of per curiam decisions granting certiorari and at the
same time upsetting lower court judgments can be expected to shed light on
the magnitude of whatever dangers are inherent in this procedure.
The figures in Table 8 show that in the 1958 and 1959 Terms there were sub3 See Brown, Forewordto the Supreme Court, 1957 Term, 72 HARV. L. REv. 77 (1958);
Note, Supreme Court Per Curiam Practice:A Critique, 69 HARV. L. Rav. 707, 724 (1956).
4 Directives that respondent's brief in opposition be both concise and brief are found in
the rules of the Court, in Supreme Court decisions and in manuals advising counsel. See
Sup. Ct. R. 24(I), 23(1)(h); Zap v. United States, 326 U.S. 777 (1945) (denial of certiorari),
order stayed, 326 U.S. 692 (1945), cert. granted, 326 U.S. 802 (1946); STERN & GRESSMAN,
SUPREME COURT PRACTCE 221 (2d ed. 1954). The goal of respondent's counsel is to induce
the Court not to take the case. He is advised to keep in mind that "... he is seeking to induce

the Court to deny a petition for certiorari, not to win a case on the merits." STERN & Gn.ssMAN, supra at 220. "Sensitive advocates will recognize the difference in performance which
the difference of purpose requires." Brown, supra note 3, at 79-80,
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stantially fewer decisions upsetting a lower court judgment contemporaneously with the granting of certiorari than in the 1957 Term. The significance of
this decrease can be best seen from an inspection of the subcategories in
Table 8. The propriety of a summary reversal based on a full opinion of the
same term turns on considerations different from those relevant to an evaluation of other summary reversals. Of interest is whether counsel for respondents in the case decided summarily had reason to believe that their case was
to be disposed of in accord with the disposition made of the case decided by
full opinion, whether they agreed to this procedure, and whether they participated in the preparation of argument in the other case.
If it be accepted that a respondent is subject to pressures influencing him
to frame his argument differently in a brief in opposition than he would in a
brief on the merits, the possibility of unfairness exists whenever a case is decided without briefs on the merits. The unfairness is reduced if the respondent
has reason to anticipate that his case may be disposed of summarily or if it is
unlikely that he would submit fuller argument in a brief on the merits even if
afforded the opportunity. A respondent may anticipate such summary treatment if he is aware that his case is to be decided in accord with a similar pending case, as discussed above, or if his case is of a category of cases customarily
disposed of without full briefing. Table 8 provides some indication of the type
of case in which the likelihood of summary disposition is greatest. In all three
terms, governmental entities were unsuccessful respondents more often than
private persons. In the earlier two terms the federal government was adversely
affected more often than any other party. Criminal cases are generally decided
without full argument more often than civil cases to which a governmental
entity is a party. Justification for summary reversal of many criminal cases
may lie in the probability that the government would make no fuller argument
even if briefs on the merits were permitted.
The incidence of decisions upsetting judgments in favor of private persons
without argument on the merits has steadily declined over the last three terms.
Of the seven cases disposed of in this way in the 1959 Term, 5 two represented
the final stages of litigation which had been before the Court in previous terms
and had been disposed of in full opinions;6 and in two others the decision was
rested upon a case decided earlier in the 1959 term in a full opinion.7 The
court appears to have been sensitive to its critics.
5 United Railroad Workers v. Baltimore & 0. R.R., 364 U.S. 278 (1960); Kreshik v.
Saint Nicholas Cathedral, 363 U.S. 190 (1960); Local 24, Teamsters v. Oliver, 362 U.S.
605 (1960); Bogle v. Jakes Foundry Co., 362 U.S. 401 (1960); United States v. Terminal
R.R. Ass'n of St. L., 361 U.S. 116 (1959); Conner v. Butler, 361 U.S. 29 (1959); Harris v.
Pennsylvania R.R., 361 U.S. 15 (1959).
6 Kreshik v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral, 363 U.S. 190 (1960); Local 24, Teamsters v.
Oliver, 362 U.S. 605 (1960)
7 United Railroad Workers v. Baltimore & 0. R.R., 364 U.S. 278 (1960); United Ter,niqql
R.R. Ass'n of St. L., 361 U.S. 116 (1959).
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II. DECISIONS NOT EXPLAINED BY THE COURT
PRIMARY JURISDICTION AND CONSPIRACY

To ELIMINATE A COMPETITOR

One of the issues before the Court in Luckenbach S.S. Co. v. United States'

was whether an allegation that certain carriers have conspired to eliminate a
competitor is cognizable by a district court, without prior resort to the Interstate Commerce Commission. In its per curiam disposition, the Supreme Court
declined to discuss a limitation to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction 2 which
the complaining carrier had urged upon it.
Luckenbach, an intercoastal water carrier, petitioned the ICC for a temporary order suspending a proposed reduction in rail rates, requested by
seven railroads acting in concert under an agreement approved by the ICC
pursuant to section 5a(2) of the Reed-Bulwinkle Act.3 The ICC agreed to investigate the lawfulness of the rates, but denied Luckenbach's petition for
suspension of the reduction. Luckenbach then filed suit in a three-judge district court to enjoin the ICC's denial of the suspension order and to secure
relief under the Sherman Act. The thrust of the antitrust phase of its complaint was that the railroads' collective ratemaking procedures were used "for
the purpose and with the intent of destroying a competitor." 4 The court denied both the injunction and the antitrust relief.5 It recognized the denial of
a suspension order to be a valid exercise of administrative discretion, not reviewable under Section 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act.6 In regard to
the antitrust phase of the suit, the court held that the ICC has primary jurisdiction over all controversies involving rail rates. The court declared that it could
not consider the antitrust allegations until after the ICC had determined the
lawfulness of the rates. Furthermore, since the agreement under which the
1364 U.S. 280 (1960). Direct appeal was pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1958).
2 For representative definitions of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, see Mr. Justice
Frankfurter's opinion in Far East Conference v. United States, 342 U.S. 570, 574 (1952); 3
DAvis, ADmIsTRATVE LAW TREATISE § 19.01 (1958). The doctrine of primary jurisdiction
requires the courts to refer to administrative agencies, for initial determination, issues of
fact within the agencies' particular expertise, thereby securing uniformity and consistency in
the determination of such issues.
For commentary on the application of the doctrine to antitrust cases, see generally Convisser, Primary Jurisdiction:The Rule and Its Rationalizations, 65 YALE L.J. 315 (1956);
Jaffe, PrimaryJurisdictionReconsidered: The Antitrust Laws, 102 U. PA. L. REV. 577 (1954);
B. Schwartz, Primary Administrative Jurisdictionand the Exhaustion of Litigants, 41 GEo.
L.J. 495 (1953); L. Schwartz, Legal Restriction of Competition in the Regulated Industries:
An Abdication of Judicial Responsibility, 67 HARv. L. REV. 436 (1954); VonMehren, The
Antitrust Laws and Regulated Industries: The Doctrine of PrimaryJurisdiction,67 HARV. L.
REv. 929 (1954); Note, 58 COLUM. L. Ray. 673 (1958).
362 Stat. 472 (1948), 49 U.S.C. § 5b(2) (1958). Throughout this note section citations are
to the act, and not to the codification.
4
1Brief for Appellant Opposing Motions to Affirm, p. 12.
5 Luckenbach S.S. Co. v. United States, 179 F. Supp. 605 (D. Del. 1959).
660 Stat. 243 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1009 (1958).
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defendant carriers acted in setting their rates exempted them from certain
antitrust sanctions, and because the ICC had approved the agreement, the
7
court sought the counsel of the ICC in construing the extent of the exemption.
Because the maximum suspension period had expired, the Supreme Court
vacated the judgment as to the suspension of the rate schedule and remanded
to the three-judge court 8 with instructions to dismiss the cause as moot. 9 It
affirmed the district court's dismissal of the antitrust phase of the suit.
Justices Black and Douglas dissented from the majority's disposition of
the antitrust phase of the suit, relying upon Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R.O In
that case, decided three years before the Reed-Bulwinkle Act authorized immunity from the antitrust laws, the Court had admitted an exception to the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction. The state of Georgia charged a conspiracy
on the part of certain railroads to restrain trade and commerce through the
fixing of arbitrary freight rates which would impede the development of the
South. While the Court recognized the primary jurisdiction of the ICC over
tariffs, it held that Georgia was not seeking an injunction against the continuation of a tariff, but, rather, against action over which the ICC had no
control-the conspiracy itself." To justify its separation of the conspiracy
from the rates, the Court relied on dicta in Keogh v. Chicago and Nw. Ry.
Co.12 for the proposition that a combination of carriers to fix reasonable and
non-discriminatory rates may be illegal under the antitrust laws.
7 Section 5a(9) of the Reed-Bulwinkle Act declares that parties to any agreement approved
by the ICC are"relieved from the operation of the antitrust laws with respect to the making of
such agreement, and with respect to the carrying out of such agreement in conformity with
its provisions and in conformity with the terms and conditions prescribed by the Commission." Because the ICC had approved the agreement and had perhaps attached certain conditions, the court requested the ICC to explain the coverage of the exemption. Presumably
the ICC might find that certain activities carried on by the railroads were outside the exemption and, in fact, inconsistent with the national transportation policy.
s One further problem raised by the procedural history of the Luckenbach case, which
will not be discussed in this note, is whether a three-judge statutory court whose jurisdiction
is limited by 28 U.S.C. § 2325 (1958) can decide any collateral issue. Did the three-judge
court and the Supreme Court have any standing even to dismiss the antitrust charges on the
ground of primary jurisdiction? Perhaps the antitrust question should first be resolved by a
one-judge district court. In a dissenting opinion in the instant case, District Judge Rodney
so argues. 179 F. Supp. 614 (D. Del. 1959).
9 Under § 15(7) of the Interstate Commerce Act, the ICC may suspend the operation of a
rate schedule for no more than seven months "beyond the time when it would otherwise go
into effect." By the time the review of the ICC's discretion was before the Supreme Court, the
seven month period had elapsed, rendering this question moot. The Court cited United
States v. Amarillo-Borger Express, 352 U.S. 1028 (1957); Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. Dixie
Carriers, Inc., 355 U.S. 179 (1957).
10324 U.S. 439 (1945).

11 Mr. Chief Justice Stone, and Justices Roberts, Frankfurter, and Jackson were not
convinced by this argument. They saw the question of rates as the crucial question, because
without unlawful rates there is no legally cognizable damage, and without damage there is
no basis for injunctive relief. 324 U.S. 439, 468 (1945) (dissenting opinion).
12 260 U.S. 156, 161-62 (1922). See also United States Nay. Co. v. Cunard S.S. Co., 284
U.S. 474 (1932) (Here an independent water carrier failed to sustain an allegation of a con-
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The Reed-Bulwinkle Act made difficult the separation of the issue of conspiracy from that of rates. By the provisions of the act the ICC was authorized
to approve agreements among carriers "upon such terms and conditions" as
it might prescribe. Section 5a(9) of the Act rendered immune from the antitrust laws activities conforming to the approved agreement and prescribed
conditions. What might formerly have been a conspiracy within the Sherman
Act was thus immunizable by the ICC.13 The exemption imported into the
law by the Reed-Bulwinkle Act closely resembled antitrust exemptions established by the Shipping Act14 and the Civil Aeronautics Act.15 All three acts
empower the appropriate administrative agency to immunize the activities of
certain carriers by approving agreements among the carriers.
Despite the emphasis placed on agency action by the immunity provisions,
the applicability of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction in this area has not
gone unchallenged. In Slick Airways, Inc. v. American Airlines, Inc.,16 an airfreight carrier brought suit under the Sherman Act against three competing
carriers. It charged a conspiracy by the defendants to eliminate it from business
and alleged predatory rate policies, abuse of privilege in Civil Aeronautics
Board proceedings, and the execution of the conspiracy through a campaign
of unfair practices. Although the defendants urged the point forcefully, the
court refused to recognize primary jurisdiction of the controversy in the CAB.
The court acknowledged the primary jurisdiction of the CAB to determine
the legality of each of the component parts of the conspiracy alleged, but distinguished the important legal issue from the legality of the parts: "a court
can have jurisdiction over an illegal conspiracy even though effectuated by
legal means and methods."' 7 Because a conspiracy to eliminate a competitor
is not the type of agreement which the agency may approve, the court considered itself competent to entertain the plaintiff's complaint.B The court
spiracy implemented by preferential contract rates, rebates and false rumors; the Court invoked the doctrine of primary jurisdiction); Terminal Warehouse Co. v. Pennyslvania R.R.,
297 U.S. 500, 511 (1936) (Here, only four years later, the Court said that a carrier might
become a party to a conspiracy where the privileges extended and payments made to each
other by the defendants were symptoms or incidents of an enveloping conspiracy with its
own illegal ends). Cf. United States v. Pacific & Arctic Ry. & Nav. Co., 228 U.S. 87 (1913).
13 The Reed-Bulwinkle Act was intended to nullify the impact of the Georgia case.
H. R. REP. No. 1100, 80th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1844, 1846-47 (1948). In order now to charge
carriers under the antitrust laws, a further distinction must be made between legitimate activities under ICC approved agreements and activities not exempted under these agreements.
14 39 Stat. 729, as amended, 46 U.S.C. § 814 (1958).
Is 49 U.S.C. § 494 (1952), repealed, 72 Stat. 800 (1958). Concurrent with repeal was enactment of a new aviation act, 72 Stat. 737. The immunity section is now 49 U.S.C. § 1384
(1958).
16 107 F. Supp. 199 (D.N.J. 1951), rehearingdenied, 107 F. Supp. 214 (D.N.J. 1952),
appealdismissed, 204 F.2d 230 (3rd Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 806 (1953).
17 107 F. Supp. at 216.
IS Contra,S.S.W., Inc. v. Air Transp. Ass'n of America, 191 F.2d 658 (D.C. Cir. 1951),
cert. denied, 343 U.S. 955 (1952); Agpar Travel Agency v. International Air Transp. Ass'n,
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observed that the plaintiff had already resorted to the CAB and that the CAB
seemed to have approved the rates in question.19 Although the court in Slick
placed little importance on the preliminary recourse to the agency in the case
before it, that fact weakens the authority of the case in the development of a
possible conspiracy limitation upon primary jurisdiction.
The limitation upon primary jursidiction, announced in the Slick case, was
recognized in Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. Aircoach Transp. Ass'n.20 Four supplemental air carriers, banded together in Aircoach, brought suit under the
Sherman Act against forty railroads and two railroad rate committees; they
charged that the practice of offering large "spot reductions" to military personnel was illegal per se. The railroads, acting in concert under a section 5(a)
agreement, contended that the practice was immunized from the antitrust
laws by the ICC's approval of their agreement and moved for summary judgment. The district court, however, entered summary judgment for the plaintiffs. 21
The court of appeals vacated the judgment and announced a double holding: the
ICC had primary jurisdiction to determine the scope of the immunity; but
even if the concerted rate reductions were immune, they might still be the
basis for antitrust relief as part of a provable conspiracy to eliminate competition by the plaintiffs. Whether the district court should suspend the suit
pending determination of the scope of immunity granted by the ICC, or
whether it should proceed upon the assumption that the conduct was immune
was entrusted to the discretion of the trial court.
The significance of the conspiracy exception to primary jurisdiction, recognized by the district court in the second holding of the Aircoach case, was
tempered the same year by the Supreme Court in Federal Maritime Bd. v.
Isbrandtsen Co.22 Isbrandtsen had charged a conspiracy by members of a shipping conference to eliminate it from the business. The FMB had found that
the purpose of the conference's dual-rate system was to stifle outside competition, but it nevertheless approved the system. 23 The Supreme Court affirmed
the court of appeals' judgment setting aside the FMB's order. The Court's
107 F. Supp. 706 (S.D.N.Y. 1952) (In these two cases there had been no prior recourse to the
Civil Aeronautics Board); United States v. Alaska S.S. Co., 110 F. Supp. 104 (W.D. Wash.

1952) (Allegation of scheme to exclude plaintiff from the shipping business. Nevertheless, the

court invoked the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, following the Cunardcase, 284 U.S. 474
(1932), and the FarEast case, infra); VonMehren, supra note 2, at 944; but see, Far East
Conferencev. United States, 342 U.S. 570 (1952) (Doctrine of primary jurisdiction applied
where the question was one of the reasonableness of the rates, and not of the illegal ends
sought by a conspiratorial association of carriers); cf. L. Schwartz, supra note 2, at 468 n. 86.
19 107 F. Supp. at 213.
20 253 F.2d 877 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
21 154 F. Supp. 106 (D.D.C. 1957).
22 356 U.S. 481 (1958).
23 4 F.M.B. 706 (1958).
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ratio decidendi would appear to be reflected in its statements that (1) the agency determination does not foreclose judicial review, and (2) the dual-rate system was, because of the purpose for which it was adopted, illegal under section 14 of the Shipping Act of 1916.24 In the course of its opinion, the Court
said that the question of purpose and intent was for the FMB to decide,25
and, therefore, on the facts of the case, initial resort to the agency seemed
proper. However, the question of primary jurisdiction was not before the
Court at a time when it had to decide whether to permit a trial court to retain
jurisdiction of an antitrust suit. The Commission had, in Isbrandtsen,already
made the necessary finding. Therefore, the dicta as to agency determination
of purpose and intent might not be considered authority for such a proposition
in the future.
One year later in Riss & Co. v. Association of Am. Railroads,26 a district
court attempted to assess the effect of Isbrandtsen on Aircoach. It may be that
the per curiam opinion in the instant case represents tacit approval of the
formulation made in Riss. Confronted by a trucker's charge that seventy railroads were conspiring to eliminate it from interstate commerce, the court
retained jurisdiction. The court declared that a conspiracy to eliminate a
competitor could not be approved and immunized by the ICC, and that the
administrative determination of the scope of section 5a(9) immunity could
not foreclose the issue to the courts. The court, following an order of the
court of appeals,2 7 considered the impact of the dicta in Isbrandtsen and declared that whenever "the issue of the intent and effect" of rate reductions
"is the sole or dominant issue" 28 in a case, the agency has primary jurisdiction.
However, since Riss alleged and offered to prove means other than predatory
rates in order to establish the conspiracy charged, 29 the court concluded that
the rate issue was not "sole or dominant," and that resort to the ICC was
24 39 Stat. 733 (1916), as amended, 46 U.S.C. § 812 (1958).

25 356 U.S. at 499.
26 170 F. Supp. 354 (D.D.C. 1959), common law writ of certiorari denied, 361 U.S. 804
(1959).
27 The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit had issued an interlocutory
opinion on August 8, 1958, quoted in the district court's opinion, 170 F. Supp. at 362-63.
28 170 F. Supp. at 363. The judge declared that this expression by the court of appeals
indicates that Isbrandtsen modifies only the first holding of Aircoach: that the scope of the
immunity is within the primary jurisdiction of the agency. In this analysis, the judge appears
to have erred. The "sole or dominant" formulation modifies the second holding of Aircoach:
that the antitrust suit might be continued in the district court when a non-immunizable
conspiracy was alleged.
29
Riss charged political pressure on elected officials to secure revocation of its license,
illegal influence on the Ohio Public Utilities Commission, illegal influence to secure unreasonably low weight limits and extensive anti-truck propaganda in various media, including
infiltration of the Illinois and Oklahoma parent-teacher organizations.
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unnecessary. The court also took notice of the potentially damaging effects
of the prolonged delay required to permit full ICC findings.30
Luckenbach was unable to benefit from the rule announced in Riss. Its
complaint charged a conspiracy to eliminate it from business, but alleged
only predatory rate practices as the means of executing the conspiracy. Thus
the Supreme Court did not have before it an application of the rule announced
in Riss; and the decision cannot be said to approve that rule, or indeed any
limitation to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. At the most, the Court was
given an opportunity to apply its dicta in Isbrandtsen by finding the agency
well-suited for the initial determination of the intent of the rate practices. This
indeed may be the most satisfactory explanation of its per curiam opinion.
For Luckenbach the result was unfortunate because injunctive relief may
come too late. If the conspiracy to eliminate it from competition exists and
meets with swift success, the results of the ICC's promised investigation may
not prevent the harm feared. In order to avoid the delay 3 l of detailed investigation, Luckenbach tried to persuade the court to consider its charge; but the
exception to primary jurisdiction, on which it sought to rely, had not yet
been developed sufficiently to permit its success. It remains to be seen whether
another carrier, alleging more than predatory rate practices, can persuade the
32
Supreme Court to develop the doctrine further by approving the Riss rule.
30 170 F. Supp. at 369; see Jaffe, supra note 2, at 591-92. See generally Note, 48 GEO.
L.J. 563 (1960).
31One further problem is suggested by the conspiracy exception and its attempted use by
Luckenbach. Plaintiffs, seeking to resort to the courts rather than to the often industryoriented administrative agencies, might tend to pad their complaints with conspiracy charges
so as to invoke the jurisdiction of the courts. This in turn might tend to unjustifiably increase
the workload of the courts. However, it can be argued that it is equally wasteful to send the
suit from court to agency and back to the courts again to apply the administrative findings.
See Jaffe, supra note 2, at 601.
32 For a defense of the Riss rule, see generally Note, 48 GEo. L.J. 563, 576 (1960).

MULTIPLE OFFENSES AND MULTIPLE PENALTIES UNDER THE
FEDERAL NARcoTIcs LAWS
In vain attempts to eliminate the illicit narcotics traffic, Congress has defined
and redefined offenses and penalties for the purchase, possession and sale of
narcotics. This proliferation of offenses' may make the violator more susceptible to conviction; it may also force him to run the risk of prolonged confinement under consecutive sentences for a single act or for a related series of
acts committed within a short period of time. Yancy v. UnitedStates,2 a recent
1 See Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, Laws ControllingIllicit Narcotics Traffic, S. Doc.
No. 120, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956); Note, Consecutive Sentences in Single Prosecutions:
Judicial Multiplication of Statutory Penalties, 67 YALE L.J. 916, 917-18 (1958).
2 362 U.S. 389 (1960).
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per curiam case, seems to sanction broad use of consecutive sentences in narcotics cases.
Yancy was convicted of two violations of 26 U.S.C. § 4704(a), 3 the first
count charging the purchase and the second the sale of 775 grains of heroin
not "in or from the original stamped package," for which consecutive five year
sentences were imposed. The prosecution proved both counts by introducing
evidence of a single sale and the possession necessarily incident thereto, since
the statute made such possession "prima facie evidence of a [purchase] violation." Thereafter defendant filed a motion to correct sentence, 4 contending
that the sentences constituted double punishment in excess of the statutory
maximum. Reciting the "unbroken line of judicial authority" contrary to defendant's contentions, the court of appeals held that there was "no choice
but to affirm" the district court's denial of the motion.5 The Supreme Court
6
affirmed by an equally divided Court.
It has been suggested that, in deciding multiple offense cases, the "courts
have announced as significant, the following elements: (1) the act, (2) the intent, (3) the consequences ... [or] (4) the law." 7 Cases in which more than one
crime is charged as a result of a single act which violates two or more statutory
provisions may be termed, for convenience, multiple-law offenses. Similarly,
cases in which the act, intent or consequence is the relevant plural element
may be classified in terms of that element. Multiple-act and multiple-intent
cases tend to raise questions of factual, or temporal, separability. 8 Multipleconsequence and multiple-law cases, however, raise questions of legal separability9 since, by definition, the offenses charged are based upon a single fact
situation. Regardless of the multiple element involved, the issue is the same:
3 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 4707(a). "General requirement. It shall be unlawful for any
person to purchase, sell, dispense, or distribute narcotic drugs except in the original stamped
package or from the original stamped package; and the absence of appropriate taxpaid
stamps from narcotic drugs shall be prima facie evidence of a violation of this subsection by
the person in whose possession the same may be found."
4 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1958). "A prisoner... claiming the right to be released upon the
ground ... that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law ... may

move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence."
s Yancy v. United States, 252 F.2d 554, 556 (6th Cir. 1958).
6 Yancy v. United States, 362 U.S. 389 (1960). Having heard the case below, Mr. Justice
Stewart did not participate.
7 See Horack, The Multiple Consequences of a Single CriminalAct, 21 M-N. L. REv. 805
(1937). Simply put, the question is whether there shall be multiple prosecutions for a criminal
transaction when it involves more than one act (id.at 806-11), or more than one intention
(id. at 812-14), or more than one consequence (id. at 814-19, 822) or when the conduct
violates more than one legal prohibition (id. at 811).
8 See, e.g., Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932); United States v. Daugherty,
269 U.S. 360 (1926).
9 See, e.g., Ladner v. United States, 358 U.S. 169 (1958); Albrecht v. United States, 273
U.S. 1 (1927); Gavieres v. United States 220 U.S. 338 (1911).
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Does the multiplicity provide a rational basis for conviction of multiple offenses, for which consecutive penalties may be imposed? To answer this question the courts commonly resort to either the "same evidence" or the "same
transaction" test.
The "same evidence" test seeks to differentiate offenses by determining
"whether each... [offense] requires proof of a fact which the other does
not."10 If each offense requires proof of a unique fact, then multiple convictions and multiple penalties are appropriate. According to the "same transaction" test, multiple elements are irrelevant so long as they are part of a single
transaction." Often, as in Yancy, the tests arrive at opposite conclusions on
the same facts.
The problem of multiple penalties arises when the trial court imposes consecutive sentences for conviction of a multiple offense. In opposing the imposition of multiple penalties, defendants commonly make one or more of three
12
contentions: (1) that the "same transaction" test should have been applied;
(2) the multiple penalties violate the double jeopardy clause;' 3 and (3) that
4
Congress intended that only one penalty be imposed.'
Blockburger v. United States,'5 the leading case, squarely holds that both
multiple-acts and single acts in violation of more than one statute are subject
to multiple penalties. Blockburger was convicted of three violations of the
Harrison Narcotics Actl6 on proof of two sales of morphine on consecutive
days to the same government agent. For the second sale the prosecution separately charged violations of both the stamped package requirement and the
written order requirement. The defense contended that the two sales were a
single continuing offense. The Court held, however, that each sale was factually separable, requiring a fresh impulse of "a new bargain;" that the "same
evidence" test rendered the two offenses charged under the second sale
separable, since "each of the offenses... requires proof of a different element." The Court found the plain meaning of the statute to be that "each
offense is subject to the penalty prescribed.... ."17 The Blockburger case may
be said to stand for three propositions: (1) that the "same evidence" test prop10Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932).
11Comment, 65 YALE L.J. 339, 348, 361 (1956).
12

See,e.g., United States v. Brisbane, 239 F.2d 859, 861 (3d Cir. 1956); Mills v. Aderhold,
110 F.2d 765, 767 (10th Cir. 1940).
13 E.g., Brief for Petitioner, pp. 11-13, Yancy v. United States, 362 U.S. 389 (1960); Brief
for Petitioner, pp. 54-60, Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386 (1958); Comment, 65 YALE
L.J. 339, 340 (1956).
14
See,e.g., United States v. Brisbane, 239 F.2d 859, 861 (3d Cir. 1956); United States v.
Lewis, 227 F.2d 524, 525 (2d Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 974 (1956).
15 284 U.S. 299 (1932).
16
INT.REV.CODE OF 1954, §§ 4701-36.
17 Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304-05 (1932).
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erly differentiates one offense from another;18 (2) that Congress had the
power to punish such offenses consecutively;19 and (3) that Congress intended
20
that such offenses might be punished consecutively.
Three multiple-offense cases 21 decided after Blockburger seem to have rejected the "same evidence" test in favor of the "same transaction" test, although they mention neither Blockburger nor the tests. The Court found in
each instance a single allowable unit of prosecution, and held that in the absence of clear congressional intent to authorize multiple penalties, "the principle of lenity should control." 22 Of the three, only Prince v. United States23
was a multiple-law case, and it was decided under the "lesser-included-offense" rationale. 24 None of the cases controlled the multiple-law situation as
presented by Blockburger or by Yancy; but in Gore v. United States25 the
Court felt constrained to "consider whether some of our more recent decisions, while not questioning Blockburger but moving in related areas, may
not have impaired its authority."26
On proof of one sale, Gore was convicted of violating three separate sections of the Code,27 and consecutive sentences were imposed. In affirming this
disposition, the court of appeals recognized the controlling authority of
Blockburger.28 A concurring opinion, however, questioned the effect of the
recent cases and suggested that the proper interpretation of congressional
IsId.at 304.

19 Id. at 303-04 (by implication). For explicit statements of this proposition see Albrecht
v. United States, 273 U.S. 1, 11 (1927); Burton v. United States, 202 U.S. 344, 377 (1906).
20 284 U.S. at 305.
21
Prince v. United States, 352 U.S. 322 (1957) (Federal Bank Robbery Act); Bell v.
United States, 349 U.S. 81 (1955) (Mann Act); United States v. Universal C.I.T. Credit
Corp., 344 U.S. 218 (1952) (Fair Labor Standards Act).
22 Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81, 83 (1955).
23 352 U.S. 322 (1957).
24 Id. at 329. On denial of defendant's motion to correct consecutive sentences, the issue

was whether the crime of entering a bank with intent to commit a robbery is merged with
the crime of robbery when the latter is consummated. Reversal was grounded upon a judicial
determination that Congress did not intend to double the maximum penalty for robbery, but
sought, rather, to allow the maximum penalty "if the culprit should fall short of accomplishing his purpose .. " Thus the Prince case presents a clear example of a "lesser included
offense." For the suggestion that not only such obvious cases, but also cases where the
"legislator has attempted to carve out a variety of offenses from one and the same transac-

tion," should be subject to single punishment under the rule "lex consumens derogat legi
consumptae," see Kirchheimer, The Act, The Offense and DoubleJeopardy,58 YALE L.J. 513,
518-20 (1949).
25
26
27

357 U.S. 386 (1958); Note, supra note 1.
357 U.S. at 388.
INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 4704(a) (stamped package requirement), 4705(a) (written

order requirement); 65 Stat. 767 (1951), 21 U.S.C. § 174 (1958) (facilitating concealment and

sale of unlawfully imported narcotic drugs).
28 Gore v. United States, 244 F.2d 763 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
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intent might warrant reversal.29 By a five-four decision the sentences were
approved by the Supreme Court. 30 The court followed Blockburger and reaffirmed the three propositions for which it has been said to stand. 3' It also
declared a fourth proposition: since Congress had the power to punish each
of the offenses separately, multiple penalties could not violate the double
jeopardy clause. 32 The question was then whether Congress had exercised this
power. That it had was inferred from the fact that each of the three statutes
was enacted separately. This revealed the "determination of Congress to turn
33
the screw of the criminal machinery ...tighter and tighter."
In a dissenting opinion, Justices Black and Douglas questioned Congress's
power to impose such penalties, resisting "a reading which... [infers] that
Congress intended multiple offenses from the same sale, for that would not
square with the [double jeopardy clause of the] Constitution." 34 The Chief
Justice, who had written the majority opinion in Prince,35 argued that in view
of Congress's purpose to achieve uniformity in sentences "the present purpose
of these statutes is to make sure that a prosecutor has three avenues by which
to prosecute one who traffics in narcotics, and not to authorize three cumula36
tive punishments for the defendant who consummates a single sale."
Mr. Justice Brennan, the fourth dissenter, found the majority opinion "inconsistent with the principles of Blockburger because it allows separate offenses to be proved and separate punishments to be imposed on the proof of
Id. at 766 (concurring opinion).
v. United States, 357 U.S. 386 (1958).
31 See text at notes 18-20 supra.
32 Speaking for the majority, Mr. Justice Frankfurter posited the following statute:
"Anyone who sells drugs except from the original stamped package and who sells such
drugs not in pursuance of a written order of the person to whom the drug is sold, and who
does so by way of facilitating the concealment and sale of drugs knowing the same to have
been unlawfully imported, shall be sentenced to not less than fifteen years' imprisonment... [provided that the penalty shall be reduced by one-third for any missing element]."
357 U.S. at 392.
The Court then put these questions: "Is it conceivable that such a statute would not be
within the power of Congress? And is it rational to find such a statute constitutional but to
strike down the Blockburger doctrine as violative of the double jeopardy clause?" Id.at 393.
While this argument may dispose of the double jeopardy contention, the fact that Congress did not express itself in the manner suggested by Mr. Justice Frankfurter raises additional questions: Is it not conceivable that Congress did not intend to impose multiple penalties under the existing statutes ? And is it rational to conceive of this possibility and yet fail to
find sufficient ambiguity of intent to invoke the principle of lenity?
33 Id. at 390. The "stamped package" requirement derives from the Revenue Act of 1918,
§ 1006, 40 Stat. 1057, 1130 (1919); the "written order" requirement from the Act of December 17,1914, § 2, 38 Stat. 785, 786 (1914); the "facilitating concealment and sale" prohibition
from an enactment of February 9, 1909, § 2, 35 Stat. 614.
29

3"0Gore

34357U.S. at 395, 397 (dissenting opinion).
3s See note 26 supra.
36 357 U.S. at 393, 394 (dissenting opinion).
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a single fact."3 7 The possibility of securing two convictions from presumptions raised by the single fact of unexplained possession of narcotics violated,
he maintained, the literal requirements of the "same evidence" test, i.e.,
"whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not."3 8
The opportunity to limit the application of the "same evidence" test to its
literal requirements was presented in Harris v. United States.39 The Court
rejected that formulation, finding it sufficient that "the violation, as distinguished from the direct evidence offered to prove that violation, was distinctly
different under each of the statutes." 40 In a dictum, the Court argued that
close scrutiny of the facts required to raise each of the presumptions would
distinguish the offenses, even under the Brennan formulation of the test.41
The equal division of the Court in Yancy suggests that a factor not common
to Gore and Harriswas at issue. The difference is the apparent absence of a
multiple element. Yancy executed a single act with a single intent resulting in
a single consequence in violation of a single section of the Code. 42 The Court's
failure to overturn his conviction permits multiple offenses to be charged for
violations of several specific provisions within one section of a single narcotics statute.4 3 The Gore case had held that Congress's intention to impose
multiple penalties could be inferred from the fact that each statute had been
enacted separately. Since this rationale cannot be applied in Yancy, it was the
37 357 U.S. at 397 (dissenting opinion).
3s Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932).
39 359 U.S. 19 (1959).

40 Id.at 23.
41"I[T]o
take advantage of the presumption of § 174 it is necessary only to prove possession by direct evidence; whereas to take advantage of the presumption of § 4707(a) it is
necessary to prove by direct evidence that the narcotic was unstamped as well as that it was
in the defendant's possession." Id. at 23-24. This argument is not to be accepted at face
value, for § 174 requires that the drugs in question have been imported "contrary to law."
65 Stat. 767 (1951), 21 U.S.C. § 174 (1958). In the ordinary case this requirement would be
satisfied by showing that the drugs were unstamped. Thus the "direct evidence" normally
adduced under each of these sections will be precisely the same.
42 See note 3 supra. The Government's brief explains that "the prosecutive technique used
here of charging both a purchase and a sale in violation of the stamped package requirement
is atypical. . ." and that the typical method, as exemplified in Gore, is now used in the
Eastern District of Michigan, where the Yancy case arose. Brief for the United States, p.
15 n. 9, Yancy v. United States, 362 U.S. 389 (1960).
It should also be noted that, on proof of a separate sale, the indictment had charged two
additional violations of the stamped package requirement. These counts were held in abeyance until the time of sentencing, when they were dismissed on the government's motion.
Record, pp. 4, 6, Yancy v. United States, 362 U.S. 389 (1960).
43 Nor would Mr. Justice Stewart's participation in Yancy have changed that result. His
opinion below suggested that the Blockburger doctrine be "re-examined" (252 F.2d 554, 556
(6th Cir. 1958)). That re-examination took place in the Gore case; Mr. Justice Stewart
acquiesced in the results thereof in the Harriscase.
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Court, rather than Congress, that "tum[ed] the screw.., tighter and
tighter."44
The Court's disposition of the double jeopardy contention seems proper.
That defense is based upon the proposition that, even if Congress intended
to punish these offenses separately and had explicitly declared such intention,
separate punishments would be void as violative of the double jeopardy clause.
Thus to circumscribe congressional power seems the least desirable solution
45
to the problem.
The three statutes involved in the typical narcotics prosecution 46 were
amended in 195147 and 195648 by legislation providing for more stringent and
44

See note 33 supra. It is not contended that single statutes have not in the past been the
basis for a finding of multiple violations, but the Yancy case appears to be the first narcotics
case where this was done. That this extension is a significant one may be inferred from the
fact that, in the Gorecase, only the narrowest majority found that separate statutes provided
such a basis; and from the fact that were it insignificant, Mr. Justice Frankfurter need not
have grounded the Gore decision on the fact that each violation arose from "three penal
laws ...[having] different origins both in time and in design" (357 U.S. at 390).
In Mullaney v. United States, 82 F.2d 638 (9th Cir. 1936), separate punishments were
upheld for convictions under two counts charging purchase and sale of the same quantity of
morphine "not in or from the original stamped package." The decision was based upon the
original stamped package." The decision was based upon the court's determination that the
sale charge was brought under the Harrison Narcotics Act (38 Stat. 785), while the purchase
charge was based upon the Jones-Miller Act (42 Stat. 596). Id. at 644. In fact, both the purchase and the sale provisions derive from the Revenue Act of 1918, § 1006, 40 Stat. 1057,
1130 (1919). It may be assumed that an accurate reading of the statute would have led the
court to reverse the conviction under one of the charges.
45 See Note, supra note 1. Compare Comment, Statutory Implementation of the Double
Jeopardy Clause, 65 YALE L.J. 339 (1956). The issue raised is whether the double jeopardy
clause has any applicability in the one-trial, multiple count situation. That the clause would
serve to bar successive trials for a single sale which transgress more than one statute is illustrated by the unique circumstances in United States v. Sabella, 272 F.2d 206 (2d Cir. 1959).
In the course of enacting the INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1954, Congress had failed to prescribe penalties for conduct made unlawful under § 4705, the written order requirement.
This omission was corrected by the Act of January 20, 1955, 69 Stat. 3. Defendants were
convicted and sentenced for violation of § 4705 based on a sale of heroin "on or about January 17, 1955." In April 1956, the defendants sought and obtained release from imprisonment
by writ of habeas corpus on the ground that at the date of the offense there was no law authorizing the sentence. On the Government's motion, the court ordered the sentences vacated
and set aside the judgment of conviction.
Thereafter, the defendants were indicted for violation of 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 173, 174 based
upon the same sale charged in the previous action. Relying upon Blockburger,the trial court
rejected the defendants' pleas of double jeopardy and the defendants were again convicted
and sentenced.
The court of appeals reversed citing Blockburger, Gore and Harrisfor the proposition
that "the defendants here could have been initially indicted for the single sale and given consecutive sentences under the two counts. .

. ."

272 F.2d 206, 211 (1959).

"The Fifth Amendment guarantees when the government has proceeded to judgment on a
certain fact situation, there can be no further prosecution on that same fact situation....
Although in such a prosecution it may join other charges based on the same fact situation, it
may not have a succession of trials seriatim." Id. at 212.
46 See note 27 supra.
47 The Boggs Act, 65 Stat. 767, 26 U.S.C. § 7237(a).
48

Act of July 18, 1956, c. 629, Title I, §§ 103-05, 70 Stat. 568, 26 U.S.C. § 7237(a).
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more uniform penalties. 49 It remains, therefore, to determine whether these
amendments are instructive of congressional intent.
Prior to 1951 a violation of each of these statutes was punishable by a sentence of up to five years imprisonment. Thus the typical prosecution might
have yielded a fifteen year sentence. In 1951 the Boggs Act5O was enacted in
response to the apparent increase in drug addiction and the felt inadequacies
of existing penalties.S1 It provided graduated minimum and maximum penalties for repeated violations of the narcotics laws,5 2 and precluded suspension
of sentence and probation on conviction of a second or subsequent offense.
Defendants Gore, Harris and Yancy were sentenced to prison terms in
excess of the statutory maximum for first offenders, but by defining the violation of each statute as a separate offense, the Court was able to reconcile the
sentences with the statute. This approach does violence to the legislative objective of establishing uniform penalties.5 3 The variety of offenses which may be
shaped from a single act, compounded by the court's discretionary imposition
of concurrent or consecutive sentences, yields a complex of variables which
may be arranged in a great number of sentencing patterns. Without disturbing
the sanctity of the trial judge's discretion, greater national uniformity can be
achieved only by limiting the prosecutor to one conviction for each "transaction."
The Boggs Act was amended in 195654 to provide even more severe penalties.5 5 The difficulty of uniformity under the Act is exacerbated by this amendment, since it gives the prosecutor and the judge the power to impose noparole sentences ranging from five to sixty years. Imposition of the current
maximum sentences in the typical multiple offense case 56 would incarcerate
the offender literally for the duration of his life. The statute does not support
the inference that Congress intended this result, for it would render inoperative those sections providing for graduated penalties for repeated violations.
Such a result, moreover, cannot be supported by any modern theory of
penology. To avoid imputing a contradictory and anachronistic intent to
Congress, the present statute should be interpreted as punishing a course of
conduct, for which one punishment only may be imposed.
49

50

See 2 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. SEav. 2602 (1951).

See note 47 supra.

512 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. Ssav. 2603-06 (1951).

52 First offense: two-five years' imprisonment; second offense: five-ten years'; third and
subsequent offenses: ten-twenty years' imprisonment.
53 Gore v. United States, 244 F.2d 763, 766 (concurring opinion).
54 See note 48 supra.
55
First offense: five-twenty years' imprisonment; subsequent offenses: ten-forty years'
imprisonment, with suspension of sentence, probation and parole precluded for all offenders.
56 See note 27 supra.
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So long as the federal courts continue to differentiate multiple offenses by
application of the "same evidence" test, the burden will be upon the defense
to show that Congress intended a single punishment for a single transaction,
or that there is sufficient ambiguity of intent to invoke the "principle of
lenity." The cases indicate that such attempts will probably be unsuccessful.
If, on the other hand, the "same transaction" test were consistently applied,
it would be up to Congress to make clear whether a given transaction, in violation of several statutes, was to be subject to multiple penalties. In the absence
of such clarification, the "same transaction" test would require a single
penalty. It may well be that this is the more realistic approach.5 7 Strict and
exclusive application of either test proceeds upon the assumption that Congress can correct results inconsistent with its intent. Although this corrective
power is theoretically available, the weight and direction of public opinion,
organized pressure groups and traditional policy make it abundantly clear
that Congress will not, as a practical matter, reduce the penalties prescribed
for persons convicted of heinous crimes.
The solution would appear to lie in the application of the "same transaction" test to multiple-law offenses. Since that test would always operate to
reduce the possible range of penalties, defendants would benefit by congressional inaction, and corrective legislation could be directed toward the politically feasible goal of increasing the range of penalties.
57 See Bickel & Wellington, Legislative Purpose and the JudicialProcess: The Lincohl
Mills Case, 71 IARv. L. REv. 17 n.67 (1957).

THE ROLE OF "INHERENT ADVANTAGES"

IN INTERCARRIER COMPETITION

In Wabash R.R. v. CommercialTransp., Inc.,1 the Supreme Court reasserted
the importance of weighing the "inherent advantages" of competing modes
of transportation in applications for certificates of convenience and necessity
before the Interstate Commerce Commission. Commercial Transport, Inc.,
applied for a certificate of public convenience and necessity 2 authorizing the
carriage of cement in bulk between points in Missouri and Illinois. The
application was opposed by five railroads which provided the only available
transportation of cement in that area. Three cement producers who controlled the shipping routes also opposed the application. They testified that
such service was unnecessary and would entail expensive construction of
truck loading facilities.3 The proposed trucking service was supported by the
1 361 U.S. 1 (1959).

2 Interstate Commerce Act, 49 Stat. 551 (1935), 49 U.S.C. § 307(a) (1958).
3One producer appeared by formal petition at the hearing, while agents of two others
testified on behalf of the railroads. Two cement producers servicing the proposed area failed
to appear in any capacity. Commercial Transp., Inc. v. United States, 173 F. Supp. 524,
528-29 (E.D. Ill. 1959).
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Association of General Contractors of Illinois and by a highway construction
firm. Their testimony tended to establish the need for, and advantages of, the
cheaper and more flexible motor carrier mode of transportation. There was
additional testimony to the effect that great quantities of cement would be
required in the near future because of a large highway building program scheduled by the State of Illinois. A joint board4 recommended that the certificate
be granted. This report subsequently was rejected by Division I of the ICC.5
The full Commission upheld the decision of Division I denying the application. 6 On review, a three-judge district court 7 reversed and remanded the case
to the ICC for further proceedings.8 The federal court found that the Commission had heeded the shippers' interests without any consideration of interests of receivers and consignees. The Commission, the court concluded, had
failed to assess the "inherent advantages" of the proposed service to the
public, and thus had acted inconsistently with the National Transportation
Policy.9 On direct appeal the Supreme Court affirmed per curiam without
opinion.10
The phrase "inherent advantages"II is, of course, nowhere defined by Congress. But it is typical of the broad and vague policy pronouncements embodied in the Transportation Act of 1940.12 The ICC has broad discretion to
4 49 Stat. 548 (1935), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 305 (1958).
s Commercial Transp., Inc., 71 M.C.C. 807 (1957).
6 Commercial Transp., Inc., No. MC-104654 (Oct. 3, 1957).
7 Administrative Procedure Act § 10, 60 Stat. 243 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1009 (1958); 28
U.S.C. §§ 1336, 2284, 2321-25 (1958).
8 Commercial Transp., Inc. v. United States, 173 F. Supp. 524 (E.D. Il1.1959).
9 "National Transportation Policy: It is hereby declared to be the national transportation policy of Congress to provide for fair and impartial regulation of all modes of transportation subject to the provisions of this act, so administered as to recognize and preserve the
inherent advantages of each;to promote safe, adequate, economical, and efficient service and
foster sound economic conditions in transportation and among the several carriers; to encourage the establishment and maintenance of reasonable charges for transportation services, without unjust discriminations, undue preferences or unfair or destructive competitive
practices; to cooperate with the several States and the duly authorized officials thereof; and
to encourage fair wages and equitable working conditions-all to the end of developing,
coordinating, and preserving a national transportation system by water, highway, and rail,
as well as other means, adequate to meet the needs of the commerce of the United States, of
the Postal Service, and of the national defense. All of the provisions of this act shall be administered and enforced with a view to carrying out the above declaration of policy." 54
Stat. 899 (1940), 49 U.S.C. preceding § 1 (1958). (Emphasis added.)
10 361 U.S. 1 (1959).

11The phrase was contained in the policy declaration that prefaced the Motor Carrier
Act of 1935, 49 Stat. 543, repealed when the National Transportation Act was enacted.
12 54 Stat. 899 (1940), 49 U.S.C. § 1 (1958). The National Transportation Policy, set forth
as the guide to the Transportation Act of 1940, is the product of a long history of congressional attempts to regulate the nation's transportation facilities beginning with the Interstate
Commerce Act of 1887, 24 Stat. 79. The Transportation Act of 1920, 41 Stat. 456, directed
policy objectives away from a concern with the prevention of abuses towards an affirmative
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interpret and give concrete meaning to the congressional declarations.13 In a
few instances, the Supreme Court has indicated explicitly that the 1940 revisions gave the more positive task to the Commission to assess "inherent advantages" in their proceedings. 14 In the mass of reported decisions, however,
the "inherent advantages" of a particular mode of transportation are seldom
discussed. 15 When competition between two different forms of transportation
occurs-between motor and rail in the instant case-the apparent reluctance

of the Commission to interpret policy should be abandoned more readily, in
light of the express mandate of Congress "to preserve the inherent advantages" of each form of service.
In proceedings on two applications to transport bulk liquids filed pursuant
to the Motor Carrier Act of 1935, the Commission considered this matter and
concluded that motor carriage had "inherent advantages" over rail carriage,
and that shippers of those commodities were entitled to adequate service by
both modes of transportation.16 This position was later reversed when an

application to transport petroleum in bulk by motor carrier was refused, even
though the Commission noted that shipment by railroad did not move as
expeditiously as would the applicant's service. 17 The Supreme Court finally
considered the matter in Schaffer Transp. Co. v. United States,'8 where a Verbuild-up of a system of railways able to handle all the country's interstate traffic. The ICC
was to be guided in its administration primarily by consideration for "adequacy of transportation service." Beginning with the rapid growth of competing modes of service in the 1930's,
Congress extended federal regulation into other kinds of transportation, eventually consolidating the various enactments (excluding air transportation) into the Transportation Act
of 1940.
13 United States v. Detroit & Cleveland Nay. Co., 326 U.S. 236, 241 (1945).
14 McLean Trucking Co. v. United States, 321 U.S. 67, 82 (1944) ("That policy, which is
the Commission's guide to 'the public interest' . . . demands that all modes of transportation.., be so regulated as to 'recognize and preserve the inherent advantages of
each ... '); Eastern-Cent. Motor Carrier Ass'n. v. United States, 321 U.S. 194, 205-06
(1944) ("It [the ICC] became, not merely the regulator, but to some extent the coordinator
of different modes of transportation."); ICC v. Parker, 326 U.S. 60, 68 (1945) ("[T]he
preservation of the inherent advantages of motor carriers is of equal importance with
efficiency under the national transportation policy .... ").
'5 "Notably [the ICC] has shied away from any clear interpretation of the national transportation policy .. " WILLIAMs, THE REGULATION OF RAIL-MoTOR RATE CoMPErrnoN 206
(1958). Williams goes on to point out that the carriers themselves in presenting evidence have
many times failed to point up important policy and issues. In fairness to the ICC, it should
also be indicated that the great load of cases before the Commission gives little opportunity
for an understaffed agency to come to grips with national policy.
16 Columbia Terminals Co., 9 M.C.C. 727 (1938); Edwin A. Bowles, 1 M.C.C. 589 (1937).
17 Bailey Common Carrier Application, 33 M.C.C. 537 (1942). One possible explanation
for the abandonment of the earlier position in this particular case might be found in the
wartime circumstances which favored sound maintenance of the railroads whose service was
never more crucial than in such a period. The loss of important traffic might have led to
abandonment of some rail service.
Is 355 U.S. 83 (1957) (Mr. Justice Frankfurter dissenting).
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mont trucker, with the support of three shippers, six receivers, and a granite
manufacturers' association, was denied a certificate by the Commission in an
area served exclusively by railroads, primarily on a finding that the main purpose of the shippers was to obtain lower rates. 19 The Supreme Court reversed,
noting that the Commission had failed to assess the need for a service having
the advantages possessed by motor carriers. 20 The Court stated specifically
that lower rates were "precisely" the kind of "inherent advantages" which
2
the Commission was to recognize. 1
In Wabash, all the shippers who controlled the routing of traffic testified
that they would not utilize the service. In Schaffer, on the other hand, both
shippers and receivers requested that the certificate be granted. The significance of the instant case would, therefore, seem to lie in the fact that "inherent advantages" were given a broader recognition than in previous cases. 22
This may reflect an effort of the federal courts to increase competition in many
areas now served only by railroads. A line of motor carrier application cases
had established that shipper testimony was the most important single item in
showing public need for a new service. 2 3 A denial of the trucker's application
appeared certain without at least one shipper's backing. The Commission,
furthermore, has been reluctant to grant certificates on the showing of only a
"future" need. 24 The attitude of the Commission was reflected in an article
19 A. W. Schaffer, 63 M.C.C. 247 (1955).
2

0"When a motor carrier seeks to offer service where only rail transportation is presently

authorized, the inherent advantages of the proposed service are a critical factor which the
Commission must assess." 355 U.S. at 89-90.
21In its report on reconsideration, the Commission gave further attention to the "inherent advantages" of motor carrier service, and granted the application. Because of these
superior services, the Commission concluded that the grant was warranted without taking
into account the alleged rate advantage. A. W. Schaffer, 77 M.C.C. 5 (1958).
22
In a case note on the district court opinion stressing the stake of the cement shippers
in opposing the application because of their control over price levels by using stabilized

railroad costs, the writer saw the significant holding of the instant case in a different light:
"The crucial impact of [the] decision is not so much on the rail-motor conflict itself, but on
the vested interest of the producers of cement." 108 U. PA. L. REv. 606, 609 (1960).
23
E.g., Post Norris Express Co., Inc., No. MC-1 10841 (April 30, 1958) (Application
supported bya dissatisfied receiver of limestone via rail, while shipper, onbehalf of opponent,
testified that there were no motor vehicle loading facilities); Harold C. Gabler, 69 M.C.C.
663 (1956); Eldon Miller, Inc., 68 M.C.C. 583 (1956). In neither of the above cases did the
Commission mention "inherent advantages," although both involved inter-carrier competition between railroads and motor carriers.
24 Ray Peake, 68 M.C.C. 45, 49 (1956); George F. Barnett Co., Inc., 64 M.C.C. 400, 402
(1955). Although in the instant case the highway construction program to start in Illinois in
1957 (Commercial Transportation, Inc., applied in 1956) was by no means "indefinite," the
Commission has denied an application for transportation of cement in bulk based on future
public need on the ground that a dam to be built in one of two counties was "too indefinite"
evidence to support a grant. Bangerter Extension, 71 M.C.C. 105, 108 (1957).
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co-authored by the Chairman of Division I, Commissioner Hutchinson.25 In
his extensive treatment of evidence in motor carrier application cases, Commissioner Hutchinson clearly pointed to a result opposite to that reached by
26
the Court.
It would appear that the federal courts, by couching their reversals of
Commission orders in the language of "inherent advantages," may be directing the ICC to reassess its role in the regulation of transportation. 27 Surely
the Commission should not consider itself the maker of policy or the planner
for a particular industry, but a shift from a passive to an active view of its
responsibilities under the Transportation Act now appears desirable. 28 The
result of such a change in attitude would be a more informative presentation
of the "inherent advantages" of the particular modes of transportation by the
competing shippers and carriers in proceedings before the Commission. While
the great bulk of past proceedings were devoid of useful economic evidence,
the Commission would in the future be able to act consistently on the comprehensive showings which the carriers would make in the proceedings. This
would also enable the Commission to decide more efficiently whether the
public need warrants the increased competition. The suggested judicial attitude in favor of increased competition, in the final analysis, indicates that the
"inherent advantages" of a competing mode should be given more weight in
the balancing of statutory transportation policies than previously acknowledged by the ICC.29
Support is given to the above conclusions by two other cases involving the
National Transportation Policy, which were before the Supreme Court in the
1959 Term, and were affirmed per curiam. State Corp. Comm'n. v. Arrow
Transp. Co.30 reasserted the federal courts' insistence that the ICC assess the
"inherent advantages" of each particular mode of transportation. Three
barge lines filed a complaint with the Commission asking it to prescribe ex25 Hutchinson & Chandler, Evidence in Motor CarrierApplication Cases, 11 VAND. L.
REv. 1053 (1958). Chairman Hutchinson participated in the decision of Division I which
denied applicant's bid for a certificate of public convenience and necessity in the instant case.
26 Id. at 1068-73.
27 The Schaffer and Wabash decisions at least should indicate to the ICC a dissatisfaction
with its previous hesitancy to assess the "inherent advantages" of a particular mode in intercarrier competition. There is some indication that the Commission has responded in part to
the new directives. See note 37 infra and accompanying text.
28 The application of restrictive standards by the ICC tends to protect established carriers
against potential competition. See DEARING AND OWEN, NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION POLICY

191-92 (1949) and WILLIAMS, op. cit. supra note 15, at 201.
29 If the Commission wishes to deny competing service in a particular area, it might protect itself from reversal on appeal by entertaining evidence and making findings on the
"inherent advantages," which could be found to be outweighed by other economic policies.
Compare the approach of the ICC in Brooks-Gillespie Motors, Inc., 10 M.C.C. 151 (1938)
(authorizing service), with Kenosha Auto Transp. Corp., 52 M.C.C. 123 (1950) (denying
application).
30 361 U.S. 353 (1960).
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barge rates on grain from Tennessee River ports. Complainants asserted discrimination under the existing rate structure, which permitted the railroads to
charge full local rates for rail shipment of ex-barge grain, while affording more
favorable treatment to ex-rail grain transported from the same ports. The
31
three-judge court reversed the Commission's refusal to change the rates,
32
relying in its opinion on previous decisions forbidding any rate-making device which deprived barge transportation of its "inherent advantage" of
33
cheaper service.
In St. John's Motor Express Co. v. United States,34 a trucker sought a certificate to transport chemicals and acids in the western states. His only competitors were other motor carriers already serving the area. Thus there was
no question of competitive modes or of "inherent advantages." The Commission granted the application on the basis of the expanding requirements in the
western states for use of liquid chemicals. 35 Using the National Transportation Policy and Schaffer as a guide,36 the Commission found that the applicant
had met the requirements of "public convenience and necessity." The order
was sustained by the reviewing federal court, and affirmed per curiam.
These two decisions serve to emphasize first, that the reviewing federal
court, in order to foster and preserve competitive advantage, will set aside a
Commission order which discriminates or fails to assess the competing modes'
"inherent advantages." Secondly, the Schaffer decision has, in at least some
instances, directed the Commission toward a more precise investigation of
what constitutes a sound transportation system in its consideration of appli37
cations to transport goods.
31 Arrow Transp. Co. v. United States, 176 F. Supp. 411 (N.D. Ala. 1959).
-2 ICC v. Mechling, 330 U.S. 567 (1947) (Commission could not lawfully permit the railroads to charge higher rate on ex-barge grain than they charged on ex-rail grain); Dixie
Carriers, Inc. v. U.S., 351 U.S. 56 (1956) (Commission could not permit the railroads to
apply local rates to the handling of ex-barge sulphur where ex-rail sulphur was handled on a
division of joint rate). The Schaffer case was relied on for the general proposition that the
standards prescribed by the National Transportation Policy are binding on the Commission.
Id. at 416.
33 "IT]his case presents another chapter in the conflict between the requirements of the
National Transportation Policy that the provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act be
administered in such a way as to preserve the inherent advantages of water transportation
and the desire of the railroads to offset those advantages by refusing to accord traffic received from a connecting barge line the same treatment accorded to traffic received from
connecting railroads." Arrow Transp. Co. v. United States, 176 F. Supp. 411,415-16 (N.D.
Ala. 1959).
34 361 U.S. 84 (1959).
35 Everts' Commercial Transp., Inc., 78 M.C.C. 717 (1958).
36 "We have, of course, constantly kept in mind our responsibility under the national
transportation policy. It goes without saying that the purpose of the policy must be considered in all proceedings of the character presented." Id. at 765.
37 The most recent acknowledgement of the directive in Schaffer by the ICC was in Best
Transp., Inc., 82 M.C.C. 407 (1960) (application denied on other grounds).
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Although the extension of the "inherent advantages" test in Schaffer and
Wabash should serve the useful purpose of leading the Commission, "despite
its enormous volume of business, to a more detailed and illuminating formulation of the reasons for the judgment that it reaches... ,"38 the responsibility to preserve and foster competition between the various modes is not without a latent ambiguity. The National Transportation Act does not clearly indicate whether Congress intended that carriers be formed into a strongly "coordinated" 39 transportation system or that carriers retain their individual and
competitive character.40 This ambiguity is most apparent in carrier certifica42
tion cases 41 and where railroads seek to establish subsidiary trucking units.
The preservation of the "inherent advantages" of each of the several types of
carriers in competition and the assurance to the shipper of a choice of service
will necessarily conflict on occasion with the advantages to be gained by efficient consolidation internally and externally in a particular industry. Hopefully, however, the increased concern of the reviewing court with the "inherent advantages" of competing modes of transportation-a concern tacitly
43
acquiesced in by the Supreme Court in the Wabash per curiam decision will now suggest to the ICC that it attack the individual case along a broader
front, with the whole pattern of competition freshly in mind.
38 Mr. Justice Frankfurter, dissenting in Schaffer Transp. Co. v. United States, 355 U.S.
83 (1957).
39
See National Transportation Policy, supra note 9.
40
See Mack & Bogue, FederalRegulation of Motor Carrier Unification, 50 YALE L.J.
1376, 1414 (1941).
41 McLean Trucking Co. v. United States, 321 U.S. 67 (1944) (ICC authorized largest
consolidation of motor carriers to date on the basis of improved transportation service and
the Policy; anti-trust legislation held subordinate as a specific expression of objectives);
Association Transp., Inc., 38 M.C.C. 137, 163 (1942) ("The large size of a motor carrier
which would result from a unification alone does not constitute sufficient ground for denial
of application."); But cf. Pacific Intermountain Express Co., 57 M.C.C. 341 (1950), aff'd on
rehearing,57 M.C.C. 467 (1951) (Proposed consolidation of motor carriers denied on basis
that railroad system damaged irreparably by such a grant; "inherent advantages" of railroads assessed).
4
2ICC v. Parker Motor Freight, 326 U.S. 60 (1942) (ICC grant to motor carrier subsidiary
of railway upheld by Supreme Court with vigorous dissent by Mr. Justice Douglas, who
claimed majority opinion affirmed "railroad convenience" instead of "public convenience").
43
Justices Douglas and Black generally support the preservation of free competition
under the Interstate Commerce Act. See McLean Trucking Co. v. United States, 321 U.S. 67
(1944). Mr. Justice Frankfurter, on the other hand, shows a reluctance to go beyond a
section of a statute to determine a possible intent of Congress in its grants to the Commission, and rests his decision on substantial evidence grounds, competitive factors being merely
a portion of the evidence to be weighed. See his dissent in Schaffer Transp. Co., Inc. v.
United States, 355 U.S. 83 (1957).
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STATE TAXATION OF GOVERNMENT CONTRACTORS AND

THE "LEGAL INCIDENCE" TEST

In Livingston v. United Statest the Supreme Court affirmed per curiam,

without opinion, 2 a decision of a three judge district court, 3 enjoining the
collection of South Carolina sales and use taxes from a contractor of the
Atomic Energy Commission.
The Savannah River plant of the AEC was operated and managed by the
du Pont Company under a contract between du Pont and the AEC. Du
Pont's sole fee for its services was to be one dollar. Du Pont was to be reimbursed for all expenses incurred in connection with the project. Funds were
deposited by the government with various banks, and du Pont drew against
these to pay operating expenses. Title to all materials purchased by du Pont
vested in the government when title left the vendor. Section 9(b) of the Atomic
Energy Act4 had expressly exempted the property and activities of the Commission from state taxation. When this provision was repealed,S the South
Carolina Tax Commission took the position that du Pont would be liable for
sales and use taxes on all subsequent purchases. The United States and du
Pont sought, in a three judge district court, 6 to enjoin collection of the taxes.
At issue was the sum of $1,700,000 in South Carolina sales and use taxes. The
court granted the injunction, one judge dissenting. 7 It held that the contract
between du Pont and the AEC constituted du Pont the "alter ego" and agent
of the government and that all purchases by du Pont under the contract resulted in sales to the United States; the United States being the purchaser, collection of the taxes would violate the government's constitutional immunity
to state taxation.8
1 364 U.S. 281 (1960).

2 Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Douglas were of the opinion that probable jurisdiction should be noted.
3 179 F. Supp. 9 (E.D.S.C. 1959).
4 60 Stat. 765 (1946).
5 67 Stat. 575 (1953).
6 Convened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1958).
7 179 F. Supp. at 24.
8 The district court also considered its jurisdiction to enjoin the collection of a state tax
under 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (1958): "The district courts shall not enjoin, suspend or restrain the
assessment, levy or collection of any tax under State law where a plain, speedy and efficient
remedy may be had in the courts of such State." The court assumed jurisdiction on two
grounds. First, it held that § 1341 has been construed not to apply to suits by the United
States, citing United States v. Woodworth, 170 F.2d 1019 (2d Cir. 1948); Board of
Comm'rs of Pawnee County v. United States, 139 F.2d 248 (10th Cir. 1944); City of
Springfield v. United States, 99 F.2d 860 (1st Cir. 1938); and United States v. Okaloosa
County, 59 F. Supp. 426 (N.D. Fla. 1945). Secondly, it noted that South Carolina law provides for payment of tax under protest and a suit for refund. Since it was not certain whether
interest is awardable to the winner of a refund suit, the South Carolina remedy was not
"plain, speedy and efficient," citing Dollar Savings Bank v. United States, 86 U.S. (19
Wall.) 277 (1873). 179 F. Supp. at 11-15.
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This decision raises once more the question of the extent of the federal government's constitutional immunity to state taxation. 9 The immunity doctrine
was first announced in the landmark case of McCulloch v. Maryland.O The
doctrine was subsequently extended to cover a wide variety of situations,"
and the economic-burden test was developed to govern the scope of application of the immunity. Under that test a state tax violated governmental immunity if the economic burden was transferred to the federal government,
12
whether or not the tax was directly levied against the government.
James v. Dravo ContractingCo.13 marked the beginning of the curtailment
of the immunity doctrine and the abandonment of the economic-burden test.
The Court there upheld the levy of a West Virginia gross receipts tax on the
income of a builder who was constructing locks and dams in a navigable
stream under contract with the federal government. In Alabama v. King &
Boozer14 the Court expressly discarded the economic-burden test. It approved
the imposition of an Alabama sales tax on the sale of lumber to a government
contractor, even though Alabama law required the seller to add the tax to the
purchase price, and the government clearly bore the economic burden under
its cost-plus contract with the builder. The Court noted that Alabama law
placed the legal incidence of the tax on the purchaser. The decision turned
upon the identity of the purchaser. Examining the contract between the builder
and the government, the Court found that title to materials did not vest in
the government until they were accepted by a government agent; that all purchases were to be made in the builder's name; and that the purchase contracts
9 For a discussion of state immunity to federal taxation see generally Powell, The Waning
oflntergovernmentalTax Immunities, 58 HARV. L. Rav. 633 (1945); Rakestraw, The Reciprocal Rule of Governmental Tax Immunity-A Legal Myth, 3 OKLA. L. REV. 131 (1950).
10 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
11See e.g., Dobbins v. Comm'rs ofErie County, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 434 (1842) (state income
tax on federal officer disapproved); Bank of Commerce v. New York, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 620
(1862) (tax on bank capital held invalid as to capital invested in government bonds); Telegraph Co. v. Texas, 105 U.S. 460 (1881) (state tax on telegraph messages sent by federal
agent disallowed); Long v. Rockwood, 277 U.S. 142 (1928) (royalties on patents granted by
United States not taxable by states). For a more detailed discussion of the expansion of the
immunity doctrine see Ratchford, Intergovernmental Tax Immunities in the United States,
6 NAT'L TAX J. 305 (1953).
12 The oft-cited case of Pollock v. Farmers Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895), is
thought by some to be the first case applying the economic-burden test to the field of tax
immunities. However that case involved state immunity to federal taxation. For cases applying the economic-burden test to the type of situation presented by the instant case, see
Graves v. Texas Co., 298 U.S. 393 (1936); Panhandle Oil Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Knox, 277
U.S. 218 (1928).
13 302 U.S. 134 (1937). For a detailed discussion of the post-1937 curtailment of the
immunity doctrine, see Powell, supra note 9. For a discussion of the shift in the Court's
attitude toward the immunity doctrine in relation to other innovations of the "Roosevelt
Court," see SMrrr AND MuxRPH', LmERTY AND JusTIcE, A HISTORICAL RECORD OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT, pp. 425-27 (1958).

14 314 U.S. 1 (1941).
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were not to purport to bind the government. On the basis of these findings, the
Court concluded that the government was not the purchaser, and approved
the tax.
In Kern-Limerick Inc. v. ScurlockS5 the Court considered a contract which
"differed [from that in Alabama v. King & Boozer] in form but not in economic
effect on the United States."1 6 Here, too, state law required that the tax be
passed on to the purchaser, but the contract between the government and the
builder designated the builder as purchasing agent for the government and
provided that title to materials would vest in the government whenever it left
the vendor. On the basis of this distinction, the Court concluded the government was the purchaser and disallowed the tax.
The test for the application of the immunity doctrine as established by
Kern-Limerick and King & Boozer is thus one of form rather than substance.
If the state tax statute requires the retailer to pass on the tax to the purchaser
and if the government is the direct purchaser, the incidence of the tax is clearly
on the government and the tax violates governmental immunity.17 If, on the
other hand, a private company does work for the government under contract
and is the immediate purchaser, then the contract is examined; and if it is
determined that the contractor purchases as agent for the government, rather
than for his own account, immunity is violated by the imposition of a state
tax. Thus emerges the "legal incidence" test.
United States v. City of Detroit,'s United States v. Township of Muskegon,19
and City of Detroit v. Murray Corp.20 further limited the scope of the immunity doctrine. In all three cases the Court held that private contractors could be
taxed for the use of government property in performance of contracts with
the government; the Court approved the imposition of a tax based upon the
value of the property. These decisions tacitly overruled UnitedStates v. County
of Allegheny 2 ' which had held that government property interests were not
taxable to the government or its bailee. The Detroit cases thus made it possible for states to impose a property use tax upon government contractors
who utilized bailed or leased government property in performing their contracts, 22 as did du Pont in the instant case.
16 Id. at 119.
15 347 U.S. 110 (1954).
17 Cf. Federal Land Bank v. Bismark Lumber Co., 314 U.S. 95 (1941). Whether or not a
state tax violates governmental immunity will thus depend partly on the form of the state
sales tax statute. These statutes either require, forbid or merely permit the retailer to add the
tax to the purchase price. Of the 33 states and the District of Columbia with sales taxes,
21 place the burden of the tax upon the purchaser. 22 TAx ADMINISTRATORS NEws 73 (1958).
20 355 U.S. 489 (1958).
18 355 U.S. 466 (1958).
21 322 U.S. 174 (1944).
19 355 U.S. 484 (1958).
22 But see Conlon, Some Tax and Revenue Problems of the State, XXXIII STATE GOVERNMENT 114, 120 (Spring 1960). The author advises against state legislation designed to take
advantage of the Detroitdecisions mainly due to uncertainty as to how state courts will construe the decisions.
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Although Livingston does strike down a tax on the ground of constitutional
immunity, it should not be considered a retreat from the Supreme Court's
post-1937 curtailment of the immunity doctrine. The district court applied the
23
"legal incidence" test established by King & Boozer and Kern-Limerick.
Absent in Livingston was the express designation of the contractor as purchasing agent which characterized the contract in Kern-Limerick. Nevertheless the
district court concluded that du Pont bought as agent for the government; and
since the South Carolina statute required the vendor to charge the tax to the
purchaser, 24 the government bore the legal incidence of the tax. The court
noted particularly the purely nominal nature of du Pont's one dollar fee, and
observed that du Pont never bought in its own name nor with its own money
and never took title to the materials. It also felt that the urgency which attended the establishment of the Savannah River plant made it appropriate for the
AEC to constitute du Pont its "alter ego" and agent. The court's reasoning is
open to question from the viewpoint of orthodox agency doctrine. Agent and
independent contractor are not generally differentiated on the basis of magnitude of the fee or urgency of the endeavor. 25 Nonetheless it would seem that
the mode of procurement specified in the du Pont-ABC contract did make
du Pont an agent at least for procurement purposes. Thus the case would seem
to establish that for purposes of application of the Kern-Limerick rule a government contractor need not be expressly designated an agent.
The South Carolina Tax Commission and the dissenting district court judge
sought to bring the case within the scope of the Detroit cases. They argued
that whereas du Pont was not a contractor for profit, as were the contractors
in the Detroit cases, the company, nevertheless, made a profit on sales of its
own commercial products for use in the plant, and also reaped the benefits of
experience and training gained by its personnel while operating the plant. The
court rejected the first contention on the ground that the amount of du Pont's
2
commercial products used was minute compared with total materials used. 6
The second argument has more force. The court rejected it, stating that the
techniques and skills required to operate the Savannah River plant were foreign to du Pont's ordinary field of endeavor and cited du Pont's withdrawal
from the Manhattan Project after the World War II emergency had abated.
23 It is interesting to note that the du Pont-AEC contract antedates the Kern-Limerick
decision, and so could not have been expressly drafted to create immunity under the rule
announced in that case.
24 65 S.C. Code § 1407 (1952). The compulsory pass-on provision was repealed in 1954
(S. C. Acts 1954, No. 644, Part IH, § 15(a) at 1682), and sales taxes after that year were not at
issue since thereafter ".. . South Carolina vendors [had] presumptively paid the tax..
179 F. Supp. at 19 n. 16.
25
See Restatement, Agency § 220(2) (1957).
26
During the period in question total purchases for the Savannah River plant were
$557,085,000. Of these, $1,379,000, less than 1/ of 1%, were commercial products of du
Pont. 179 F. Supp. at 22.
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This rationale is not entirely persuasive. Certainly du Pont would not have
been selected on two occasions when such plants had to be established with
speed and efficiency if these operations were entirely foreign to du Pont's
ordinary commercial activities. By rejecting the theory of the Detroitcases on
grounds of insufficient benefit to du Pont, 27 the court shed some light on the
question of how much benefit must accrue to a user of government property
before he becomes taxable under the Detroit decisions-a question left open
by the Detroitcases themselves. Narrowly construed, the case would seem to
indicate that the benefit must be more than nominal and intangible; but dicta
of the district court would limit the Detroit doctrine to cases where the user
of government property is an independent contractor for profit.
Although the district court correctly applied the "legal incidence" test, the
test itself is open to challenge. Because expenditures by state governments
have continued to exceed income despite increased revenues, 28 most states are
in need of more money from existing sources. At the same time activities of
the federal government are proliferating, so that continued federal-state conflict in the field of taxation can be expected. The resolution of this conflict
is an urgent and complex problem. The "legal incidence" test results in the
application of purely formal standards to this area where public policy should
be a prime consideration. 29 Government officials should not be allowed to
"draw the constitutional line by changing a few words in a contract." 30 Nor
should state legislators be permitted to draw the line by altering statutory
language. A return to the "economic-burden" test would at least supply a
rational element, absent under the present test, to the application of the
immunity doctrine.31 Any solution to the problem must recognize that the
application of immunity involves a weighing of state need against federal
sovereignty-a conflict inherent in our federal system. Although such a guiding principle is abstractly appealing, it is difficult to conceive of any criteria,
short of economic burden, which could be applied by the courts in the resolution of the conflict. In short, there may be no middle ground between "legal
incidence" and "economic burden."
Given this dilemma, one further suggestion might be advanced. The courts
might leave to Congress the entire responsibility for the application of governmental immunity and allow all government contractors to be taxed by the
27 The court might have been able to find du Pont exempt from the South Carolina use
tax on the ground that the South Carolina law defines the taxable use as "incident to ownership" (65 S.C. Code § 1367 (1952)) and du Pont did not have legal title to the property.
Compare 6 Mich. Stat. Ann. § 7.7(5)-(6) (Supp. 1957), which was involved in the Detroit
cases.
28

See Rothenberg, State Budgets 1960, XXXII STATE GovERNMmNT 89 (Spring 1960).

29 See dissent in Kern-Limerick v. Scurlock, 347 U.S. 110, 124 (1954).

30 Id. at 126.
31 See Powell, supra note 9, at 670-71.

328

THE UNIVERSITY OF-CHICAGO LAW REVIEW [VoL 28:323

states where Congress has not expressly prohibited the tax.3 2 It can be argued
that the protection of tax immunity should be invoked only when Congress
feels that it is warranted by the specific case. Congress could likewise make
provision for hardship imposed upon states when they are deprived of revenue
33
by federal governmental activity within their boundaries.
In the instant case, the argument that the tax should have been allowed in
the absence of express congressional prohibition is particularly compelling.
Carson v. Roane Anderson Co.34 exempted from state tax a contractor supplying materials to the AEC Oak Ridge plant, on the basis of section 9(b) of the
Atomic Energy Act.35 The section expressly exempted activities of the commission from state tax. Thereafter Congress repealed 9(b).36 The district court
majority in Livingston felt that Congress merely meant to return the AEC
to whatever tax status it enjoyed under the Constitution.3 7 But an intention
to allow states to tax contractors dealing with the AEC seems at least equally plausible.
32

See dissent in Kern-Limerick v. Scurlock, 347 U.S. at 127.
33Congress has done this in many cases. For a detailed study of such legislation, see
U.S. COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, A STUDY COMMITTEE REPORT ON PAYMENTS IN LIEU OF TAXEs AND SHARED REENUEs (June 1955).

34 342 U.S. 232 (1952).
35 60 Stat. 765 (1946), 42 U.S.C. § 1809 (b) (1952).
36 67 Stat. 575 (1953).

37 179 F. Supp. at 19.

THE OUT-OF-STATE SELLER AND THE LocAL PRIVILEGE TAX

In Berkshire Fine Spinning Associates v. City of New York,' the Supreme
Court dismissed an appeal from a state court decision which, although it
would not seem to be directly supported by any prior full opinion of the
Court, finds authority in previous per curiam decisions of the Court. The
"drummer rule," as formulated in a number of the Court's decisions,2 protects an out-of-state corporation from state taxation imposed on the mere
solicitation of orders. 3 In determining what activity over and above solicita1361 U.S. 3 (1959).
2

E.g., Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing Dist., 120 U.S. 489 (1887); McLeod v. J. E.
Dilworth Co., 322 U.S. 327 (1944); Memphis Steam Laundry Cleaner, Inc. v. Stone, 342

U.S. 389 (1952); West Point Wholesale Grocery Co. v. City of Opelika, 354 U.S. 390 (1957).
See generally Powell, New Lights on Gross Receipts Taxes-The Berwind-White Cave, 53
HARV. L. REV.909 (1940); Strecker, "Locql Incidents" of InterstateBusiness, 18 OHIO ST.

L. J. 69 (1957).
3 Norton Co. v. Dep't of Revenue, 340 U.S. 534, 537 (1951), states the rule as follows:
"Where a corporation chooses to stay at home in all respects except to send abroad advertising or drummers to solicit orders which are sent directly to the home office for acceptance,
filling, and delivery back to the buyer, it is obvious that the State of the buyer has no local
grip on the seller. Unless some local incident occurs sufficient to bring the transaction within
its taxing power, the vendor is not taxable. MeLeod v. Dilworth Co., 322 U.S. 327."

19611

COMMENTS

tion within the taxing state affords a basis for taxation, the Court has sharply
differentiated between taxes which the state has declared to be levied upon
4
the privilege of doing business within the state and taxes taking other forms.
5
Although the economic bases for such a differentiation may be questioned,
it must be respected in any search for precedential authority for unexplained
per curiam dispositions since it has never been repudiated by the Court. Berkshire and its predecessors raise the question of what activities besides solicitation must be engaged in within the taxing state in order to form the basis
for a tax on the privilege of doing business within that state. As recently as
1951, the Court in Spector Motor Serv. v. O'Connor6 declared invalid a state
tax upon the franchise of a foreign corporation for the privilege of doing business within a state when the business consisted solely of interstate commerce.
Spector makes it clear that any local privilege tax imposed upon a foreign
corporation must be based on the company's intrastate activity which is
separable from interstate commerce.
In Berkshire, a Massachusetts corporation manufacturing textiles sought
a refund of taxes paid and a declaratory judgment that its sales proceeds were
exempt from New York City's General Business and Financial Tax7 because
the corporation's activities within the state constituted interstate commerce
exclusively. Determining that the company's activity in New York City could
be separated from its interstate commerce activities, the New York Court of
Appeals held the plaintiff's gross receipts taxable.S
The taxpayer's principal headquarters was in Rhode Island, where deliveries
were made f.o.b. the factory. Its New York offices checked the credit of prospective purchasers, received and banked sales proceeds, arranged for advertising, issued invoices, kept inventory and sales records, directed dyeing according to customer specifications, reported to the Rhode Island home office
on the fabrics required by the New York market, and solicited orders. The
New York staff was authorized to reject, modify, and accept offers to buy.
Accepted orders were forwarded to be filled at a plant or warehouse outside
the state. Office furnishings constituted the corporation's only property in
New York. Of the ninety people employed in the plaintiff's New York offices,
twenty were salesmen.
In distinguishing Berkshirefrom UnitedPiece Dye Works v. Joseph,9 where
4 See, e.g., Spector Motor Serv. v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602 (1951); Northwestern States
Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450 (1958).
5 The same funds normally may be reached by calling the tax an apportioned income tax
rather than a privilege tax. See Roesken, The Impact of the Spector Decision, 29 TAXES 523,
526-28 (1951).
6 340 U.S. 602 (1951).
7 NEW YoRK CITY ADMINISTRATIVE CODE § B46-2.0 (1957).

8 5 N.Y.2d 347, 157 N.E.2d 614 (1959).
9 307 N.Y. 780, 121 N.E.2d 617 (1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 916 (1955).
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the taxpayer was held exempt from the same tax, the New York Court of
Appeals noted that in the latter case the New York office only promoted and
solicited business, whereas Berkshire's offices consummated sales and contracts, sent bills, received payments, and exercised considerable control over
production and credit.10 Because the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal for
want of a substantial federal question, without citation or explanation," it is a
matter of conjecture which activities the Court considered so substantial and
separable from interstate commerce as to deprive the plaintiff of immunity
from state taxation under the commerce clause of the federal Constitution.
The full Supreme Court opinion most arguably supporting the Berkshire
result, and the one relied upon by the New York Court of Appeals, was delivered in Norton Co. v. Dep't of Revenue.12 There the foreign corporation
operated an Illinois retail store which forwarded orders it could not fill from
local stock. These orders were accumulated at the out-of-state factory; then
shipment was made in bulk to the local outlet, saving freight charges for customers and thereby bolstering the seller's competitive advantage in the local
market. The Supreme Court upheld the application of an Illinois privilege tax
insofar as it related to sales in which the customer benefited from these local
services, but denied the constitutionality of the tax on sales in which the order
and shipment bypassed the local store entirely. The Court paid homage to the
continuing vitality of the "drummer rule," but found that it was the retail
store, and not mere solicitation, which was responsible for maintaining the
market.
The Norton decision does not appear to be dispositive of Berkshire.In Norton the Court was impressed with the fact that no source of customer relationship other than the retail store was present. The pure solicitation activities of
Berkshire in New York would seem at least as persuasive an explanation of
Berkshire's New York market as would the additional non-solicitation services rendered. If Norton does not adequately support the result in Berkshire,
two post-Norton per curiam decisions of the Court would seem to provide
direct authority for Berkshire.
Field Enterprisesv. Washington'3 concerned the application of a Washington privilege tax to a Delaware publishing company with its principal place of
business in Illinois. Field maintained a district office in Washington, where it
conducted promotional meetings and classes for solicitors and displayed sets
of books. About 410 salesmen worked out of the office. Employees at the
office did not solicit orders. Stock was kept outside Washington and, except
for the initial down payment, all payments were made to Chicago. Orders
10 5 N.Y.2d at 355, 357-58, 157 N.E.2d at 616, 618-19.
11Mr. Justice Whittaker and Mr. Justice Harlan were of the opinion that probable jurisdiction should be noted.
12 340 U.S. 534 (1951).

13 352 U.S. 806 (1956).
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solicited in Washington were forwarded to Chicago subject to acceptance
there. The books were then shipped directly to the purchaser, f.o.b. Chicago.
Application of Washington's Business and Occupation Tax14 was upheld by
the supreme courts of Washington 15 and of the United States.16
In United States Steel Corp. v. Washington,17 the opinion of the Supreme
Court of Washington, from which appeal was taken, stated: "The sales are
negotiated within the state of Washington, and the fact that delivery is made
direct to the purchaser does not change the nature of the local transaction."1s
There the local office performed credit functions, recorded sales transactions,
kept a bank account, and handled complaints. The sales force forwarded
orders to the manufacturing site for confirmation and then notified customers
that their orders had been accepted. Citing Field, the Washington Supreme
Court concluded: "[I1t appears that the sales activities of the Seattle office of
appellant are decisive factors in establishing and holding the local market for
its goods. Thus, it is subject to the tax." 19 The Supreme Court dismissed an
20
appeal.
In Norton the Court intimated that a local privilege tax may be sustained
whenever a local activity is one of the "decisive factors in establishing and
holding the market." 2 1 The state courts in Field, United States Steel, and
Berkshire appear to have applied this test and to have concluded that the local
activity was the "decisive factor" in holding the market. Surely the "decisive
factor" test cannot be the real basis for the Norton decision, for it would apply
with equal force to local solicitation itself. The problems created by the test
articulated in Norton are illustrated in its application by state courts in Field,
United States Steel, and Berkshire. In each of these cases, solicitation would
22
appear to have been more productive of sales than any other local activity.
If it was merely the channeling of orders through the district office in Field
that was regarded as a separable local incident, then Field overruled Cheney
Bros. Co. v. Massachusetts.23 If the collection activity figured strongly in the
14 WASH. REV. CODE § 82.04.220 (Supp. 1959).

15 47 Wash. 2d 852, 289 P.2d 1010 (1955).

16 352 U.S. 806 (1956).
17 358 U.S. 46 (1958).

Is 51 Wash. 2d 224, 226, 316 P.2d 1099, 1101 (1957).
19 Id. at 225, 316 P.2d at 1100.
20 358 U.S. 46 (1958).
22

21 340 U.S. at 538.

Compare International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S.310 (1945), declaring a foreign
corporation amenable to suit in a state court on the basis of a minimum of business activity
within the state. There is no reason why jurisdiction to tax and jurisdiction for purposes of
service of process should necessarily be coterminous, but it may be that the same activity is
now sufficient for both purposes. Cf. id. at 321, where the privilege of hiring salesmen was
being taxed.
23 246 U.S. 147 (1918).
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Supreme Court's affirmance of Field,then Berkshire,Field, and United States
Steel can be reconciled with Cheney, where no collections were made in the
taxing state. In the Court of Appeals' treatment of Berkshire, the fact was
stressed that agreements of sales were closed in New York City; 24 but, as the
dissenting opinion of the Appellate Division noted, "this circumstance alone
25
has never been made a basis for local privilege taxation."
While it may seem regrettable that the Supreme Court did not avail itself
of the opportunity in Berkshireto clarify the law with a full opinion, a different
result was probably foreclosed by the Fielddecision upholding a local privilege
26
tax on facts more favorable to the taxpayer than those presented in Berkshire.
What is most interesting in this line of cases is that Field was disposed of by
a per curiam affirmance citing Norton as its only supporting authority. 27 The
cases may be readily distinguished on the basis of the services of Norton's
local store. Thus Field,where there was no store involved but only a district
office, possibly represented a substantial extension of prior doctrine. Yet the
Supreme Court, in effect, told the lower court to reread Norton. Perhaps it
was the display of books or the classes for salesmen in Field that provided the
basis for the tax; but that again is only conjecture.
Although a per curiam dismissal or affirmance cannot necessarily be regarded as an adoption of the lower court opinion, 2 8 state court opinions in
these cases provide the only available source of guidance to the bar. Traditionally, the law relating to commerce among the states has required close
supervision by the Supreme Court. In the interests of certainty and uniformity,
the Supreme Court will eventually be compelled to grant to lower courts the
benefit of a considered opinion on the "solicitation plus" situation. In the
meantime, there remains substantial doubt as to which factors besides solicitation and delivery will suffice to render an out-of-state seller subject to local
privilege taxation.
One consequence of this line of cases may be a diminution of the distinctions
between the constitutional limitations placed on income taxation and those
applied to privilege taxation. Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v.
Minnesota29 established the constitutional validity of an apportioned state
income tax upon an out-of-state company engaged solely in interstate com245 N.Y.2d at 355, 157 N.E.2d at 618.
25 6 App. Div. 2d 252, 261, 176 N.Y.S.2d 77, 85 (1958).

26 Appellants in Berkshire attempted to distinguish Field on the ground that Field delivered locally. Brief for Appellants, pp. 13,14,361 U.S. 3. Since Field shipped f.o.b. Chicago,
that distinction seems without merit. Moreover, it has been established that solicitation plus
delivery in the state of destination will not deprive the out-of-state seller of the drummer
rule's shield. Memphis Steam Laundry Cleaner, Inc. v. Stone, 342 U.S. 389 (1952); West
Point Wholesale Grocery Co. v. City of Opelika, 354 U.S. 390 (1957).
27 Ordinarily per curiam affirmance means that the Court thought the appeal entirely
frivolous or else obviously controlled by a prior decision. Note, Supreme Court Per Curiam
Practice:A Critique, 69 HARv. L. REv. 707, 709, 712 (1956).
28 Id. at 715.
29 358 U.S. 450 (1959).
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merce. 30 By widening the range of separable local activities which satisfy the

Spector requirement, the progeny of Norton may call for increasingly similar
results in cases involving a privilege tax on receipts from sales engendered by
local efforts. This trend may be viewed with approval by those who regret the
different standards applied to the two forms of taxation and who deplore the
Court's preoccupation in Spector with the label which the state attached to its
tax. 31
30 Subsequent to the decision of NorthwesternPortlandCement, Congress acted to restrict
the power of a state to levy income taxes on interstate commerce more severely than does the
commerce clause. 15 U.S.C. §§ 381-384 (Supp. 1959).
31See, e.g., Barrett, "Substance" vs. "Form" in the Application of the Commerce Clause to
State Taxation, 101 U. PA. L. REv. 740, 742-43 (1953); Hartman, State Taxation of
Interstate Commerce: an Appraisaland Suggested Approach, 1953 WASH. U.L.Q. 233; 37
VA. L. Rav. 876, 877 (1951).

PRICING POLICY AND CERTIFICATES OF PUBLIC CONVENIENCE
AND NEcEssITY; SECTION 7(e) OF THE NATURAL GAS ACT

The Supreme Court, in Public Serv. Comm'n v. FPClissued the second, and
more extreme, in a series of mandates directing the Federal Power Commission
to scrutinize proposed prices before issuing certificates of public convenience
and necessity to producers of natural gas. Section 7(e) of the Natural Gas Act,
which provides for the issuance of such certificates, does not expressly require
consideration of initial price as an element of what "is or will be required by
the present or future public convenience ...."2 The Commission has generally issued certificates with little or no consideration of price, and has relied
upon subsequent proceedings authorized by the act to correct any unreasonable prices that might exist. The effectiveness of these subsequent proceedings
may be seriously questioned, however, when it is realized that they have not
halted the great rise in gas prices over the last several years. 3
1 361 U.S. 195 (1959).
2 52 Stat. 824 (1938), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 717f(e) (1958). There are two other sections
of the Natural Gas Act of 1938 which provide for determinations of the reasonableness of
rates. Section 4(e), 52 Stat. 822, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 717c (1958), empowers the Commission to inquire into the lawfulness (i.e. justness and reasonableness) of a proposed increase of an existing rate, the burden of proof being on the producer. Under this section, the
Commission may suspend the proposed rate for five months. Beyond that time, the producer
must post a bond to guarantee reimbursement to the consuming public for so much of the
increase as is found to be unlawful.
Section 5(a), 52 Stat. 823, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 717d (1958), permits the Commission
to act on its own initiative to institute hearings to determine whether an existing rate is
"unjust, unreasonable, unduly discriminatory, or preferential" and to fix the "just and
reasonable rate.., to be thereafter observed." This section does not provide for any temporary suspension or possible refund to the public. Furthermore, the burden of proof is on
the Commission to show that the prices are unreasonable.
3 Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., 20 F.P.C. 264, mimeo. ed., pp. 1-7 (1958) (dissenting opinion); Smith, The UnnaturalProblemsofNaturalGas, Fortune, Sept. 1959, p. 120.
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In the instant case, the Commission, acting under section 7(e), granted certificates to twenty-six gas producers who had contracted for the sale of gas
produced in southern Louisiana and offshore areas to Transcontinental Gas
Pipe Line Corporation (hereinafter referred to as Transco). 4 Transco was
unable to supply its customers adequately without additional sources of supply. The prices charged in these contracts were materially higher than those
negotiated in Transco's prior contracts, although they were not found to establish a new "price plateau" in the area. The applicants admitted that the
proposed initial price would result in an immediate general price increase of
approximately two cents per thousand cubic feet, and would "trigger" many
existing contracts to an amount in excess of $5 million in 1959 alone.5 The
court of appeals upheld the order of the Commission, holding that the record
demonstrated that the Commission had given proper attention to the question
of price.6 The Supreme Court in a per curiam decision 7 vacated the judgment
of the court of appeals and remanded to the Commission for reconsideration
in light of Atlantic Ref. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'nS (commonly referred to
as Catco). In Catco, the FPC twice refused to issue a certificate sought under
section 7(e) on the ground that the record was insufficient to support a finding
that the public convenience and necessity required sale at the proposed rate. 9
The producers then informed the Commission that they would not dedicate
the gas to the interstate market unless a permanent certificate was granted
unconditionally at the rate proposed. Upon rehearing, but without additional
evidence, the certificate was issued.10 In reaching its decision, the Commission
noted that "important as is the issue of price.., as far as the public is concerned, the precise charge that is made initially is less important than the assurance of this great supply of gas."" The Supreme Court found the order granting the certificate to be in error and directed that the case be remanded to the
2
Commission for further proceedings.'
While the Court in Catco recognized the need for assuring adequate supplies of gas to an already gas-hungry market, it indicated that the Commis4Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., supra note 3.
5The triggering of existing contracts results from the widespread use of "most favored
nations" clauses.
6Public Serv. Cornm'n v. FPC, 269 F.2d 865 (3d Cir. Aug. 4, 1959) (Hastie, J., dissenting).
7 Public Serv. Comm'n v. FPC, 361 U.S. 195 (Dec. 14, 1959).

8360 U.S. 378 (June 22, 1959), affirming Public Serv. Comm'n v. FPC, 257 F.2d 717 (3d
Cir. 1958).
9 Continental Oil Co., 17 F.P.C. 563 (1957); Continental Oil Co., 17 F.P.C. 732 (1957).
10
Continental Oil Co., 17 F.P.C. 880 (1958).
1Id.at 881.
12 Atlantic Ref. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 360 U.S. 378 (1959).

19611

COMMENTS

sion's handling of the price issue was unsatisfactory.13 In an attempt to
ameliorate the problem of rapidly increasing gas prices, the Court placed the
question of price squarely within the concept of public interest. By so doing,
the Court admonished the Commission that it not only has a rightto give consideration to the reasonableness of price in a section 7(e) proceeding, but that
33 In so deciding, the Court at last forced into retirement a rather dubious rule first promulgated in Hope Natural Gas Co., 19 F.P.C. 405 (1958), and applied in the decisions of all
subsequent producer certificate proceedings. In summary, the rule provided that a producerapplicant could make out a "prima facie" case for unconditional certification at practically
any initial price simply by submitting proof of the "existence of a market" for the gas at that
price and of the "economic feasibility" of the project. Objections to such a rule are numerous. First, and probably foremost, it completely ignores the question of price in determining
whether the standard of public convenience and necessity has been met. See the dissenting
opinion of Commissioner Connole in Transco, 20 F.P.C. 264, mimeo. ed., p. 4 (1958). Second, it places the burden on an intervenor to show that the rates are unreasonable, rather
than placing the burden on the applicant who hopes to benefit from such a price proposal to
prove that the rates are reasonable. The inequity of such a situation is readily apparent when
it is realized that "marketability" and "feasibility" are practically conclusively established
before a producer even files for a certificate, thus placing a monumental burden on an
intervenor to overcome the "prima facie" case. See Brief of Public Serv. Comm'n, p. 8,
Public Serv. Comm'n v. FPC, 361 U.S. 195 (1959). Finally, the entire approach seems to
assume that the prices agreed upon by the contracting parties were competitively determined and therefore "reasonable." In view of the fact that eight producers control about
68% of the nation's natural gas reserves, such an assumption may well be unwarranted.
See Smith, supra note 3, at 123.
It is not completely clear whether in Transco the Commission adopted the Hope rule or
not. It seemingly rejected the rule by explicitly recognizing that price is an element to be considered in determining public convenience and necessity, although "the importance of price
in relation to other elements involved may be materially lessened," and by noting that the
standard of public convenience and necessity "is not a rigid absolute of unchanging content,
to be mechanically applied regardless of the wide diversity of facts presented by different
cases." Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., 20 F.P.C. 264, mimeo. ed., pp. 5, 6 (1958). But
when the time came to consider the price issue, the Commission accepted the findings of the
presiding examiner as fully supported by the facts "which sufficiently satisfy the minimum
standards of law applicable in a case of this kind." Id. at 6. The Commission then echoed
familiar refrains of the Hope rule by noting an absence in the record of any evidence to show
the rates unreasonable, thus implying that the intervenors had not overcome the primafacle
showing by the producer. At this point, the Commission was in a quandary. It was impracticable within the confines of a section 7 proceeding to apply the traditional rate base formula generally used in section 4 or section 5 proceedings to determine whether the rate was
reasonable or not. Nor was there any evidence to establish a reasonable rate if a rate condition were deemed desirable. Id. at 7. In fact, there was great uncertainty as to whether a condition could be imposed at all due to the absence of legal authority. Id. at 8.
The Commission's uncertainty as to its authority to impose price conditions would appear strange in light of Signal Oil & Gas Co. v. FPC, 238 F.2d 771 (3d Cir. 1956), in which
issuance of a certificate conditioned on a downward rate revision was upheld. The Signal
decision was based on explicit language of a 1942 amendment to section 7(e) which provided
that: "The Commission shall have the power to attach to the issuance of the certificate and
to the exercise of the rights granted thereunder such reasonable terms and conditions as the
public convenience and necessity may require." There are, however, several Commission
decisions, both before and after Signal, in which the Commission explicitly refused to consider the imposition of rate conditions. E.g., Re Tamborello, 11 P.U.R. 3d 413 (1955); Hope
Natural Gas Co., 19 F.P.C. 405 (1958).
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it has a statutory duty to do so owing to the inadequate protection afforded
4
the public where relief is limited to a section 5(a) proceeding.'
The court of appeals rendered its decision in Transco after the Supreme
Court had decided Catco. Issuance of the Transco certificate was upheld.1S
Catcowas distinguished on the grounds that in that case there was no showing
of immediate public need, and that the proposed Catco prices set a new price
plateau. Technically, it must be conceded that the Transco prices did not set
new price levels. But this is true only because the Catcoprice literally "became
the floor"16 for subsequent negotiations, including those culminating in the
instant case. In the twelve-month period from the Commission's Catco order
to the reversal by the Supreme Court (June 1957 to June 1958), the Commission issued about six other certificates at the same price level as that authorized
in Catco.17 Since the Commission's orders in those cases were final and no
longer subject to judicial review, the prices for these other sales can be said
to have established the new price level. In this respect, the Transco price does
conform to the prevailing price level in the area. It has been suggested, however, that to confer legitimacy on a Catco descendant by reference to other
Catco progeny, all of which are based on the rejected predecessor, is the epitome of the "bootstrap doctrine," and would, in effect, nullify the remand of
18
the Catco case.
The Supreme Court in Catco ruled that the applicants had failed to establish that "the public served through the Tennessee Gas system is greatly in
need of increased supplies of natural gas."' 9 On the other hand, in Transco
the record established "a large and immediate need for more gas... "20 The
question is whether this is a material distinction justifying a different disposition of the cases. If the court of appeals thought the distinction was a material
one, then it seems to have misconceived the thrust of the Catco decision.
14In the words of the Court:
"It is true that the Act does not require a determination of just and reasonable rates in a
§ 7 proceeding as it does in one under § 4 or § 5. Nor do we hold that a 'just and
reasonable' rate hearing is a prerequisite to the issuance of producer certificates. What we do
say is that the inordinate delay presently existing in the processing of § 5 proceedings requires a most careful scrutiny and responsible reaction to initial price proposals under § 7.
Their proposals must be supported by evidence showing their necessity to 'the present or
future convenience and necessity' before permanent certificates are issued. This is not to say
that rates are the only factor bearing on the public convenience and necessity, for § 7(e)
requires the Commission to evaluate all factors bearing on the public interest. The fact that
prices have leaped from one plateau to the higher levels of another, as is indicated here, does
make price a consideration of prime importance." 360 U.S. at 390-91.
15Public Serv. Comm'n v. FPC, 269 F.2d 865 (3d Cir. Aug. 4, 1959).
16Atlantic Ref. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 360 U.S. 378, 392 (1959).
17
E.g., Southern Natural Gas Co., 19 F.P.C. 558 (1958).
Is Brief of Public Serv. Comm'n, p. 16, Public Serv. Comm'n v. FPC, 361 U.S. 195 (1959).
19 Atlantic Ref. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 360 U.S. 378, 392 (1959).
20 Public Serv. Comm'n v. FPC, 269 F.2d at 868.
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While "public need" is a factor worthy of consideration in determining public
convenience and necessity, it cannot be so considered at the expense of omitting "careful scrutiny" and "responsible reaction" to the price element.
The cases do differ, however, in one important aspect: consideration accorded to price by the Commission. In Catco, the record of Commission proceedings seems to indicate that the Commission realized that the proposed
price was unreasonable, but found other considerations to outweigh that of
price. In Transco, the Commission explicitly recognized that price was an element to be considered in determining public convenience and necessity, but
ruled that the findings of the presiding examiner that the proposed price was
reasonable were supported by the facts and minimum standards of law applicable to a case of that kind. The court of appeals regarded this treatment
by the Commission as sufficient to preclude judicial review of the substantive
decision reached. 21 It may be argued that the Supreme Court's order vacating
this judgment transgressed the realm of administrative discretion. 22 At least
the judicial intervention here is more striking than that in Catco, where no
finding at all was made regarding the reasonableness of price. The absence of
a finding by the Commission in Catco provides a legitimate basis for the reversal; i.e., the Court was saying that the Commission had improperly construed the requirements of section 7(e). But the Court's reversal in Transco,
where the Commission made a finding of reasonableness, appears to have no
basis other than the Court's disagreement with the substantive decision of a
specialized agency.
Perhaps this intervention was necessitated by the fact that the Commission's
order in Transco, if permitted to stand, might nullify the effect of the Court's
Catco rule. Having once demonstrated the degree of control which it was
willing to exercise over the Commission in order to insure adequate scrutiny
of price in section 7(e) proceedings, the Court may have felt it necessary to
reinforce such action by even more extreme supervision. However, these practical exigencies afford justification for the Court's reversal in Transco only
insofar as the policies of Catco are capable of enforcement; and it is questionable whether such policies are in fact enforceable. First, enforcement requires
an agency willing to actively regulate. There are observers who feel that the
21"The weighing of the factors and the conclusions to be reached is a task for the Commission. If the necessary elements have not been considered, the error is one of law and subject to court correction. If they have been considered and the conclusion reached is not
unreasonable, the conclusion stands whether it is one we should have reached or not. That,
in our judgment, is the case here." Id. at 869.
22 For a discussion of the scope of review over administrative agencies generally, see
DAvIS, ADMINIsTRATIvE LAW, ch. 20 (1951); Cooper, Administrative Law: The "Substantial
Evidence" Rule, 44 A.B.A.J. (1958). With particular reference to the FPC, see, e.g., Oklahoma Natural Gas Co. v. FPC, 257 F.2d 634 (D.C. Cir. 1958); Michigan Consol. Gas Co. v.
FPC, 246 F.2d 904 (3d Cir. 1957); Signal Oil & Gas Co. v. FPC, 238 F.2d 771 (3d Cir.
1956).
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FPC has demonstrated a manifest unwillingness to regulate.23 Support for
this observation may be found in the Commission's recommendation that the
Natural Gas Act be amended to eliminate any requirement of certificates of
public convenience and necessity for independent producers. 24 Secondly, even
if the Commission proves willing to comply with the Court's policies, the
nature of the market may render effective regulation impossible. The Commission's disinclination to regulate initial prices of independent producers
would seem to indicate that the Commission believes the prices set by producers and pipeline corporations in their contracts to be reasonable. If there is
actual competition in the market, this conclusion may be sound. It must be
noted, however, that eight gas producers control approximately 68% of the
nation's natural gas reserves.2 5 The Court, in its insistence on price regulation,
appears to assume a non-competitive market.26 Yet if this assumption is correct, perhaps the market position of the dominant producers is such that they
could effectively withstand Commission attempts at rate regulation. What is
to prevent them from withholding their gas reserves if the Commission refuses
to sanction sales at the desired price? By refusing to market the gas at lower
prices and dedicating the gas, to the greatest extent possible, to intrastate
markets, the producers might avoid or defer application of the Catco policies.
In such a situation, it is doubtful if the Commission could remain impervious
for long to the needs of a gas-hungry market. When confronted with this situation in Catco, the Commission granted a certificate at the proposed price,
asserting that there were other factors which might outweigh that of price.
Developments subsequent to, and independent of, the Transco reversal indicate that enforcement of the Catco policies is now possible or at least more
likely than before. The Commission has taken bold steps in initiating a new
pricing policy.2 7 The radical innovation of this new policy is the establishment
of a price standard for each of the gas producing areas.28 The emphasis on a
23 Smith, The UnnaturalProblems of Natural Gas, Fortune, Sept. 1959, p. 122.
24 FPC, Thirty-ninth Annual Report, pp. 18, 19 (1959). This recommendation may be
unwise in view of the fact that the rapid increases in the price levels for natural gas have been
brought about almost entirely by initial contracts for gas entering the market for the first
time. Such contracts may not only establish new rate levels for future contracts to be made
in the area but may also immediately trigger "most favored nations" clauses in already
negotiated contracts containing lower prices. Thus, reliance on a subsequent section 5(a)
proceeding to adjust the rate would be largely futile.
25
See note 13 supra.
26 Compare Smith, supra note 23, with NEUNER, THE NATURAL GAS INDUSTRY: MONOPOLY & COMPETITION IN FIELD MARKETS (1960).
27 Statement of General Policy No. 61-1, issued Sept. 28, 1960, the same day the Commission rendered its decision in Phillips Petroleum Co., Opinion No. 338.
2
8 In deference to the pending Catcoand Transco cases, the Commission did not announce
the price standard for the southern Louisiana and Mississippi areas. It is likely that the
Commission will reaffirm the prices certified originally, because of the certificates based on
the Catco prices issued in intervening proceedings. The orders in these proceedings were not
appealed and are now final.
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fair price for the gas itself, rather than pricing by the traditional rate base
method for each individual producer, may perhaps facilitate a more efficient
and effective regulation of the gas industry. 29 The practical applications of
such a policy seem clear. From now on, a producer-applicant in a section 7(e)
proceeding must file a proposed rate in conformity with the established price
standard of his area in order to receive unconditional certification. If the proposed price is above the area standard, he must submit evidence to justify the
rate. If the Commission is not convinced of the justifiability of the proposed
rate, it will grant a certificate conditioned on the lower area rate, permitting
the producer to file for an increase at some subsequent date under a section
30
4(e) "just and reasonable" rate hearing.
Of course the big producers may still refuse to dedicate their gas to the
interstate market if their proposed price is above the area standard and they
do not accede to issuance conditioned on the lower area price. However, the
Commission's new area pricing policy is an indication that the Commission
will be less willing than it was in the past to certify initial prices establishing
a new price level. No check on rising prices will result if the Commission revises the area standard upward every time a producer proposes a higher price.
But this is unlikely to happen since a prime value of the new policy to the
Commission is that it should save time-a value which would be materially
lessened if the area standard were frequently revised. The success with which
producers may be able to withstand even the most rigorous efforts of the
Commission to hold down prices must be left to speculation. The new pricing
policy makes it appear likely that the Commission will resist rate increases
until market needs and producer ultimatums compel acquiescence.
The combination of the Catco decision and the FPC's new pricing policy
should provide the tools and framework for more effective gas regulation. Perhaps the Court, by reversing Transco, encouraged the Commission to inaugurate the area pricing method when it had been reluctant to do so earlier. If
so, the Court's intervention in the Commission's decision making processes
in Transco may have advanced the policies underlying the Court's decision in
Catco.
29

The increased ease of administration may dispel the alleged reluctance by the Commis-

sion to actively regulate. The enormous backlog of cases confronting the Commission made
it practically impossible to give to price the sort of attention urged in Catco in section 7(e)
proceedings using the traditional rate base method.
30
Note the striking similarity between the new pricing policy and the "threshold method"

proposed by Commissioner Connole in his dissenting opinion in Transco, 20 F.P.C. 264,
mimeo. ed., p. 10 (1958).
EmlNT DoMAIN: INTEREST ON THE AwARD AND JUST COMPENSATION
In a per curiam decision, the Supreme Court dismissed the case of LaPorte
v. New York' for want of a substantial federal question. In so doing the Court
1 361 U.S. 116 (1959).
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has apparently accepted 2 the proposition that continued possession of property by a condemnee after title has passed to the condemnor negates, as a matter
of law, the condemnee's right to interest, or to some other form of compensa3
tion, for delay in payment after taking.
The condemnee had appealed as a matter of right4 from a decision of the
New York Court of Appeals 5 affirming the Appellate Division's reversal 6 of
a Court of Claims decision 7 which had held that to deprive the condemnee of
such interest would violate his constitutional rights under both the New York
and the federal constitutions. The State of New York acquired title to the
condemnee's property by filing an appropriation map with the Albany County Clerk as required by the statute. 8 The statute further required that the
condemnee be personally served with a copy of the appropriation map, but
this was not done until almost two years after the date of taking. 9 The condemnee did not learn of the appropriation for approximately 21 months, and
filed his claim for price and interest shortly before he was officially served
with a copy of the map. Until he filed his claim, the condemnee apparently
remained in undisturbed possession of the condemned property.10 The dispute
arose under section 19(1) of the Court of Claims Act, which provides: If a
claim which bears interest is not filed until more than six months after the
accrual of said claim, no interest shall be allowed between the expiration of six
months from the time of such accrual and the time of the filing of such claim.
The state conceded that interest was due for the first six months after taking
and from the date that the claim had been filed. Interest for the interim period
was the subject of the controversy.
In the court of appeals, it was argued that to deprive the condemnee of
interest for this interim period would violate his constitutional right to just
compensation." In denying, under these circumstances, that interest as com2

See Ulman & Spears, Dismissed for Want of a Substantial Federal Question, 20

B.U.L.REv. 501 (1940); Note, 69 HARv. L. REV. 707, 709 (1956); Annot., 12 A.L.R. 2d 29,

33 (1950).
3 This proposition was the touchstone of the decision in the court of appeals. Without it,
constitutional justification of the result would have been impossible. "Taking" is here used
in the technical sense as occurring at the time at which the owner becomes entitled to compensation. See 2 NIcHOLS, EMINmr DOMAIN 239 (3d ed. 1950).
4 28 U.S.C. § 1257(2) (1958).
5 LaPorte v. State, 6 N.Y.2d 1, 187 N.Y.S.2d 737, 159 N.E.2d 540 (1959).
6 LaPorte v. State, 5 App. Div.2d 362, 172 N.Y.S.2d 249 (1958).
7 LaPorte v. State, 5 Misc.2d 419, 159 N.Y.S.2d 596 (1957).
8 HiGHWAY LAW § 347(5a).
9 The New York courts have generally held that the filing of the appropriation map con-

stitutes taking in the technical sense. Cacciatore v. State, 4 App. Div.2d 928, 167 N.Y.S.2d
454 (1957). See also, 2 NICHOLS, EMNrNT DOMAIN 239 (3d ed. 1950).
10 See text at note 37 infra.
11 Brief for Appellant, pp. 11, 13, LaPorte v. State, 6 N.Y.2d 1, 187 N.Y.S.2d 737, 159
N.E.2d 540 (1959).
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pensation for delay in payment after taking is a necessary element of just
compensation, the Court of Appeals' decision necessarily rested on the premise that possession is the legal equivalent of interest. 12
While it is arguable irrespective of the just compensation question, that the
construction given Section 19(1) violates the condemnee's fourteenth amendment rights to "equal protection"1 3 and "due process,"1 4 it is clear that, if
interest under the facts of the LaPortecase were held to be an element of just
compensation, that construction of the statute would fall on the ground of
lack of reasonable notice alone.15 Thus, it is the interest question that is the
crux of an evaluation of the Court's disposition of the case.
The federal government has long been restrained in its eminent domain activities by the fifth amendment. Until recent years, it appears to have been the
almost universal practice of the government to make the passage of title an
event contemporaneous with payment.16 It was not until the great increase in
public works construction during the depression, and the emergency conditions caused by the World Wars, that the federal government began with any
frequency to take possession of condemned property before the passage of
title.17 The extension of federal constitutional jurisdiction over the eminent
domain activities of the states under the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment has been largely the product of the last fifty years.18 While varie12 Id. at 15, 187 N.Y.S.2d at 747, 159 N.E.2d at 542-43.

13The claimant might well have complained that he was deprived of interest by means of
a construction of Section 19(1) which renders it incompatible with the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment. Specifically, he would have been justified in complaining that he was deprived of interest through the operation of an arbitrary classification of
persons entitled to interest, i.e., those whom the state chose to notify. Under the rule of the
LaPortecase, the fortunate condemnee is entitled to both interest and possession, while his
less fortunate neighbor cannot complain that he, through no fault ofhis own, is entitled only
to posession. Cf. Armour & Co. v. North Dakota, 240 U.S. 510, 517 (1916); Dominion
Hotel v. Arizona, 249 U.S. 265, 268 (1919).
14 The claimant might well have had grounds to complain that his due process rights were
violated by a construction of Section 19(1) which started the period of limitation running
before he had reasonable notice that his claim existed. That construction demanded that he
take action to protect his rights, i.e., the filing of a claim, before he had any reason to be
aware of the event which made protection necessary. See Walker v. City of Hutchinson, 352
U.S. 112 (1956).
Is Ibid.

16 E.g., Bauman v. Ross, 167 U.S. 548 (1897); Shoemaker v. United States, 147 U.S. 282
(1893); Town of Hingham v. United States, 161 Fed. 295 (lst Cir. 1908); United States v.
Nahant, 153 Fed. 520 (lst Cir. 1907).
17 E.g., Jacobs v. United States, 290 U.S. 13 (1933). Compare cases cited in note 16 supra.
ISFor the purposes of discussion herein, it is assumed that the "just compensation" requirement of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment is the same as that of the
fifth amendment. See McGovern v. City of New York, 229 U.S. 363 (1913); Backus v. Fort
St. Union Depot Co., 169 U.S. 557 (1898); Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. v. City of Chicago, 166
U.S. 226 (1896). As late as 1909, however, the application of the fourteenth amendment to
eminent domain questions was not a settled issue, at least in the minds of the writers of the
leading treatises in the field. See LEwis, EmINETrr DOMAIN 21 (lst ed. 1888); LEwis, EMIENT
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gated interest doctrines had been developed under the respective state constitutional restraints before the extension of federal jurisdiction,19 these appear to
havebeen as unsophisticatedas were the methods for the exercise of eminent domain of the period. As a result, it is not surprising to discover that the right
to interest as an element of just compensation has not been fully defined by
the Supreme Court.
Jacobs v. United States, 20 is one of a line of cases 21 in which the Supreme
Court held that interest or some other form of compensation for delay in payment after taking is a matter of constitutional right, not of judicial discretion.
Interest is generally awarded in the absence of proof as to the actual use value
of the property taken. 22 However, none of these cases make clear the theory
behind the awarding of interest as opposed to some other measure of compensation.
24
In United States v. Rogers23 and SeaboardAir Lines Ry. v. United States,
the Supreme Court laid down the rule that, for constitutional purposes, the
condemnee's right to interest accrues upon taking. The Seaboardrule's corollary-that the right to interest does not accrue before taking-was established
in Shoemaker v. United States.25 The grounds of the latter decision were twofold: that there had been no taking, title and possession remaining in the condemnee; and, that while the condemnee had been subjected to some inconveniences before taking, these were presumed to have been considered and
allowed for in fixing the amount of the compensation. 26 The principle is now
well settled that if payment occurs concurrently with or before taking, interest
if any, is a matter of legislative grace. 27
The Shoemaker case, though conceding that the property owner was inconDOMAIN 23 (2d ed. 1900); LEwis, ErmENT DoMAIN 22-23 (3d ed. 1909); MLus, EmqErw
DomAIN 365 (1st ed. 1879); MiLLs, EMNENT DOMAIN 531 (2d ed. 1888); RANDOLPH, EMiNENT
DOMAIN 33-34 (1894).
9
1 See 1 ORGEL, VALUATION UNDER THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN 28-31 (2d ed. 1953).
20 290 U.S. 13 (1933).
21

E.g., Brooks-Scanlon Corp. v. United States, 265 U.S. 106 (1924); Annot., 36 A.L.R.2d
337, 428 (1954).
22

For a discussion of the confusion which persists as to the constitutional basis and
rationale of interest as a measure of just compensation for delay in payment, see Note, 38
N.C.L. Rnv. 89 (1959).
23 255 U.S. 163 (1921).
24 261 U.S. 299 (1923).
25 147 U.S. 282, 321 (1893). Accord, Bauman v. Ross, 167 U.S. 548, 598 (1897).
26 The Shoemaker case has been cited as holding that the right to interest was negated by

the condemnee's continued possession after taking.E.g., 3 NIcHOLS, EMInm-r Doz4IN 11112 (3d ed. 1950). The court of appeals in the instant case cites Shoemaker as so holding.
6 N.Y.2d at 7, 187 N.Y.S.2d at 741, 159 N.E.2d at 542. For a contrary view see Nichols,
Interest on Condemnation Awards, 1 LEGAL NorEs ON LOCAL GovERNmENT 3, 4 (1936).
27 See generally 3 NicHoLs, op. cit. supra note 26, § 8.63 (1).
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venienced merely by the filing of the condemnation action, did not consider this
28
a decisive argument for the payment of interest. In Brown v. United States,
Mr. Chief Justice Taft went further, recognizing the inconveniences to which
a property owner may be put when his property has been, for practical purposes, frozen in a condemnation proceeding, and indicated that the Court
could not say that interest given prior to taking was not just compensation.
Although the case may be dismissed as being grounded on the Conformity
Act 2 9 and, thus, the result of a federal attempt to accommodate state law,30
Brown nonetheless serves to point up the lack of conceptual clarity regarding
the rationale of interest as an element of just compensation.
Finally, the Court has expended a considerable amount of effort in attempting to clarify the rationale of the use of interest as a measure in condemnation
awards. Most of this discussion has been presented against the background of
the rule that interest does not run upon claims against the government in the
absence of contract or statute. It has been argued that the interest that is a
necessary element of just. compensation is really not interest in the technical
sense but a convenient way of evaluating the injury to the condemnee incident
to delay in payment. 31 United States v. Hotel C0.32 made the constitutional
basis of the interest award clear by holding that just compensation and
attendant interest were words of art only when used with regard to eminent
domain questions; 33 but when the term "just compensation" was used out of
the eminent domain context it did not include interest. Furthermore, it seems
clear that the statutory rate of interest does not always represent just compensation in the eminent domain context, although it would be conclusive as
to the rate of interest on ordinary interest-bearing claims. 34
The theory has been suggested that, upon taking, the owner becomes a
money creditor of the condemnor and thus is entitled to interest on the money
owed to him.35 However, the recognized relationship between the value of use
and the rate of interest seems to undermine the validity of such an analysis.
A more plausible, if less elegant, explanation of the interest award is quite
simply that it is a convenient measure. This view explains the general absence
of a carefully discriminating choice as to the rate of interest that will compen28 263 U.S. 78, 86 (1923).
29 25 Stat. 357 (1888).
30 See Danforth v. United States, 308 U.S. 271, 285 (1939).
31See Shoshone Tribe v. United States, 299 U.S. 476 (1937); Smyth v. United States, 302
U.S. 329 (1937); United States v. Klamath Indians, 304 U.S. 119, 123 (1938); Nichols,
Interest, supra note 26 at 4.
32 329 U.S. 585, 589 (1947).
33 See also United States v. Tillamooks, 341 U.S. 48, 49 (1951).
34
See A. F. & G. Realty Corp. v. City of New York, 313 U.S. 540 (1941), affirming per
curiam Matter of City of New York (Bronx River Pky.), 284 N.Y. 48, 54, 29 N.E.2d 465,
468 (1940).
35 1 ORGEL, VALUATION UNDER THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN, 20-24 (2d ed. 1953).
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sate the owner for loss of the use of his property.36 It also explains the relatively unsophisticated process of mixing of measures when the condemnor is
allowed to set-off rents and profits received by the condemnee during the interest period. 37 The set-off practice and occasional substitution of a rate of
interest different from the statutory or customary rate further suggests that
interest, the convenient measure, is to be automatically employed only when
the parties do not choose to attack its fairness.
The theory under which interest has become the recognized measure of just
compensation for delay in payment is of considerable importance in considering the LaPortedecision. If interest and possession are considered legal equivalents for the purpose of determining just compensation for delay in payment
it would seem to follow that continued possession after taking would negate
the right to interest. The Supreme Court has never held that such possession
is the automatic equivalent of interest,3s but even if that conclusion is accepted, the result in LaPorteappears to fall short of just compensation.
There are, to be sure, sound bases for the conclusion that beneficial use may
be adequate compensation for delay in payment. Where income producing
property is involved, it can readily be seen that the condemnee who received
both his full rents and interest on his award might be receiving something
more than just compensation. The property taken in LaPorte was a thirty
foot strip of unimproved land for which the owner was admittedly entitled
to fair value at the time of taking, and interest or some other form of compensation for delay in payment. No evidence was introduced on either side as to
the value of the use of the property. Indeed, the fact of possession was not
alleged or proved, but was determined by judicial inference. 39 The property
was not income producing, so that any value which the owner received therefrom had to come in the form of price appreciation. He was deprived of any
such appreciation during the period in dispute by the fact that title had already passed to the State of New York. Thus, it would seem that the Court
in LaPortewas lacking in a practical as well as legal justification for equating
possession with interest in relation to the just compensation question.
However, the failure here is as such one of the form of the statute as it is
of the content of the decision. The condemnation procedure followed was, no
36Ibid.

37 Id. at 29 n.41, 30 n.42.

38 Nor is the decision of the Court of Appeals supported on this point by New York law.
See In the Matter of City of New York (Newton Ave.) 219 N.Y. 399, 407-408, 114 N.E.
837, 838-39 (1916); Chiarella v. State, 162 Misc. 232, 238, 294 N.Y.Supp. 243, 250 (Ct.
Cl. 1937), aff'd 252 App. Div. 358, 300 N.Y.S. 281 (1937); In the Matter of the Mayor of
New York, 40 App. Div. 281, 58 N.Y.Supp. 558 (1899); ORGEL, op. cit. supra note 34, at

28 n.38.
39 It has been argued that the absence of a judicial determination of the value of possession renders the decision inconsistent with constitutional guarantees. Note, 12 SviAcusE L.
REv. 90, 91-92 (1959).
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doubt, designed to avoid many of the most discussed problems in the eminent
domain field. Demands of buyers that the state's condemnation plans be made
available to them in order to prevent useless purchases of, and investments
in, land about to be condemned are satisfied. Likewise owners are protected
against declines in the market value of their property precipitated by the
state's announcement of its intent to purchase. The filing of the map concurrently with passage of title serves these purposes. By the same device, the state
is protected against market increases in the value of property due to its announced plans, since title passes with the filing.
Prior to the adoption of the provision for passage of title upon filing of the
map, the property owner was forced to bear the risk of decline in market value
after filing. The filing of the map under those circumstances amounted to a
declaration of intention, but certainly not a "taking" in the technical sense.
Nonetheless for most practical purposes the owner's property was frozen
since the filing of the map served to inform all potential purchasers of the
planned condemnation.
Thus, while LaPorte is demonstrative of one method of dealing with some
of the problems created by advance planning on the part of the state, the case
brings into sharp focus a number of other problems which would not have
appeared had not the statute by its form sprung the technical trap of a "taking" upon the filing of the map. The question presented is one of the responsibility of the condemnor for losses incurred by the freezing for a lengthy period
not only of the alienability of property, but of its use as well. In the ordinary
declaration of intention situation, the property owner has no recourse against
the potential condemnor. Under the New York statute, however, if the owner
is given notice, he has the choice of forcing the state to pay him immediately
or of remaining in possession until the state takes actual possession. The effect of LaPorteis to make it unnecessary for the state to give notice to the property owner; in the event that the state fails to do so it is not obliged to pay
interest on the award, at least in the absence of a showing of damage on the
part of the property owner. Yet the converse "presumption" will be found in
just compensation doctrine, i.e., the property owner should receive interest in
the absence of a showing of no damage by the condemnor.40 It is with these
problems that the New York court failed to deal,41 and it is these same problems with which the constitutional concept of just compensation in its present
form is unable to cope.
LaPorte points up that the rules for determining just compensation were
40

See text accompanying note 22 supra.
41 The New York legislature likewise demonstrated some lack of awareness of the interest
problem in that the Highway Law was amended to make title pass upon filing and before
notice to the condemnee. The legislature also amended the Court of Claims Act section
10(1) in order that the statute of limitations on the award would not qommence to run until
notice had been given the condemnee.
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neither sufficiently delineated, nor sufficiently clear, to be applied readily to
the situation produced by the relatively sophisticated procedure for taking
employed in this case-the filing of a map. That procedure, while more sophisticated, is, nonetheless, reminiscent of procedures used in colonial America before the development of the constitutional restraints which now control the
taking of private property.42 The development of the constitutional doctrine
of just compensation was paralleled for the first hundred years or more by an
increasing complexity in the procedures required to effect taking. 43 In recent
years, however, those procedures have been greatly streamlined. LaPorte, it
may be argued, is demonstrative of the absence of a complementary development in the doctrine of just compensation.
42

See generally 1 NIcHoLS, EMiNENT DOMAIN, 39-50 (3d ed. 1950).

43 Ibid.

III. DECISIONS EXPLAINED BY THE COURT
WRONGFUL DEATH IN ADMIRALTY AND THE "TUNGUS"

A INORITY

OF

DocTRINE:

FivE

In Goett v. Union CarbideCorp.' the Supreme Court reaffirmed the doctrine
of The Tungus v. Skovgaard,2 which had declared that state law governs wrongful death cases occurring upon navigable waters within the territorial jurisdiction of the states. However, the division of the Court in Goett suggests an
uncertain future for the Tungus doctrine.
Union Carbide Corporation was the owner of an unmanned tank barge
which was delivered to the Amherst Barge Company for repairs and improvements. Goett, an employee of Amherst, was sandblasting the deck of the barge
when he fell into the Kanawha River and was drowned. The barge had no
railing around its deck and carried no rescue equipment. The decedent's administratrix brought a libel in admiralty against the owner of the barge, alleging that the lack of rescue equipment caused the decedent's death and that
the barge was unseaworthy without rescue equipment or, alternatively, that
Union was negligent in delivering the barge to Amherst without such equipment. The death occurred within the navigable waters of West Virginia and
3
the libelant relied upon that state's Wrongful Death Act.
The district court found that the barge was unseaworthy, that Union was
1 361 U.S. 340 (1960).

2 358 U.S. 588 (1959).

3 W. Va. Code 1955, §§ 55-7-5, 55-7-6, 55-7-8. The Jones Act, 41 Stat. 1007 (1920), 46

U.S.C. § 688 (1958), did not apply since decedent was not an employee of the vessel; the
Death on the High Seas Act, 41 Stat. 537 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 761 (1958) did not apply because the death did not take place beyond one maritime league from the shore of any state.
The administratrix had the right to compensation from decedent's employer, Amherst, under
the Longshoremen's and Harborworkers' Compensation Act, 44 Stat. 1424 (1927), 33 U.S.C.
§§ 901-50 (1958), but could elect to sue the barge's owner as a third-party tort feasor.
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negligent, causing the decedent's death, and that the decedent was not shown
to have been guilty of contributory negligence or to have assumed the risk.
The court of appeals 4 reversed the judgment holding that it was unnecessary
to decide whether a wrongful death claim could ever be based upon unseaworthiness under the West Virginia act because decedent was not entitled to
the warranty of seaworthiness, and, in any case, the barge was not unseaworthy; the circuit court further held that Union owed no duty to the employees of Amherst once the barge had been delivered to Amherst, whose responsibility it was to supply its own employees with a safe place to work.
Speaking per curiam, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment and remanded to the court of appeals to determine (a) whether the West Virginia
Wrongful Death Act, as to a maritime tort, employs the West Virginia or the
general maritime concept of negligence, (b) whether in the light of that determination, the district court's finding as to negligence is correct, and (c)
whether the West Virginia Wrongful Death Act incorporates the doctrine of
unseaworthiness. The case had been decided below before the decision of The
Tungus. In the absence of clear expression, the Court felt that it was "highly
doubtful" whether the court of appeals had applied state law. 5
The division of the Court in Goett is an enigma. The Chief Justice and Justices Black, Douglas and Brennan, all of whom dissented in The Tungus, join
the majority opinion in Goett "solely under compulsion of the Court's ruling"
in The Tungus. They note explicitly their "continued disagreement" and "reserve their position as to whether it should be overruled." 6 This leaves Mr.
Justice Clark as a "majority of one, ' 7 i.e., the only justice to support both the
result in Goett and its supposed rationale, the Tungus doctrine. Neither the
dissent of Mr. Justice Harlan,8 joined by Mr. Justice Frankfurter, nor that of
Mr. Justice Stewart, 9 represents a change in their previous positions. They
merely state that remand is pointless in the absence of any showing that West
Virginia law imposes duties greater than the general maritime law. In addition, Mr. Justice Stewart finds reasons for believing that the court of appeals
did apply "state law" (i.e., that the court of appeals believed that the act encompasses federal maritime law).10 Paradoxically, their dissents in Goett demonstrate continued support of The Tungus to the same extent that the vote of
four of the majority demonstrate continued opposition. It is the dissent of Mr.
Justice Whittaker that is surprising; although he was with the majority in The
Tungus, he now takes a position that seems to depart from that ruling.
Union Carbide Corp. v. Goett, 256 F.2d 449 (4th Cir. 1958).
361 U.S. at 343.
6361 U.S. at 344 n.5.
7 This is the second time that Mr. Justice Clark's unique view has determined the result in
an admiralty case. See Maryland Casualty Co. v. Cushing, 347 U.S. 409 (1954). See also
4

5

Comment, 22 U. Cm. L. Rsv. 550 (1955).

8 361 U.S. at 344.

9 361 U.S. at 348,

10 361 U.S. at 345.
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Since Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen"'and Chelentis v. Luckenbach S. S. Co.12
it has been well established that the constitutional grant to the federal courts
of judicial power over admiralty 3 means the supremacy of federal maritime
law even when a maritime case is brought in a state court under the "saving to
suitors clause" of the implementing congressional legislation.' 4 Thus in Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique15the Court vacated a judgment
which had employed distinctions of state law concerning licensees and invitees
to deny recovery, and held that the governing federal maritime law did not
employ such distinctions stating that this result would be the same even "if
this action had been brought in a state court."1 6 Long before the appearance
of the federal supremacy doctrine, The Harrisburg7 had established the principle that admiralty provides no remedy for wrongful death; to fill this gap
admiralty will apply the wrongful death statutes of the various states.' 8
In The Tungus, Mr. Justice Stewart, writing for a majority of five, restated
this traditional position. He declared that the power of the state to create a
remedy includes the power to determine when the remedy shall be permitted,
and that an admiralty court adopting a state remedy must apply the remedy
in accordance with state law.19 The opinion relied upon precedent; 20 no policy
argument was made.2 1 But, for the first time in its long history, the traditional
position was attacked. The "federalist minority," Mr. Justice Brennan, joined
by Justices Black and Douglas and the Chief Justice, pointed out the paradox
11244 U.S. 205 (1917).
16 Id. at 628.
12 247 U.S. 372 (1918).
17 119 U.S. 199 (1886).
13 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2.
15 The Hamilton, 207 U.S. 398 (1907).
14 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1958).
19 358 U.S. at 593.
15 358 U.S. 625 (1959).
20
In addition to The Harrisburg, the authorities upon which Mr. Justice Stewart's position rests are: The Hamilton, 207 U.S. 398 (1907); The La Bourgogne, 210 U.S. 95 (1908);
Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia, 257 U.S. 233 (1921); Levinson v. Deupree, 345 U.S. 648 (1953).
21 The argument could be made that, at least in regard to non-seamen, the states have a
stronger interest than maritime law in fashioning remedies and duties applicable to wrongful
deaths occurring within their territorial waters. In these cases most plaintiffs and libelants
would be citizens of the state whose wrongful death statute was to be applied (in sharp
contrast to the beneficiaries of seamen). Mr. Justice Harlan has stated that: "Where tortious
conduct causes death, the decision of a State to provide a right of action in favor of the victim's estate or beneficiaries represents a response to considerations peculiarly within traditional state competence: providing for the victim's family, and preventing pauperism by
shifting what would otherwise be a public responsibility to those who committed the wrong.
These are matters intimately concerned with the state's interest in regulating familial relationships." Hess v. United States, 361 U.S. 314, 332 (1960). See also Currie, Federalism and
the Admiralty: "The Devil's Own Mess," 1 Sup. CT. REv. 158 (1960). But the difficulty in
connecting such an interest analysis with a position based on precedent is that the same
argument here used to justify the status quo in wrongful death cases could be used to justify
the extension of state law to cover personal injury cases, an extension which would require a
radical rearrangement of the present structure, and would clearly be contrary to established
precedents. No member of the Court contends that the primary jurisdiction is not federal
and that the "adoption" of the state statutes is not a matter of federal permission.
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arising from the doctrine:22 If a non-seaman is injured upon the navigable
waters of a state, then federal maritime law applies; but if he is killed, then
state law applies. The requirement of a seaworthy ship establishes a federal
maritime duty not to kill as well as a federal maritime duty not to injure. A
remedy for a wrongful death occurring within admiralty jurisdiction should
give the decedent's beneficiary the rights which arise from the breach of this
duty. Admiralty, Mr. Justice Brennan contended, is capable of fashioning an
appropriate remedy.
From the practical viewpoint of libelants, the significance of The Tungus is
its bearing upon whether state law will be so applied as to make the decedent's
contributory negligence a bar to recovery (in contrast with the admiralty doctrine of comparative negligence); and whether the various state wrongful
death statutes will be interpreted to allow unseaworthiness as a basis for recovery. In The Tungus these questions were not directly in issue. The district
court had dismissed the libel brought by the deceased harborworker's administratrix, holding that recovery could not be based upon unseaworthiness
under the state wrongful death act. 23 The court of appeals reversed,2 4 advancing the questionable proposition that the New Jersey Wrongful Death Act
encompasses the federal maritime law (which in turn applies the state remedy
to fill the gap in admiralty). 25 The Supreme Court declined to disturb the
lower court's interpretation of New Jersey law. On its facts, Goett could have
raised such issues. The possibility has been eliminated; on remand the Fourth
Circuit held that West Virginia's Wrongful Death Act also encompasses fed26
eral maritime law.
Goett, along with its companion case, Hess v. United States,27 is the child of
The Tungus. While Hess probes some of the consequences of the parent case, 28
22 358 U.S. at 597 (separate opinion).
23 141 F. Supp. 653 (1956).

24 252 F. 2d 14 (1957).

25 Questionable or not, the proposition seems to be growing in fashion. See e.g., Union

Carbide Corp. v. Goett, 278 F.2d 319 (4th Cir. 1960); Halecki v. United Pilots Ass'n, 251
F.2d 708 (2d Cir. 1958); Skovgaard v. The M/V Tungus, 252 F.2d 14 (3d Cir. 1957). However, other circuits have held that the state wrongful death acts do not furnish a cause of
action under the Federal maritime law: e.g., Graham v. A. Lusi, Ltd., 206 F.2d 223 (5th Cir.
1953); Lee v. Pure Oil Co., 218 F.2d 711 (6th Cir. 1955). For technical arguments that the
state death acts do not encompass federal maritime law, see Kolins & Cecil, Maritime Torts
Resulting in State TerritorialWaters, 26 INs. COUNSEL J. 567 (1959). It is often said that the
state wrongful death acts create a new cause of action in the statutory beneficiaries. E.g.,
PROSSER, TORTS § 105 (2d ed. 1955).

26 Union Carbide Corp. v. Goett, 278 F.2d 319 (4th Cir. 1960).
27 361 U.S. 314 (1960).
2S In the Hess case the issue was the constitutionality of the right of action for wrongful
death created by the Oregon Employers' Liability Law which created a stricter standard of
duty than does the federal maritime law. Mr. Justice Stewart wrote the opinion and, followig The Tungus, found the Oregon act constitutional. The Chief Justice and Justices Black,
Douglas and Brennan joined "solely under compulsion" of The Tungus. Mr. Justice Harlan,
joined by Mr. Justice Frankfurter, first reaffirmed his view that "where the duty imposed by
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Goett, particularly in the light of Mr. Justice Whittaker's dissent, indicates
that the parent case may soon be overruled.
Mr. Justice Whittaker's view is that maritime law is remedially supplemented by state wrongful death acts, but that the characteristic features of
maritime law define the conditions of the remedy. The court of appeals, he
concluded, properly applied the West Virginia statute in this connection. At
first sight, his position is difficult to distinguish from that of the dissent in The
Tungus; there seems to be a minority of five. The puzzle was dryly noticed by
the court of appeals when it considered the case on remand: "This brings him
[Mr. Justice Whittaker] close to the position of the four justices who dissented
in [The Tungus]... and concurred 'under compulsion' in Hess and Goett.
It is not for us to resolve this problem." 29 But Mr. Justice Whittaker insists
that there is not a word in the Tungus decision that is contrary to his position.30 Furthermore, he criticizes the position of the "federalist minority" in
Tungus. Whereas he would have admiralty adopt the state wrongful death
statutes, he feels that the federalist minority "said, in effect, that admiralty
would merely look to see whether the state had enacted a wrongful death
statute and, if it had, would.., put it aside and fashion its own remedy for
wrongful death."31
Although his own position is somewhat vague, Mr. Justice Whittaker may
have clarified the concept employed by the federalist minority. It was clear
that the dissent in The Tungus did not advocate overruling The Harrisburgand
either creating a new admiralty remedy, or fashioning one by analogy to the
Death on the High Seas Act.32 But prior to Mr. Justice Whittaker's dissent in
a state death act is no greater than that already existing under federal law, the application of
the statute is solely, or nearly so, a reaction to strong, localized state interests, and there is no
real encroachment on federal interests." 361 U.S. at 333. But he then went on to declare that
the fact that the federal maritime law permits the state to create a right of action that is not
stricter than the federal maritime law, does not mean that it should permit a stricter standard
to be applied. See generally Currie, supra note 21, at 186-207.
29 Union Carbide Corp. v. Goett, 278 F.2d 319, 321 (4th Cir. 1960).
30 Technically The Tungus did no more than affirm the circuit court's decision that the
New Jersey statute incorporated the federal maritime law. It is difficult, however, to agree
that there is "not a word" in that decision contrary to Mr. Justice Whittaker's position. The
test, of course, would be the review of a decision in which a wrongful death act had been
applied so as to restrict federal maritime law. Presumably Mr. Justice Whittaker would vote
for reversal and Mr. Justice Stewart for affirmance.
3' 361 U.S. at 348.
32 41 Stat. 537 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 761 (1958). For the suggestion that the Court should
have fashioned a remedy by analogy to the Death on the High Seas Act, see Currie, supra
note 21, at 195. The Death on the High Seas Act provides that it shall not apply to deaths
on waters within the territorial jurisdiction of the states. However, since Congress has established a remedy for wrongful death upon all navigable waters except the territorial waters of
the states, it would indeed seem like judicial legislation for the Court to fashion a remedy for
the remainder without looking to state law even for an analogy. Mr. Justice Stewart regards
the Death on the High Seas Act as demonstrating concern that "the power of the States to
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Goett it was not clear whether the dissent in The Tungus proposed to fashion a
federal remedy by analogy to state law or to apply state statutes remedially.
The federalist minority have precedent, in Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills,33
for their position that federal courts can fashion a body of law by analogy to
state law. Even more suggestive is the long standing admiralty practice of
applying state statutes of limitation by analogy to determine whether a claim
has become barred for laches, and allowing the claim even if the applicable
statute has run if the delay was excusable and resulted in no prejudice to the
defendant.34 In wrongful death cases, to fashion a remedy by analogy would
seem to mean that federal maritime law would govern the cause of action but
that the state scheme of beneficiaries would be utilized, thereby avoiding the
necessity of overruling The Harrisburg.Neither the federalist minority nor Mr.
Justice Whittaker suggests a recommended disposition of ceilings on the
amount of recovery which the state wrongful death acts now impose.
Unless there is a submerged disagreement here, the two positions would
seem to accomplish the same result. From the point of view of the libelant,
either fashioning by analogy or the application of state acts remedially would
accomplish the same result of insuring that a claim can be based upon the
rights created by the federal maritime law. Therefore, the question remains:
Why did not the five coalesce to form a majority?
Insurance lawyers might suspect that the new remedy which the federalist
minority proposes to fashion would work to the advantage of plaintiffs and
libelants; but Mr. Justice Brennan does not advance this as an argument for
change. Nor does Mr. Justice Brennan develop an argument that any imporcreate actions for wrongful death in no way be affected by enactment of federal law," The
Tungus v. Skovgaard, 358 U.S. at 593. Mr. Justice Brennan replies that the "effect of Congress' action was to leave the state statutes available as remedial measures," 358 U.S. at 608;
but that it offers no guide as to what substantive law (maritime or state) is to apply under the
state acts. He concludes that: "It is odd to draw restrictive inferences from a statute whose
purpose was to extend recovery for wrongful death." Ibid. Mr. Justice Harlan in his dissent
in Hess v. United States, 361 U.S. 314, 330-31 (1960), joined by Mr. Justice Frankfurter,
indicates that he sides with Mr. Justice Brennan on this point.
33 353 U.S. 448 (1957). It is curious to find the Court in Lincoln Mills willing to fashion a
body of law by analogy in a controversial area, in the face of vigorous criticism and merely
upon the authority of an obscure statute, and yet unwilling to fashion for admiralty a clear
and coherent remedy for wrongful death upon the authority of a constitutional grant of
urisdiction dating from 1789. The membership of the Court was the same as in The Tungus
and Goett except that Mr. Justice Stewart had not yet replaced Mr. Justice Burton. Mr. Justice Douglas wrote the opinion; Justices Burton and Harlan concurred; Mr. Justice Frankfurter dissented.
3

4 See GILMORE & BLACK, THE LAw oF ADMIRALTY 630-37, 296 n. 149 (1957). However,

The Harrisburgitself involved a wrongful death claim barred by the state statute of limitations. The decision that a state statute of limitations was applicable since the state statute
alone created the right to sue, was the beginning of all the trouble. Since that decision, laches
has governed personal injuries, but statutes oflimitations have been applied strictly in wrongful death cases. See Bournias v. Atlantic Maritime Co., Ltd., 220 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1955).
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tant federal interest is violated by the application of the state wrongful death
statutes. His attack upon the majority position is purely in terms of its anomalous and arbitrary character; he repeatedly expresses the offensiveness of
applying federal law to personal injury cases and state law to wrongful death
actions. "Admiralty law" he summarizes, "is primarily judge made law. The
federal courts have a most extensive responsibility of fashioning rules of substantive law in maritime cases.... This responsibility places on this court the
duty of assuring that the product of the effort be coherent and rational." 35
Perhaps uniformity in the maritime law itself is to be viewed as a federal interest apart from any consideration of the interests of the shipping industry.
It would be strange if those who advocate abandoning the present system
because it is not coherent and rational would move to a position such as Mr.
Justice Whittaker's, which, although similar in result, is still far from clear.
To use state wrongful death acts "remedially" would be to use them as "remedies in the abstract." What would be done if a state court were to refuse to
apply the death act of its own state in the remedial fashion that Mr. Justice
Whittaker advocates? The power to create a remedy includes the power to
determine what conduct shall give rise to a right of recovery. Also, this would
subject the citizens of the states to unequal treatment under the same statute
depending upon whether the tort occurred on land or water. Finally (although
this objection has no political reality), the federal remedy would still be dependent upon the existence of a state remedy. To use the state acts only by
analogy would avoid these conceptual difficulties.
This may explain why the federalist minority chose not to join with Mr.
Justice Whittaker and make Goett the occasion for overruling The Tungus. It
does not explain why he did not join them. Apparently his separate course is
explainable in terms of judicial propriety; to fashion a remedy by analogy may
have seemed to him too much like judicial legislation.
In regard to judicial propriety, any restraint which the Court feels in adopting any of the alternatives to the present anomalous situation would appear to
be self-imposed. The constitutional grant of judicial power over admiralty
would seem to authorize even the extreme act of overruling The Harrisburg.
However, admiralty, which has not fashioned for itself the power of equitable
relief,36 and which has often adopted state law to fill its "gaps," 37 can hardly
lay claim to an unqualified tradition of creativity. In the two recent cases of
Halcyon Lines Y. Haenn Ship Corp.38 and Wilburn Boat Co. v. Fireman'sFund
35 358 U.S. at 611.
See generally GiLMoRE & BLACK, Op. cit. supra note 34, at 37-39.
37
See generally Currie, supra note 21.
38 342 U.S. 282 (1952). A shipowner was sued for personal injuries by an employee of a
shoreside contractor. The shipowner brought in the contractor and urged that he be required to make contribution since he was the primary tort feasor. The Court dismissed the
contribution proceedings. Mr. Justice Black stated: "To some extent courts exercising jurisdiction in maritime affairs have felt freer than common-law courts in fashioning rules, and
36
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Ins. Co.,39 the Court specifically refused to "fashion a remedy" for contribution between tort feasors in a non-collision case or to establish a rule regulating marine insurance contracts. Both decisions were written by Mr. Justice
Black of the federalist minority which now proposes to fashion a remedy in
wrongful death cases. Yet the record is not barren of creativity; the "unsea40
worthiness" doctrine itself was fashioned by the Court in this century.
It was the Court's free choice to adopt the state statutes ;41 surely the Court
may now abandon them. But self-imposed restraint exists. No doubt this is
because the issue is not seen as a constitutional one, but simply as a matter of
admiralty law, since the state death acts are adopted by admiralty and fail to
infringe upon an existing federal remedy. Even the dissenters in The Tungus do
not wish to overrule The Harrisburgbecause, however dubious the decision
was, "the holding has become part and parcel of our maritime jurisprudence." 42 Mr. Justice Brennan also speaks of "the felt necessity of having some
statutory definition." 43 Mr. Justice Whittaker in his dissent in Goett is more
conservative; he advances a vague and unsatisfactory conceptualization, apparently because he feels that precedents dictate the conclusion that admiralty
itself has no remedy for wrongful death, and therefore adopts the state acts.
The present unstable division does the Court little credit. The dissenters in
Tungus seem to have been delighted to seize an opportunity to embarrass the
majority of The Tungus by applying that ruling in ways which its proponents
did not anticipate: "As long as the view of the law represented by that ruling
prevails in the Court, it should be applied evenhandedly, despite the contrary
views of some of those originally joining it that state law is the measure of
recovery when it helps the defendant, as in The Tungus, and is not the measure
we would feel free to do so here if wholly convinced that it would best serve the ends ofjustice. We have concluded that it would be unwise to attempt to fashion new judicial rules of
contribution and that the solution of this problem should await congressional action." 342
U.S. at 285. For discussion and criticism of this decision, see GILMORE & BLACK, Op. cit.
supra note 34, at 366-374, and Currie, supra note 21, at 212-13.

39 348 U.S. 310 (1955). Mr. Justice Black remarked that although the Court couldfashion
a rule, "such a choice involves varied policy considerations and is obviously one which
Congress is peculiarly suited to make. And we decline to undertake the task." 348 U.S. at
320. In dissent, Mr. Justice Reed said: "If uniformity is needed anywhere, it is needed in
marine insurance." 348 U.S. at 333. For criticism of this decision, see GILMoRE &BLACK,
op. cit. supra note 27, at 60-63, 383, and Currie, supra note 21, at 215-19.
40 See generally GiLMORE & BLACK, supra note 34, at 315-32.
41 In his dissent in the Hess case, supra note 27, at 335, Mr. Justice Harlan stated that
"where the tort is maritime and the action brought under the 'saving clause,' state created
rights may be asserted only byfederalpermission.That is the premise on which The Hamilton
and its offspring proceeded." Of course Mr. Justice Harlan uses this point not to advocate
overruling The Harrisburg,but to argue that state law need not be permitted to impose a
standard stricter than the federal maritime law.
42 358 U.S. at 599.

43 358 U.S. at 604.
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of recovery when it militates against the defendant." 44 This might be sardonic
humor of high quality, but one wonders if it is responsible judicial behavior,
especially since it seems probable that the federalist minority could have resolved their conceptual differences with Mr. Justice Whittaker and thereby
effected a stable solution.
Of course, Mr. Justice Whittaker's position may differ more substantially
from that of the federalist minority than is apparent; his dissent in Goett is too
cryptic to give grounds for certainty. It is also possible that the various Justices
are frozen in their present positions. If so, one hopes that some new concept
might bring about a thaw. Mr. Justice Clark, the majority of one in Goett,
cited with approval in Cox v. Roth45 both a remark by Mr. Chief Justice
Hughes in Just v. Chambers46 that: "The rule of the non-survival of a cause of
action against a deceased tortfeasor has but a slender basis in admiralty cases
in this country," and a statement by Roscoe Pound that: "To think of recovery for wrongful causing of death as something exceptional... is an
anachronism. Today we should be thinking of the death statutes as part of the
general law." 47
Gilmore and Black have speculated that: "Both the Just and Cox cases
went to the abatement of the action on the death of the tortfeasor. Quaere,
however, whether the Court might not be willing to reexamine the survivorship question from the victim's point of view in, for example, an action by a
deceased seaman's personal representative under general maritime law for
unseaworthiness." 4 8 The Court has not considered this approach to the problem. Although it is in a sense a radical approach, it is the most direct and
simple way of insuring that death claims would be governed by the federal
maritime law; there would be no need to wrestle with the scheme of beneficiaries created by state wrongful death acts; the claim would simply be a
part of the decedent's estate, much like a claim in contract. If the Court cannot
bring itself to overrule The Harrisburg,perhaps the survival remedy should be
placed alongside the remedy provided by state wrongful death acts. The Harrisburgwould then rapidly wither away. If Mr. Justice Clark were to recall his
earlier dictum in Cox v. Roth, he particularly might be swayed; is there any
reason to draw a distinction between a deceased tort feasor and a deceased
victim?
This is merely one approach that the Court does not appear to have considered. No doubt there are other solutions. One cannot but feel that the Court
44 361 U.S. at 344 n.5.
45 348 U.S. 207, 210 (1955). The decision held that under the Jones Act a right of action
for wrongful death survived the death of the tortfeasors.
46 312 U.S. 383, 387 n.4 (1941).
47 13 NACCA L.J. 189 (1954).
48 GiLMoRE & BLACK, supra note 34, at 302 n.172.
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has not devoted its best efforts to the problem despite its having been raised in
49
four cases within the last two terms.
The differences between the alternatives discussed were not important to
the practical libelant or plaintiff until recently. Western Fuel v. Garcia,50 decided during the heyday of the uniformity doctrine 5' was as anomalous in
result as The Tungus. But it was not until the Court transformed unseaworthiness into a right of enormous value to a plaintiff or libelant, with the resultant
torrent of litigation to obtain it,52 that the difference between the treatment of
personal injury and wrongful death cases became startling.
It is difficult to predict whether the present unstable division will remain
throughout another term, or whether Mr. Justice Whittaker will join with the
dissenters, or the dissenters will join with him. Whichever view prevails, it is
to be hoped that the very offensiveness of the anomaly in question might
generate a new attitude of creativity in admiralty.
49 In addition to Goett, Hess and The Tungus, the problem was also raised in United
Pilots Ass'n v. Halecki, 358 U.S. 613 (1959).
50 257 U.S. 233 (1921).
51 See text following note 11, supra.
52

GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 34, at 315.

REMAND TO A STATE SUPREME COURT FOR DETERMINATION

OF UNSETTLED QUESTIONS OF STATE LAW

Nostrand v. Little' raises the question of the proper disposition by the
United States Supreme Court of an unsettled issue of state law in a case coming from a state court. The State of Washington requires that every public
employee subscribe to a "loyalty oath" stating that he is "not a subversive
person or a member of the Communist Party or any subversive organization." 2 The act provides that refusal to subscribe to the oath "on any ground
shall be cause for immediate termination of such employee's employment." 3
Two University of Washington professors brought an action for declaratory
judgment, claiming the act to be violative of the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment as well as other provisions of the federal constitution.
In a unanimous decision, 4 the Supreme Court of Washington upheld the constitutionality of the loyalty oath provisions of the act, reversing a contrary
ruling by the trial court. On appeal, the United States Supreme Court vacated
the judgment and remanded to the state court for further consideration on the
ground that the state court had not passed on the claim of appellant that under
1 362 U.S. 474 (1960).
2 WASH. REv. CODE § 9.81.070 (1955).

3 Ibid.

4 Nostrand v. Balmer, 53 Wash. 2d 460, 335 P.2d 10 (1959).
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the act no hearing is afforded at which the employee can explain or defend his
refusal to take the oath.
In the exercise of its jurisdiction to review state court decisions,5 the
United States Supreme Court has seldom remanded for clarification of an
issue of state law.6 The Court may review only federal questions raised and
determined below; 7 thus, issues of state law may be considered only when
essential to a proper determination of the federal questions presented. It is to
be expected that interpretations of state law which the Court judges essential
for a proper determination on review will normally have been made by the
state court in arriving at the decision from which an appeal was taken. That
this expectation is occasionally unfulfilled may reflect a growing use of actions
for declaratory judgment in which complex statutes, never before construed,
are attacked on broad constitutional grounds.8 Under these circumstances
state courts may fail to make those statutory interpretations which the Supreme Court later considers essential to review. State constructions of local
statutes are, of course, binding on the federal courts. 9 In the absence of a controlling state decision, however, the Court may rule on both state and federal
questions. But it is not obliged to do sol0 and may, under appropriate circumstances, remand to the local court for determination of the unsettled state
question."
Because of the unusual costs and delays involved, it is apparent that remands for clarification of state law impose a substantial burden on litigants.
Less apparent are the public interests which justify the Court's refusal to rule
on state issues, when its jurisdiction to do so is established.
5 See 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1948).
6But see, e.g., Dorchy v. Kansas, 264 U.S. 286 (1924); Musser v. Utah, 333 U.S. 95

(1948).
7 Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1874).
8 See, e.g., Alabama State Fed'n of Labor v. McAdory, 325 U.S. 450 (1945); CIO v.
McAdory, 325 U.S. 473 (1945); Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 331 U.S. 549, 572-74
(1947). Although the last case involved an action for writ of prohibition, the Court stated
that "in all but name the two procedures are substantially identical, for the purposes of our
jurisdiction and function in review." 331 U.S. at 574.
9 Green v. Lessee of Neal, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 291 (1832); Leffingwell v. Warren, 67 U.S.
(2 Black) 599, 603 (1863); Bucher v. Cheshire R.R., 125 U.S. 555 (1888); Chicago, M., St.
P. & P. R.R. v. Risty, 276 U.S. 567,570 (1928). But cf., Gelpcke v. City of Dubuque, 68 U.S.
(1 Wall.) 175 (1864); Burgess v. Seligman, 107 U.S. 20 (1883); Concordia Ins. Co. v. School
Dist. 282 U.S. 545 (1931).
10 Dorchy v. Kansas, 264 U.S. 286 (1924).
11This procedure is not to be confused with the more commonly employed technique of
remanding to the highest state court for clarification of an ambiguous decision which appears to rest on both state and federal grounds. In the latter circumstance, the request is not
for a ruling on a state issue formerly ignored, but rather for clarification of whether the state
issue ruled upon may form an adequate and independent ground of the court's prior disposition of the case. See, e.g., Minnesota v. National Tea Co., 309 U.S. 551 (1940); Herb v.
Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117 (1945).
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The doctrine of federal abstention from the exercise of jurisdiction in cases
involving unsettled issues of state law12 has had its source and clearest application in cases originating in the federal courts. The likelihood of unsettled state
questions being thrust upon the federal courts for determination is greater in
this procedural setting than in cases coming directly from state courts. 13 Although the abstention doctrine has not been expressly applied to cases of the
latter kind,14 the public interests which justify refusal of the Supreme Court to
rule on unsettled state issues may be the same in both settings. In the leading
abstention case, RailroadComm'n v. Pullman Co.,' 5 a company soughtin the
federal court to enjoin enforcement of an order of the Texas Railroad Commission. Alternative grounds for relief were argued, one going to the constitutionality of the order, the other to the authority of the Commission under the
Texas statute to make the order in question. The Supreme Court directed the
federal district court to abstain from deciding the case, but to retain jurisdiction until the parties had an opportunity to obtain from the Texas courts a
ruling on the state issue involved. The evils to be avoided by abstention were
"the waste of a tentative decision as well as the friction of a premature constitutional adjudication."16
The first of the two arguments for abstention may be simply stated. Constructions of local statutes by federal courts are not binding on the courts of
the state. Therefore, decisions based upon federal court constructions of local
statutes must be considered tentative in nature. As such, they run the risk of
wasted judicial effort. Only if local courts follow the statutory interpretation
suggested by the federal court will the decision based thereon be of continuing
12 For recent discussions of the doctrine see, e.g., Wright, The Abstention DoctrineReconsidered,37 TExAs L. REv. 815 (1959); Note, 73 HARv. L. Rmv. 1358 (1960); Note, 59 COLuM.

L. RyV. 749 (1959); Note, 108 U. PA. L. REv. 226 (1959).
13 Whether original federal jurisdiction is based on diversity of citizenship (28 U.S.C.
§ 1332 (1948), as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1958)) or the presence of a federal question
(28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1948), as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1958); Hum v. Oursler, 289 U.S.
238 (1933)), the jurisdiction extends to a potentially wider range of state issues than may be
considered in reviewing a state court judgment. In the latter cases, the only issues which may
be considered are those the resolution of which is strictly necessary to the determination of
the federal issues presented.
14 Because of substantial uncertainties regarding the construction of complex statutes
under constitutional attack, the Court has in several instances dismissed cases arising from
state courts. E.g., Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 331 U.S. 549 (1947); Alabama State
Fed'n of Labor v. McAdory, 325 U.S. 450 (1945). In each case, extended justifications for the
dismissals have been given. Where more clearly-defined questions of statutory construction
were presented, the Court has used the vacate-remand technique. In these cases little justification, whether drawn from self-styled "abstention" cases or elsewhere, has been offered.
The failure to employ abstention arguments to justify remands such as in Nostrandmay reflect the fact that remands to state courts impose much lighter burdens on litigants than do
abstentions in cases originating in the federal courts. See Note, 73 HARV. L. Rav. 1358 (1960).
15312 U.S. 496 (1941).
16 Id. at 500.
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importance.17 The applicability of the argument to Nostrand v. Little is evident. For the Supreme Court to rule upon the constitutionality of the Washington loyalty oath statute, under the assumption that a hearing either is, or is
not, provided, might be to run the risk of a subsequent undermining of that
constitutional ruling by an alternative state construction of the statute.
It is less clear that such a constitutional ruling would increase the risks of
state-federal friction, as is suggested by the second reason for abstention given
in the Pullman decision. The applicability of the friction argument to Nostrand,
however, may be more clearly seen from its formulation in the recent abstention case, Harrison v. NAACP.18 As in Nostrand, the suit involved a direct
attack on the constitutionality of an ambiguous state statute. Abstention was
justified as a means of avoiding "unnecessary interference by the federal
courts with proper and validly administered state concerns." 19 The "concerns"
to which the Court refers appear to be the policies served by the statute under
attack, rather than the general interests of local courts in interpreting state
statutes. But on this reading, the rationale appears to beg the very questions at
issue. If construction of the local statute and a subsequent constitutional ruling
would be interference, it is not clear that they would be unnecessary interference. The adjudication which the Court declined to make had as its very purpose the determination of whether the statute formed a basis for a proper and
valid administration of state concerns.
It is clear that the friction-creating interference to which the Court referred
was not simply constitutional adjudication, whether by state or federal courts,
but rather a possible result of adjudication, viz., the striking down of state
statutes on constitutional grounds. The interference would be unnecessary
insofar as statutes which might form the basis for a proper and valid administration of state concerns were overturned. The Court says, "[A]l we hold is
17 Constructions leading to unfavorable constitutional decisions may be intrinsically less
subject to waste than are favorable decisions based on alternative constructions. This results
from the tendency of unfavorable rulings to cut off subsequent litigation on the statute in
local courts. Therefore, if the avoidance ofjudicial waste were the only argument for abstention, the technique would not be employed where constructions unfavorable to constitutionality are indicated.
There are circumstances in which even constructions leading to favorable constitutional
decisions contain internal checks against waste. Where two or more equally plausible interpretations of a statute are possible, one of which clearly leads to constitutionality, the others
evidently raising difficult constitutional problems, the Supreme Court is likely to choose the
first. Where state courts subsequently have the opportunity to examine the interpretational
question, uncertainty regarding the constitutionality of alternative constructions may lead
them to follow the interpretation suggested by the Supreme Court. Insofar as this type of
federal influence on the construction of state statutes is to be condemned-and it is not clear
that it should be-the objection will not be based on the arguments discussed in this comment. Rather, the objection will be based, presumably, on a general theory of the proper
forum for the interpretation of state statutes.
18 360 U.S. 167 (1959).

19 Id, at 176,
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that these enactments should be exposed to state construction or limiting interpretation before the federal courts are asked to decide upon their constitutionality, so that federal judgment will be based on something that is a complete product of the State, the enactment as phrased by its legislature and as
20
construed by its highest court."
The argument may be summarized in two steps. (1) State courts may be
more willing than federal courts to construe local statutes narrowly in the interest of avoiding unconstitutionality. In Alabama State Fed'n of Labor v.
McAdory, 21 the Court recognized that "state courts, when given the opportunity by the presentation to them for decision of an actual case or controversy, may, and often do, construe state statutes so that in their application
they are not open to constitutional objections which might otherwise be addressed to them." In the federal courts, by contrast, the presumption of constitutionality is limited by the counterpressure arising from fear of a wasted
decision. The narrower the federal construction of a local statute, the greater
the possibility that it will subsequently be disfavored by courts of the state, and
thus the more tentative and potentially wasteful will be a constitutional ruling
based on the construction. (2) Consequently, out of the crucible of constitutional adjudication in state rather than federal courts may come a new "product of the state," less subject-and properly so-to the interference of an
unfavorable constitutional ruling. Deference to state courts, then, in the determination of constitutional cases involving questions of statutory construction,
is to be justified by a possible difference in result.
The avoidance of a judicial waste and unnecessary interference does not
require that every constitutional case involving statutory ambiguities be remanded to a state court for clarification. 22 Absent some doubt about the
proper construction of the statute, the risk of judicial waste would be small;
and if the constitutional ruling were not likely to turn on the resolution of the
interpretation question, then unnecessary interference would not be at issue.
The remand in Nostrand v. Little may be subject to question on both points.
"One of the claims [of appellants]," said the Court in Nostrand,"is that no
hearing is afforded at which the employee can explain or defend his refusal to
take the oath .... [W]e cannot say how the Supreme Court of Washington
would construe the statute on the hearing point." 23 The statutory provisions
under attack in the case, however, were amendatory of sections 12 and 13 of
Chapter 254, Laws of 1951. Section 15 of the original act clearly gives the
right of judicial review to "any person discharged under the provisions of this
20 Id.at 178.
21 325 U.S. 450, 470 (1945).
22

See Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 331 U.S. 549, 574 (1947).

23 362 U.S. at 475.

360

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW

[VoL 28:355

24

act." Nevertheless, section 15 may not control, for the per curiam opinion
states that "the fact that the State's statute here under attack supplements
previous statutory provisions [raises] questions concerning the applicability of
the latter .. ,"25 In any event, the hearing issue is submerged in a deeper criticism of the remand made by Mr. Justice Douglas in his dissenting opinion.
He points to the clear wording of the statute which says that refusal to take the
oath "on any grounds" shall be cause for "immediate termination" of employment. 26 He argues that under these circumstances a hearing at which an
employee could explain or defend his refusal to take the oath would seem to
serve no function. 27 So long as the statute creates an irrebuttable presumption
running from refusal to take the oath to unfitness for public employment, Mr.
2
Justice Douglas suggests, the remand is for an irrelevancy. 8
Despite the apparent clarity of the statute, however, four factors may account for the refusal of the majority to assume that the Washington court
would not, on remand, find in the statute both a required hearing and an opportunity to rebut the presumption of unfitness.
(1) When a statute is under direct constitutional attack, the element of
threat implicit in a remand for statutory interpretation cannot be ignored.
Unless the Supreme Court believed that the statute's constitutionality might
turn on the answer given by the state court to the question of interpretation,
the costs of a remand to litigants could not be justified. The remand situation
emphasizes, therefore, less the state court's role as impartial arbiter over an
adversary proceeding, than its role as co-agent with the legislature in effectuating state policy by creating a statute invulnerable to constitutional attack.
24 WAsH. REv. CODE § 9.81.090 (1951). The pertinent part of the section reads:

"Any person discharged under the provisions of this act shall have the right within thirty
days thereafter to appeal to the superior court... for determination by said court as to
whether or not the discharge appealed from was justified under the provisions of this act.
The court shall regularly hear and determine such appeals and the decisions of the superior
court may be appealed to the supreme court of the state of Washington as in civil cases.
Any person appealing to the superior court may be entitled to trial by jury if he or she so
elects."
25 362 U.S. at 475-76.
26
WASH. RIv. CODE § 9.81.070 (1955), amending LAws OF WASH., ch. 254, § 12 (1951).
The section reads in pertinent part as follows: "Every such person, board, commission...
or other agency shall require every employee or applicant for employment to state under
oath whether or not he or she is a member of the communist party or other subversive organization, and refusal to answer on any grounds shall be cause for immediate termination
of such employee's employment ..
27 362 U.S. at 478.

28 The thrust of the Douglas criticism does not go to the wording of the question addressed to the Washington Supreme Court. "Whether a hearing is afforded at which the
employee can explain or defend his refusal to take the oath" may reasonably be read to
imply a question regarding the possible usefulness of such a hearing. What the criticism must
assume is that the Washington Court's answer to the presumption is a foregone conclusion
because of the clear wording of the statute which makes refusal to take the oath "on any
grounds" cause for dismissal.
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(2) The Washington Supreme Court had already demonstrated its willingness to undertake limiting interpretation of the statute in the face of constitutional attack. As part of their case before the Washington court, appellants
had attacked the absence of an "element of scienter" in the required loyalty
oath. The attack was strongly based, both as a matter of construction 29 and
as an argument of constitutional law.30 In response, the Washington Supreme
Court held that "as we interpret the form of oath, we find that this element [of
scienter] is implied in every clause thereof and of the pertinent statutory
31
provisions."
(3) There is reason to believe that the constitutional attack, based on the
irrebuttable presumption and the absence of hearing, was not clearly presented to the Washington court. In their motion to dismiss, appellees vigorously denied before the United States Supreme Court that appellants' constitutional objection based on the absence of a hearing was "raised in, considered
or passed upon by the Supreme Court of Washington." 32 Appellants answered
that "while the wording of these Constitutional arguments as set forth in our
State brief is not identical with the wording of the questions presented in the
Statement as to Jurisdiction, the concepts involved in our arguments were
clearly expounded to the State Supreme Court throughout our brief and Petition for Rehearing." 33 If the Court concluded that appellants' hearing-presumption point was not adequately presented to the Washington court, then
any inferences unfavorable to a remand, which might be drawn from the
failure of the state court to limit the statute on first hearing, would be viti4
ated.3
29 The oath which was tendered to appellants contains no qualifications. It reads, in material part, as follows: "(2) That I am not a subversive person or a member of the Communist

Party or any subversive organization, foreign or otherwise, which enages in or advocates,
abets, advises, or teaches the overthrow, destruction or alteration of the constitutional form
of the government... by revolution, force or violence."
30 The constitutional argument rested primarily, it would appear, on Wieman v. Updegraff
344 U.S. 183 (1952) in which the United States Supreme Court struck down a test oath as
applied to a college professor on the ground that the statute created an "indiscriminate
classification of innocent with knowing activity. . ." and thus violated due process.
31 53 Wash. 2d 460, 484, 335 P.2d 10, 24 (1959).
32
Appellees' Motion to Dismiss, p. 9, 362 U.S. 474 (1960).
33 Brief for Appellee Opposing Motion to Dismiss, p. 7, 362 U.S. 474 (1960).

34 The same conclusion, however, raises doubts concerning the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to entertain appellants' hearing-presumption argument at all. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1257 (1948); Dewey v. Des Moines, 173 U.S. 193, 197-98 (1899). Yet interestingly enough,
this question, however decided, may not cast doubt on the propriety of the remand in
Nostrand.In Musser v. Utah, 333 U.S. 95 (1948), defendant had been convicted for advocating bigamy under a state statute making it unlawful to conspire "to commit acts injurious to
public morals." The Supreme Court of Utah had upheld the conviction, without opinion,
against a general attack based on the fourteenth amendment to the federal constitution.
Before the United States Supreme Court, a question of unconstitutional vagueness in the
statute was raised for the first time in response to suggestions from the bench. The Court
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(4) The Court took judicial notice, in Nostrand, of a supervening decision
by the Washington court which may have indicated a change in constitutional
theory. In City of Seattle v. Ross, 35 the state court overturned an ordinance
because it established a presumption of guilt without affording the accused an
opportunity of a hearing "to rebut the same." 36 In light of this reading of
Seattle v. Ross, the Nostrand Court said "we cannot say how the Supreme
Court of Washington would construe the statute on the hearing point." 37 If in
Seattle v. Ross, however, the Washington court accepted a major premise of
appellants' argument in Nostrand, then the state court could avoid inconsistency on remand only by overturning the statute or by construing the statute
in such a way as to avoid the constitutional infirmity. The former course is
unlikely, coming so soon after a unanimous decision upholding the statute.
The latter choice, under all the circumstances considered, would appear to be
a genuine possibility. And it is on the strength of this possibility that the disposition of Nostrandmust finally be justified.
vacated the judgment of the state supreme court and remanded for further consideration,
justifying its action on the ground that questions inherent in the appeal and involving determinations of state law had not been presented to the Utah Supreme Court, and that, perhaps, the point had therefore been waived or lost. The theory appears to have been that
although the Court had no jurisdiction over the new argument on appeal, its jurisdiction
over the case was sufficient to justify vacating and remanding to the state court. On remand,
appellant would have the opportunity to raise his newly-found argument properly under
state procedure.
35 154 Wash. 794, 344 P.2d 216 (1959).
36 The ordinance made it "unlawful for anyone not lawfully authorized to frequent, enter,
be in, or be found in, any place where narcotics, narcotic drugs or their derivatives are unlawfully used, kept or disposed of." The ordinance was quoted in City of Seattle v. Ross, supra
note 35, at 217.
37 362 U.S. at 475. The sole authority cited by the Court for its disposition of Nostrand
was Williams v. Georgia, 349 U.S. 375 (1955). Although the relevance of Williams is not
entirely clear, it would appear to indicate the importance which the NostrandCourt attached
to the supervening decision in Seattle v. Ross. In Williams v. Georgia, petitioner sought reversal of a conviction for murder, on the ground of unconstitutional discrimination in the
selection of the petit jury. The state supreme court below affirmed the conviction on procedural grounds, not reaching the constitutional question. Although the state had asserted
before the court below that no denial of equal protection was involved in the case, it was
admitted before the United States Supreme Court that petitioner had been deprived of his
constitutional rights. (The significance of the state's change of position is doubtful, however,
inasmuch as the state court had conceded that, but for the procedural objections, defendant's claim of constitutional infirmity in the conviction would stand. 210 Ga. 665, 669, 82
S.E.2d 217, 219 (1954).) Nevertheless, because of the change of position by the state, the
Court vacated and remanded, stating that "we have frequently held that in the exercise of
our appellate jurisdiction we have power not only to correct error in the judgment under
review but to make such disposition of the case as justice requires. And in determining what
justice does require, the Court is bound to consider any change, either in fact or in law, which
has supervened since the judgment was entered. We may recognize such a change, which
may affect the result, by setting aside the judgment and remanding the case so that the state
court may be free to act." 349 U.S. at 390.
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MOOTNESS AND COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES IN CRIMINAL APPEALS
In Parkerv. Ellis' the petitioner had originally been convicted, in 1954, on a
charge of forgery by a Texas state court, and sentenced to seven years in
prison. In 1955 his conviction was affirmed by the Court of Criminal Appeals
of Texas. 2 He then sought to obtain his release through a writ of habeas corpus, alleging inter aliaa lack of assistance of counsel which resulted in a denial
of due process of law. After a state court denial of his petition, Parker petitioned the Federal District Court, which also denied his petition, and on appeal, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, in a two to one decision, afimed, 3
holding that Parker's trial failed to disclose any unfairness that would necessitate reversal. In March of 1959 certiorari was granted by the United States
Supreme Court. Two months later, in June of 1959, Parker was released from
prison after having served his full sentence. Almost a year later, in May of
1960, the Supreme Court held in a per curiam decision that upon Parker's
release from prison the case had become moot, since custody is a prerequisite
to habeas corpus relief.4 The decision was rendered by five of the Justices with
four Justices dissenting. In addition to the per curiam opinion based on the
custody requirement, there was a concurring opinion by Justices Harlan and
Clark,5 and two dissenting opinions, one by Mr. Chief Justice Warren in
which Justices Black, Douglas and Brennan joined,6 and one by Mr. Justice
Douglas in which Mr. Chief Justice Warren joined.7 The concurring opinion
considered the case moot on the further ground that there were no legal consequences of the conviction. Mr. Chief Justice Warren dissented to both the
interpretation of the custody requirement by the majority, and the concurring
opinion's limited consideration of only the legal consequences of a conviction.
Mr. Justice Douglas in his dissent adopted the fiction of an order nunc pro
tunc to overcome the lack of custody.
The custody requirement of the Habeas Corpus Statute is clear.s Nevertheless, the question of whether one who has been released from physical custody9 is eligible for relief under the Habeas Corpus Statute has often been
1 362 U.S. 574 (1960).

576.

2 276 S.W.2d 533 (1955).

5 Id. at

3 258 F.2d 937 (5th Cir. 1958).

6Id. at 577.

4Parker v. Ellis, 362 U.S. 574 (1960).
7Id. at 595.
828 U.S.C. § 2241 (1958), provides that "The writ of habeas corpus shall not extend to a
prisoner unless.... He is in custody."
9 Generally there must be an actual or physical restraint of the person for the writ of
habeas corpus to issue. Mere moral restraint is not enough. Stallings v. Splain, 253 U.S. 339
(1920); Wales v. Whitney, 114 U.S. 564 (1885); Strand v. Schmittroth, 251 F.2d 590 (9th
Cir. 1957); Whiting v. Chew, 273 F.2d 885 (4th Cir. 1960); Rowland v. State of Arkansas,
179 F.2d 79 (8th Cir. 1950). Accord, Hendershott v. Young, 209 Md. 257, 120 A. 2d 915
(1956); Ex parte Powell, 191 Wash. 152, 70 P.2d 778 (1937); Exparte Ventura, 44 F. Supp.

520 (W.D. Wash. 1942). An argument can, however, be made in situations where the peti-
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raised. Certainly habeas corpus relief is not available to one who has served
his entire sentence, since "without restraint of liberty the writ will not issue."1 0
Where, for other reasons, the petitioner is no longer in the respondent's custody, petitions for writs of habeas corpus have been almost uniformly denied." The reasoning behind these cases seems to be that since the petitioner
has been freed, the function of the writ has been served. Such a rationale

would appear sufficient, in conjunction with the statutory "custody" language, to justify the result in the instant case. However, the case may be significant for its implications regarding the treatment of mootness questions
presented in situations not involving a custody requirement.
Mootness problems are a segment of the broader "case or controversy"
question presented by the Constitution.12 The general rule is that a criminal
appeal is moot in the federal courts if the prisoner has served his sentence and
has not shown that under either state or federal law further penalties or disabilities can be imposed on him as a result of a judgment that has been satisfied.13 The underlying rationale for the general rule would appear to be twotioner is paroled or released on bail that "constructive custody" should be sufficient. The
restrictions placed upon the petitioner's freedom in these situations lend some support to
this argument, but only a small minority of courts have been willing to accept "constructive
custody" as a sufficient restraint. In re Petersen, 51 Cal.2d 177, 331 P.2d 24 (1958). (Petitioner
released on bail; writ held not to depend on actual detention.) In re Bandmann, 51 Cal.2d
388, 333 P.2d 339 (1958). (Release on parole held not to render habeas corpus proceeding
moot.) A "constructive custody" argument is not applicable in the instant case, since a release from prison after sentence has been served removes all restrictions upon the petitioner's
freedom.
10 McNally v. Hill, 293 U.S. 131, 138 (1934) (petitioner serving a validly imposed sentence
attacking an allegedly invalid consecutive sentence to be served in the future). Accord, Holloway v. Looney, 207 F.2d 433 (10th Cir. 1953).
1l Weber v. Squier, 315 U.S. 810 (1942) (petitioner paroled); Tornello v. Hudspeth, 318
U.S. 792 (1943) (petitioner released on bail); Zimmerman v. Walker, 319 U.S. 744 (1943);
Johnson v. Hoy, 227 U.S. 245 (1913) (petitioner released on bail); Stallings v. Splain 253
U.S. 339 (1920) (petitioner released on bail); Wales v. Whitney, 114 U.S. 564 (1885) (petitioner released on bail). Accord, parole cases: Siercovich v. McDonald, 193 F.2d 118 (5th
Cir. 1951); Adams v. Hiatt, 173 F.2d 896 (3d Cir. 1949); Factor v. Fox, 175 F.2d 626 (6th
Cir. 1949); bail cases: Rowland v. State of Arkansas, 179 F.2d 709 (8th Cir. 1950); Sibray v.
United States, 185 Fed. 401 (3d Cir. 1911); Veach v. Smith, 42 F. Supp. 161 (S.D. Pa. 1941);
ExParteMusci, 1 F. Supp. 587 (S.D.N.Y. 1932). Contra,Mackenzie v. Barret, 141 Fed. 964
(7th Cir. 1905); the last-mentioned case may have been overruled by Walmer v. Tittemore
61 F.2d 909 (7th Cir. 1932), where the court held that before one may successfully seek a
writ of habeas corpus, he must be actually restrained. Accord,service of sentence case: Witte
v. Ferber, 219 F.2d 113 (3d Cir. 1954). The court in response to the petitioner's contention
that he would suffer the additional disability of losing his pension payments, stated that,
"Unfortunately for the petitioner we cannot proceed to a determination of his challenging
contention because his release from custody compels us to dismiss his appeal .. ." Id. at
114.
12

R OBERTSON & KnuKu{M, JURusDICTIoN OF THE SuPREME COURT OF THE UNTED STATES,

Ch. 26 (Wolfson & Kurland ed. 1951).
13 Id. at 532-33.
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fold: (1) the dependence of the adversary system upon self interest as the motive best suited to bring all pertinent issues to the fore, and (2) preservation of
economy of judicial endeavor by preventing the courts from performing useless acts.
The landmark mootness case in the service-of-sentence area is St. Pierre v.
United States,14 where the Supreme Court held the case moot because, after
the petitioner had fully served his sentence, there was no longer a subject
matter upon which the judgment of the Court could operate. In St. Pierre the
Court implied that if certain collateral consequences of the satisfied sentence
could be shown, the result might have been different.'s However, the Court
stressed that legal consequences and not "the moral stigma of a judgment
which no longer affects legal rights" would be necessary to present a case for
appellate review.16
The first case to recognize the existence of a legal interest in a petitioner
after he had served his sentence was Fiswick v. United States.17 An alien's
appeal was heard because, as a collateral consequence of his conviction, he
would have been subject to the further legal disability of deportation. Recognizing this possibility, the Court premised its decision on the petitioner's "substantial stake in the judgment of conviction which survives the satisfaction of
the sentence imposed on him."18 How substantial that stake must be was a
problem that remained to be decided in terms of what collateral consequences
of a criminal conviction are sufficient to justify relief.
A criminal conviction opens the door to a myriad of collateral consequences: the social stigma and injury to reputation caused by a conviction, the
denial of access to certain economic opportunities, the loss of civil rights, and
the possibility of further disabilities under habitual criminal statutes and criminal registration statutes' 9-the first two of which cannot be described as legal
consequences. Since Fiswick, the Supreme Court has directed its attention in
service-of-sentence cases to the legal consequences of a criminal conviction,
disregarding the extra-legal consequences in defining the material collateral
consequences of a criminal conviction.
The two most recent Supreme Court decisions prior to the instant case illustrate the development of the legal consequence aspect of the collateral consequences doctrine in the mootness cases. The first of these cases, United States
v. Morgan,20 involved a petitioner who sought review of a prior federal convic14 319 U.S. 41 (1943) (Sentence fully served before certiorari granted). See also Ex Parte
Baez, 177 U.S. 378 (1900). In the latter case a petition for habeas corpus was not allowed
where the prisoner's sentence would have been served before the writ could issue.
15 The court stated: "Nor has petitioner shown that under either state or federal law
further penalties or disabilities can be imposed on him .. " 319 U.S. at 43.
16 Ibid.
17 329 U.S. 211 (1946).
18Id.at 222.
19 See generally, Note, 59 YALE L.J. 786 (1930); Note, 26 So. CAL. L. REv.425 (1953).
20 346 U.S. 502 (1954).
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tion which had been the basis for an increased sentence in a subsequent state
prosecution for a different offense. Although the sentence under the federal
conviction had been fully served, the Court held that the legal results of the
conviction persisted, and granted the petitioner a writ of error in the nature of
coram nobis to review the first conviction. Likewise, in Pollard v. United
States,2 1 the fact that the petitioner had served his sentence under an embezzle22
ment conviction was held not to preclude review. Although it is open to
criticism on other grounds, 23 the Pollarddecision indicates that the legal collateral consequences doctrine is firmly established, even in those cases where
the legal consequence is not made explicit. The Parker case is of special interest, however, because it casts light on the present Court's approach to the
extra-legal consequences of a criminal conviction.
The petitioner in Parker had earlier been convicted of a felony in another
state. Under Texas law, the legal consequences to the petitioner would have
been the same regardless of whether or not the conviction before the Court
was upheld, since the other extra-state felony conviction alone would have
been a sufficient basis for legal disabilities.24 Thus, if the instant case had not
21 352 U.S. 354 (1957).
22 The Court stated that the "possibility of consequences collateral to the imposition of
sentence is sufficiently substantial to justify our dealing with the merits." Id. at 358. Accord,
Dickson v. Castle, 244 F.2d 665 (9th Cir. 1957); Egan v. Teets, 251 F.2d 571 (9th Cir. 1957).
23 The Supreme Court in Pollarddisregarded a custody requirement similar to the one in
the Parkercase. The custody requirement involved was that of 28 U.S.C. § 2255, which the
lower federal courts had rigidly enforced. See Hoffman v. United States, 244 F.2d 378 (9th
Cir. 1957); Oughton v. United States, 215 F.2d 578 (9th Cir. 1954); Fooshee v. United
States, 203 F.2d 247 (5th Cir. 1953); United States v. McGann, 245 F.2d 670 (2d Cir. 1957);
United States v. Bradford, 194 F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1957). The Pollardcase, although not expressly overruled on the custody point, must be considered as having limited precedential
value in view of the Supreme Court's decision in Heflin v. United States, 358 U.S. 415 (1959).
The majority of the Court in Heflin explicitly stated, in a special concurring opinion: "It is
clear that a motion for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 [Federal Habeas Corpus Statute] is
available only to attack a sentence under which a prisoner is in custody." Id. at 420. The
court in the Heflin case did, however, allow a prisoner to attack a sentence which he had not
yet begun to serve, under Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which provides that the court may correct an illegal sentence at any time. Sentences subject to review
under this rule are limited to those that the conviction did not authorize. United States v.
Morgan, 346 U.S. 502, 506 (1954); United States v. Bradford, supra at 201.
24
Harwell v. Morris, 143 S.W.2d (1940). This case held that a felon convicted in another
state lost his right to vote in a Texas election. The strength of this holding is somewhat diminished by the fact that the case was not reviewed by the Texas Supreme Court, and that in
an earlier Texas case it was stated that "at common law and on general principles of jurisprudence when not controlled by express statute.., such conviction of another state can
have no effect by way of penalty beyond the limits of the State in which it is rendered."
Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. 263, 303 (1892). Under § 78 of the Texas Probate Code
convicted felons of other states are expressly disqualified from serving as executors and administrators; and under the Texas Habitual Criminal Statute [Tax. PEN. CODE art. 63
(1948)] out of state felony convictions will support an increase of the penalty. Garcia v.
State, 140 Tex. Crim. 340, 145 S.W.2d 180 (1950). Further possible disabilities involve the
right to hold office and to serve on juries. TEx. PEN. CODE art. 52 (1948).
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been held moot, the Court's decision would have turned on a consideration of
the extra-legal consequences of Parker's conviction. This view is reflected in
Mr. Chief Justice Warren's dissent, in which, having disposed of the "in cus26
tody" problem, 25 he explicitly adopts the extra-legal consequences theory.
The extra-legal consequences theory represents the minority position of jurisdictions in the United States. Such jurisdictions consider the disgrace and
moral stigma which accompany conviction of a crime to be a sufficient interest
to prevent a case from being declared moot.2 7 The majority of jurisdictions
follow the rule that one who has paid his fine or served his full prison term
cannot prosecute an appeal of his conviction. 28 The strictness of the latter
approach is considerably mitigated by the collateral legal consequences doctrine, but the majority rule would be almost completely nullified if the Supreme Court were to adopt the dissenting view expressed in the instant case.
The issue of whether or not extra-legal consequences will be sufficient to
25 The Chief Justice considered the custody requirement irrelevant "because the function
of the writ-to provide and to facilitate inquiry into the validity of the applicant's claimhas already fully been served." Parker v. Ellis, 362 U.S. 574, 582 (1960) (dissenting opinion).
He also asserted that "the statute does not impose this same restriction [custody] upon the
grant of relief. Rather, the federal courts are given a broad grant of authority to 'dispose of
the matter as law and justice require.'" Ibid.
26 "[Alside from these considerations [legal consequences], however, there is something
fundamentally wrong with the theory that mootness should turn upon whether or not a
convicted person can run for office or cast a ballot.... Five years of law abiding life in a
new community give Parker a significant enough stake in the outcome of this adjudication
to preclude a finding of mootness." Id. at 592-94.
27 Roby v. State, 96 Wis. 667, 71 N.W. 1046 (1897); Lopez v. Killigrew, 202 Ind. 397, 174
N.E. 808 (1931). Although a legal consequence was involved in the Lopez case, both Lopez
and Roby rely on extra-legal consequences to enable a petitioner, who has fully served his
sentence, to prosecute an appeal of his conviction. Exparte Byrnes, 26 Cal.2d 824, 161 P.2d
376 (1945); People v. Becker, 108 Cal. App.2d 764,239 P.2d 898 (1952); People v. Chamness,
109 Cal. App. 778, 288 Pac. 20 (1930); Accord, People v. Marks, 64 Misc. 679, 120 N.Y.
Supp. 1106 (Ct. Gen. Sess. 1909); Village of Avon v. Popa, 96 Ohio App. 147, 121 N.E.2d
254 (1953).
28 The view taken in the majority of jurisdictions is that the payment of a fine precludes a
review of the conviction. Bergdoll v. United States, 279 Fed. 404 (3d Cir. 1922); Government
of the Virgin Islands v. Ferrer, 275 F.2d 497 (3d Cir. 1960); Hanback v. District of Columbia,
35 A.2d 189 (D.C. Mun. App. 1943); Gillen v. United States 199 F.2d 454 (9th Cir. 1952)
(expressly rejects the minority view that reputation and social stigma should be taken into
account in determining mootness); Pennywell v. McCarrey 255 F.2d 735 (9th Cir. 1952);
18 A.L.R. 867 (1922); 74 A.L.R. 638 (1931); 24 C.J.S. CriminalLaw § 1668 (1941); 2 AM.
JuR. Appeal & Error § 231 (1936). In a minority of jurisdictions payment of a fine does not
impair a defendant's right to appeal. Johnson v. State, 172 Ala. 424, 55 So. 226 (1911);
Commonwealth v. Fleckner, 167 Mass. 13, 44 N.E. 1053 (1896).
In the analogous situation where the prisoner has served his sentence prior to the determination of his appeal, the appeal has, in the majority ofjurisdictions, been held moot. St.
Pierre v. United States, 319 U.S. 41 (1943); Williams v. United States, 261 F.2d 224 (9th Cir.
1958); City of Seldovia v. Lund, 138 F. Supp. 382 (D.C. Alaska 1956); Hill v. United
States, 75 A.2d 138 (D.C. Munic. App. 1950); State v. Cohen, 45 Nev. 266, 201 Pac. 1026
(1921). Contra, Roby v. State, 202 Ind. 397, 174 N.E. 808 (1931); Lopez v. Killigrew, 97
Wis. 667, 71 N.W. 1046 (1897).
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prevent a case from being held moot where the petitioner's sentence has been
served was not squarely faced by the majority in Parkerdue to the ruling on
the custody requirement in the Habeas Corpus Statute. 29 A result which
would have disregarded the custody requirement would have defied precedent
and materially altered the application of the Habeas Corpus Statute. Where
there is no custody requirement, as in the St. Pierrecase or in a case involving
a writ of error coram nobis,30 the Supreme Court will have to weigh the extralegal aspects of a criminal conviction against a background of cases which
have not chosen to adopt this approach.
The dissenting opinion of Mr. Chief Justice Warren in Parkerappears to be
the first important introduction of the extra-legal consequences doctrine into
the mootness cases. Adoption of the extra-legal consequences doctrine by the
3
four dissenting Justices, and its express rejection by only two of the Justices, 1
casts doubt on the Court's strict adherence in future cases to the more limited
legal consequences doctrine.
29
Mr. Justice Douglas is willing to indulge in a fiction to overcome the custody requirement. He suggests that an order nuncpro tunc be issued which would grant the writ as of the
time that petitioner was still in custody (at the time that certiorari was granted). He admits,
however, that the cases he relies on are not directly in point, since they deal with the situation in civil suits where one of the parties to the litigation has died.
30 United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502 (1954); Shelton v. United States, 242 F.2d 101
(5th Cir. 1957).
3
1Justices Harlan and Clark in their concurring opinion take the position that since the
petitioner had already lost his civil rights, the instant case did not present a "case or controversy" within the constitutional meaning of that term. It is this position that Mr. Chief
Justice Warren sharply attacks in his dissent. Mr. Justice Douglas' position is somewhat
ambiguous, but in view of his concurrence in the Warren dissent, it would seem that he too
would subscribe to the extra-legal consequence theory. The other three Justices who based
their decision strictly on the custody requirement cannot be considered as having spoken
on the extra-legal consequences theory.

APPELLATE REVIEW OF COMPETENCY To STAND TRLAI
IN THE FEDERAL COURTS

Serious questions concerning appellate review of the issue of competency to
stand trial are raised by the per curiam opinion in Dusky v. United States.'
The Supreme Court there reversed the defendant's conviction for violation of
2
the Mann Act.
On motion of the defense, and pursuant to Section 4244 of the Federal
Criminal Code,3 the defendant was committed to the United States Medical
1 362 U.S. 402 (1960).
2 18 U.S.C. § 1201 (1958). The defendant was found guilty under an indictment charging
him with unlawfully transporting across state lines a kidnapped girl.
3 18 U.S.C. § 4244 (1958). This section provides that either the United States Attorney,
defense counsel or the court itself may move for a judicial determination of competency to
stand trial at any time prior to sentencing, if there is reasonable cause to believe that the
accused is incompetent. Provision is made for either a medical examination or commitment
to an institution for a medical determination of competency, followed by a judicial hearing.
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Center for Federal Prisoners for determination of his competency to stand
trial. The Center's psychiatric staff found him incompetent. One of the doctors, the only witness to appear at the subsequent hearing, so testified; but the
district judge reached the opposite conclusion. The defendant then pleaded
guilty, and was tried and convicted. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the finding of competency, refusing to overturn the trial court's
decision in the absence of any indication that it was clearly erroneous. 4 The
Supreme Court reversed the judgment on the ground that there was insufficient evidence to support the finding of competency. The Court remanded the
case for a hearing as to the defendant's present competency to stand trial and
for a new trial if he were to be found competent.
The first of two significant aspects of this case is the Supreme Court's
supervision of the trial judge's traditional discretionary power to determine
competency. 5 Appellate courts have frequently stated that a trial judge will
not be reversed unless his findings are "clearly erroneous," 6 "unsupported by
substantial evidence,"7 or against "the clear weight of the evidence." 8 The
Court reversed in this case because, applying the statutory standard,9 it found
no substantial evidence to support the finding of competency. A review of
prior decisions has failed to disclose another instance in which, after a statutory hearing, a trial judge has been reversed on his finding of competency. The
Court appears to have been influenced greatly in reaching its decision by the
Solicitor General's argument for remand, which was explicitly accepted.1O He
had urged that it was unclear whether the trial judge had applied the statutory
standard."
4 271 F.2d 385 (8th Cir. 1959).
5 See, e.g., Krupnick v. United States, 264 F.2d 213, 217 (8th Cir. 1959): "[A] finding
made and becoming final that the accused is able to understand the proceedings against him

and properly to assist in his own defense, and so is competent to stand trial, will ordinarily be
res judicata of that question."
6
E.g., United States v. National Ass'n of Real Estate Bds., 339 U.S. 485, 496 (1950).
7 E.g., Engstrom v. Wiley, 191 F.2d 684, 686 (9th Cir. 1951).
8
E.g., Cleo Syrup Corp. v. Coca-Cola Co., 139 F.2d 416,418 (8th Cir. 1943). It is clear,
however, that the limitations on judicial review of findings of a trial court sitting without a
jury are not as rigid as are those on the review of similar findings by a jury, and that the
standard applied to a judge sitting alone depends upon the type of evidence on which his
findings are based. United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948);

Orvis

v. Higgins, 180 F.2d 537, 539-40 (2d Cir. 1950).

9 18 U.S.C. § 4244 (1958): Ifthere is cause to believe that a person is "so mentally incompetent as to be unable to understand the proceedings against him or properly to assist in his
own defense... ," the trial judge shall hold a hearing to determine competency to stand
trial. This was also the test of competency prior to the statute. See McIntosh v. Pescor, 175
F.2d 95, 98 (6th Cir. 1949). The common law rule and, with minor variations in wording, the
rule in other jurisdictions, is identical with the statutory requirement. See WMHOrN,
MENTAL DisoRDER AS A CRIU-tAL DEFENSE, 430-31 (1954).
10 362 U.S. st 402.
11Brief for the Solicitor General, p. 10, Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960)

(mimeographed brief). Dr. Sturgell, testifying at the competency hearing, stated that the
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The statute does not specify the quantum or type of evidence necessary to
support the court's determination of competency; nor does it attempt to allocate the burden of proof: "If the [preliminary] report of the psychiatrist indicates a state of present insanity or such mental incompetency in the accused,
the court shall hold a hearing.., and make a finding with respect thereto."12
The courts of appeals have not interpreted this statute to limit the trial judge
to consideration of medical testimony;13 documentary evidence may be received;14 the accused may be heard and the court's observation of him may
overcome the effect of contrary medical testimony.'5 Even defense counsel's
belief that his client is competent is admissible.16 The action of the Court in
Dusky, however, indicates clearly that a trial judge cannot ignore overwhelm7
ing psychological evidence in reaching his decision.1 It may be that the thrust
of the opinion is broader than this: perhaps the Supreme Court is directing the
lower courts to give greater weight to psychiatric evidence than such evidence
has heretofore been accorded. But more important still, the Court may also
have included a subtle direction concerning the burden of proof. The Court in
Dusky rejected the apparent view of the court of appeals that there must be
substantial, unequivocal evidence of incompetency advanced by the defense;
perhaps the Court is now saying that the burden is on the government to ad8
vance substantial evidence of competency.'
defendant "was oriented as to time, place and person,"-a statement seized upon by the trial
judge as a basis for his finding. But the doctor was emphatic in his confirmation of the
Medical Center's report, and its conclusion that Dusky was unable to understand the proceedings against him and to assist in his own defense. Dr. Sturgell's testimony could not
reasonably be taken to support any conclusion other than that the defendant was incompetent to stand trial. See Brief for the Solicitor General, pp. 10-12, supra, and Dusky v.
United States, 271 F.2d 385, 397 (8th Cir. 1959).
12 18 U.S.C. § 4244 (1958).
13 "While, of course, expert psychiatric judgment is relevant on this question [competency

to stand trial], it cannot be controlling. Resolution of this issue requires not only a clinical
psychiatric judgment but also a judgment based upon a knowledge of criminal trial proceedings that is peculiarly within the competence of the trial judge." Gunther v. United States,
215 F.2d 493, 496-97 (D.C. Cir. 1954). Compare the discussion of the difference between the
standards for psychiatric examination of an accused and the "moral judgment" which a
jury must make when there is a defense of insanity at the time of the crime in Holloway v.
United States, 148 F.2d 665 (D.C. Cir. 1945).
14 United States v. Chandler, 72 F. Supp. 230 (D. Mass. 1947), aff'd 171 F.2d 921 (1st
Cir. 1948).
15United States v. Gundelfinger, 98 F. Supp. 630 (W.D. Pa. 1951).
16 Hill v. United States, 223 F.2d 699 (6th Cir. 1955).
17 Cf. Fielding v. United States, 251 F.2d 878 (D.C. Cir. 1957), where, after a jury trial,
the court of appeals reversed the denial of a motion for acquittal by reason of insanity notwithstanding the verdict of guilty. All of the psychiatric testimony indicated insanity at the
time ofthe crime and the only contrary testimony was that of a policeman on the scene of the
arrest.
18 The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has suggested that the preliminary
psychiatric report affords prima facie evidence of the validity of the report's conclusion.
Fooks v. United States, 246 F.2d 629 (D.C. Cir. 1956). If the conclusion of that report is that
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However, resolution of these questions must await interpretation of this
case by the lower courts, or a clearer statement by the Supreme Court itself,
since this case shows such a preponderance of evidence on one side of the issue
that it is impossible to extract a certain and definitive holding from the Court's
per curiam opinion. Not only was there no evidence presented to rebut the
testimony of the psychiatrist, but the trial judge did not hear the defendant
testify, and had no sufficient opportunity to observe him in the courtroom.
The second significant issue raised by Dusky involves the Court's ultimate
disposition of the case. Instead of remanding the case to the district court for
further consideration of the defendant's competency at the time of trial and
leaving the feasibility of a nuncpro tunc determination within the discretion of
the trial judge,19 as the Solicitor General had urged, 20 the Supreme Court remanded "for a new hearing to determine defendant's present competency to
stand trial, and for a new trial if defendant is found competent." 2' This disposition was ordered because of the "doubts and ambiguities regarding the
legal significance of the psychiatric testimony in this case and the resulting
difficulties of retrospectively determining the petitioner's competency as of
22
more than a year ago."
As has been noted, no other case has been found in which a trial court's
determination of competency has been overturned. The Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia has, however, reversed several convictions because
no formal competency hearing had been held. In Lloyd v. United States,2 3
the court attempted to distinguish the disposition of these appeals:
in those cases which have arisen on direct appeal the court has granted a new trial;24 while in those cases which have arisen on motions to
vacate sentence 25 the court has remanded for nunc pro tunc determinations of
the defendant is incompetent, then it would seem that the burden should shift to the prosecution. Professor Weihofen states the federal rule to be that the prosecution must "prove beyond
a reasonable doubt that the defendant is sane enough to stand trial .. " WEIMro-N, op. cit.
supra note 9, at 435, citing United States v. Chisholm, 149 Fed. 284 (1906). In the past, however, the courts of appeals seem to have required only a preponderance of the evidence. It

would appear to follow from some of the statements made by the courts that if the trial judge
has anything at all on which to base a judgment, that will suffice. See, e.g., Hill v. United
States, 223 F.2d 699 (6th Cir. 1955); McIntosh v. Pescor, 175 F.2d 95 (6th Cir. 1949).
19 See Seidner v. United States, 260 F.2d 732 (D.C. 1958).
20 Brief for the Solicitor General, pp. 12-13, supra note 11.
21

362 U.S. at 403. (Emphasis added.)

22 Ibid.
23 247
24

F.2d 522 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
Kelley v. United States, 221 F.2d 822 (D.C. Cir. 1954); Wear v. United States, 218
F.2d 24 (D.C. Cir. 1954); Perry v. United States, 195 F.2d 37 (D.C. Cir. 1952).
25 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1958). But this section does not require the reviewing court to remand a case for further findings if the findings are found to be insufficient; a new trial may

also be ordered.
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competency as of the time of trial. 26 But two more recent decisions by that
court belie this distinction. 27 Indeed, a new trial has not been ordered in a case
of this type since the Lloyd decision in 1954. Thus has been laid to rest, at least
temporarily, the conclusion of the Court in Kelley v. United States that the
statutory sequence requires that the competency of an accused be determined
before his trial, since "otherwise the determination would be made.., long
28
after the event which it was intended to precede."
Two cases involving competency to stand trial reached the Supreme Court
prior to the Dusky case; both were also decided per curiam. These two cases
arose on motions to vacate the sentences. In neither case had a formal competency hearing been held; but in both there was evidence sufficient to raise a
question as to the competency of the accused. The first case was Frame v.
Hudspeth,2 9 which the Court remanded "for the purpose of making a full inquiry into the mental status of the petitioner at the time he entered the pleas of
guilty"-more than three years prior to the decision of the Supreme Court. In
the second case, Bishop v. United States,30 the Court also remanded for a nune
pro tunc determination of competency. In that case the trial had taken place
eighteen years prior to the Court's order.
The reasons given by the Court in Dusky for ordering a hearing to determine the defendant's present competency and for a possible second trial are
not sustained by the previous cases. There is substantial difficulty in retrospectively determining competency; but the Court was faced with much longer
time lapses in both Frameand Bishop. Yet in neither case did the Court provide for a determination of present competency. Moreover, this precise problem is involved in the many cases in which the defense of insanity at the time
of the crime is raised and the jury is asked to determine retrospectively the
mental condition of the accused. "[E]xaminations designed to reveal a person's mental condition at a past date are not only standard practice, but are
often essential to the proper administration of justice." 3 ' Also, it would be
difficult to contend that, despite ambiguities "regarding the legal significance
26
See, e.g., Krupnick v. United States, 264 F.2d 213 (8th Cir. 1959); Seidner v. United
States, 260 F.2d 732 (D.C. Cir. 1958); Lloyd v. United States, 247 F.2d 522 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
27
Wells v. United States, 239 F.2d 931 (D.C. Cir. 1956); Gunther v. United States, 215
F.2d 493 (D.C. Cir. 1954). Both cases were brought on direct appeal; both were remanded
for nunc pro tunc determinations.
28 221 F.2d 822, 825 (D.C. Cir. 1954). See Contee v. United States, 215 F.2d 324, 329
(D.C. Cir. 1954) (dissenting opinion), where it is pointed out that remanding a case for a
nunc pro tunc determination assimilates proceedings under 18 U.S.C. § 4244 (1958) to those
under 18 U.S.C. § 4245 (1958), the procedural section for a prisoner who has been convicted
and is serving his sentence. Section 4245 provides for a nunc pro tunc determination of competency, if the issue has not previously been raised,upon certification by the Director of the
Bureau of Prisons that there is probable cause to believe that a person convicted of an offense
against the United States was mentally incompetent at the time of trial.
29 309 U.S. 632 (1940). (Emphasis added.)
30 350 U.S. 961 (1956). (Per curiam.)
31Gearhart v. United States, 272 F.2d 499, 503 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
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of the psychiatric testimony," a retrospective determination would have been
more difficult in Dusky, where thorough records of the psychiatric investigation were available, than in Frameand Bishop, where no previous competency
hearing was held.
It is possible that the real reason for the decision in this case is that the
Supreme Court itself concluded from the uncontroverted medical testimony
that the defendant was in fact incompetent at the time of his trial.32 On this
assumption, it would be superfluous to remand for a nuncpro tunc determination of competency, since the result of such a proceeding would be obvious.
If such is the case, the opinion is of little value as precedent or as a guide to the
lower courts, for it is unlikely that future cases will arise with facts pointing so
clearly to one conclusion.
On the other hand, it is possible that there is another, and more far-reaching
basis for the Court's action. Retrospective determination of sanity at the time
a crime was committed is unavoidable, since only as of that time is the question material. But there is no corresponding necessity for retrospective determination of competency to stand trial. Competency to stand trial is presently
ascertainable, and it is an important element in the administration of criminal
justice. Ideally, no person should be tried without a formal competency hearing, if there is reason to suspect his ability to aid in his own defense. If there is
cause to question the competency of a person already convicted, when either
no formal hearing has been held, or when there was error in a prior determination, then the accused should have the benefit of a new hearing and, if necessary, a new trial.
But weighed against this ideal are the practical problems of criminal administration. If the accused were found presently competent to be tried anew for a
crime committed many years before, severe difficulties concerning availability
and credibility of witnesses to the crime would be raised. 33 It may be that the
Court in Dusky weighed the ideal against these practical considerations and
found the balance in favor of determination of present competency. This
would also help to explain Bishop and Frame.There the "difficulties of retrospectively determining" competency may have been outweighed by the need
for effective criminal administration, since the time lapses between trial and
appeal were much greater.
It may be, however, that the Court, in remanding for determination of
present competency, was motivated by an entirely different concern. The argument based on the prescribed statutory sequence, 34 for example, has never
32

Compare Dusky with Mesarosh v. United States, 352 U.S. 1 (1956), and Communist
Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 351 U.S. 115 (1956). In both of these cases the
Court's view as to the ultimate issue seems to have influenced the disposition of the case,

even though that view was not, as it was not here, articulated in the opinion of the Court.
33 In Bishop the credibility of witnesses testifying to an occurrence which happened eighteen years before could certainly be questioned.
34 See text at note 28 supra.
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been satisfactorily rebutted. Whatever the reason for this disposition, the
Court could have been more explicit.35 What then is the reason for the reversal
itself? Was it based solely on the preponderance of the evidence on one side of
the issue? Or is there also in the opinion a subtle direction to the lower courts
to change their perspective as to burden of proof on the question of competency? Is psychiatric evidence hereafter to be given greater weight? The per
curiam disposition of Dusky leaves these questions unanswered.
35 Assuming the validity of the balancing of the ideal with the practical as a basis for the
decision in this case, the use of the per curiam opinion may be explained by the Court's
reluctance to assume the virtually impossible task of announcing a rule which would apply
in all situations. But in this event the Court should at least have articulated a test which the
lower courts could apply in future cases. On the other hand, if the assumption is correct that
the preponderance of the evidence on one side of the issue makes this case sui generis, then
the Court is putting the per curiam opinion to good use.

BURDEN OF PROOF OF ELIGIBILITY FOR RELIEF FROM DEPORTATION

In Kimm v. Rosenberg,' a five-to-four per curiam decision, the Supreme
Court upheld the administrative denial of discretionary relief to an alien who
sought to mitigate some of the adverse effects of deportation. The alien, a
Korean, had been admitted as a student in 1928. He subsequently violated his
exempt status by terminating his studies, and became subject to deportation. 2
After proceedings had been opened in 1948, the alien filed for suspension of
the proceedings or, in the alternative, for permission to depart voluntarily to
avoid deportation. 3 Section 19(c) of the Immigration Act of 1917 authorized
the Attorney General, at his discretion, to grant such relief "in the case of any
alien (other than one to whom subsection (d) of this section is applicable) who
is deportable under any law of the United States and who has proved good
moral character for the preceding five years.. .."4
While attempting to establish the required good moral character, the alien
asserted the fifth amendment protection against self-incrimination and refused to answer questions regarding Communist affiliations subsequent to his
arrival in the United States. Despite continued queries and admonitions by the
immigration officials and the hearing officer, the petitioner persisted in his
1363 U.S. 405 (1960).
2
Immigration Act of 1924, 43 Stat. 153, made special provision for foreign citizens desiring to pursue formal study in the United States. Privileges granted by the provision ceased
upon termination of study. These provisions have been replaced by the Immigration and
Nationality Act of 1952, 72 Stat. 351, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (1958).
3 The advantages of voluntary departure are significant. The stigma of compulsory ejection is avoided; barriers to the possibility and speed of a subsequent return to the United
States are removed; and the alien can select his own destination. GORDON & ROSENFELD,

IMMIGRATON LAW AND PRocEDnuR

§ 7.2 (1959).

462 Stat. 1206 (1948). These provisions have been replaced by the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 66 Stat. 214, 8 U.S.C. § 1254 (1958).
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refusal, whereupon the hearing officer found that "as a matter of administrative discretion, the facts and circumstances in this case do not warrant the
exercise of discretionary relief."5 The Board of Immigration Appeals concluded that Kimm was "not entitled to any form of discretionary relief." 6 On
appeal, the district court ruled 7 that the issue before it was not the implementation of administrative discretion, but rather the determination of petitioner's
eligibility therefor.8 Both the district court and the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit 9 affirmed the Board's ruling that the petitioner was ineligible for
discretionary relief on the grounds that he had failed to prove that he was a
person of good moral character and that he had not established non-deportability under section 19(d) of the Immigration Act of 1917.
Section 19(d) of the Immigration Act of 1917 provided that "the provisions
of subsection (c) shall not be applicable in the case of any alien who is deportable" for violation of the sections listed.10 Violation of the student visa
provisions, with which the petitioner in Kimm was charged, was not one of
those enumerated in section 19(d). Deportability because of membership in, or
affiliation with, the Communist Party and other parties committed to totalitarian government was, however, incorporated in section 19(d) as a violation
precluding relief under section 19(c) by the Internal Security Act of 1950.11
The Supreme Court's decision was based upon an interpretation of a ruling,
issued by the Immigration and Naturalization Service to provide for the administration of discretionary relief measures, which included a provision that
the alien must sustain the burden of demonstrating eligibility for the discretionary relief.12 The Court held that the burden of proof imposed by the administrative regulations required that the alien not only show that he had been
5 Kimm v. Hoy, 263 F.2d 773, 777 (9th Cir. 1959); Record, p. 74, Kimm v. Rosenberg,
363 U.S. 405 (1960).
6 Kinm v. Hoy, 263 F.2d 773, 777 (9th Cir. 1959); Record, p. 79, Kimm v. Rosenberg,
363 U.S. 405 (1960).
7 Kimm v. Hoy, 263 F.2d 773,777 (9th Cir. 1959); Record, pp. 8-12, Kimm v. Rosenberg,
363 U.S 405 (1960).
8 The question of eligibility for discretionary relief may involve determinations of fact and
law, and is subject to judicial review. GoRDoN & ROSENFELD, op. cit. supra note 3, § 7.1.
9 Kimm v. Hoy, 263 F.2d 773 (9th Cir. 1959).
10 62 Stat. 1206 (1948). These provisions have been replaced by the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, supra note 4.
11Aliens deportable under the Act of October 16, 1918,40 Stat. 1012, entitled "An Act to
exclude and expel from the United States aliens who are members of the anarchistic and
similar classes," as amended, were among those precluded from obtaining discretionary
relief under section 19(d). Section 22 of the Internal Security Act of 1950, 64 Stat. 987, 1006,
amended the Act of 1918 to include Communist affiliates. These provisions have been replaced by the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 66 Stat. 182, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (28)
(1958).
12 15 Fed. Reg. 7638 (1949). "The burden of establishing that the alien meets the statutory
requirements precedent to the exercise of discretoinary relief shall be upon the alien."
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of good moral character for the required period, but also that he prove nondeportability under the provisions of section 19(d). The lower court decision
adverse to the alien was affirmed on the ground that the alien was not eligible
for discretionary relief under section 19(c) because he had failed to prove that
he was not deportable under the provisions pertaining to affiliation with the
Communist Party.13 It was not necessary, therefore, to consider the adequacy
of evidence submitted to prove good moral character.
Mr. Justice Douglas, with whom the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Black
concurred, dissented on the ground that a ruling against the petitioner implied
that the assertion of a constitutional right demonstrated bad moral character.14
Mr. Justice Brennan, with whom the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Douglas
joined, dissented on the ground that the majority ruling was an unwarranted
extension of the statutory burden of proof required of a petitioning alien.15
Previous decisions interpreting the statute had turned not on the extent of
6
the burden, but on the question of what constituted good moral character.'
The Kimm case held that the alien must prove not only that he has satisfied the
moral character requirements, but also that section 19(d) was not applicable
to him. Since section 19(d) stated that "the provisions of subsection (c) shall
not be applicable in the case of any alien who"17 comes within the scope of
subsection (d), the effect of this new proof requirement was to charge the petitioning alien with the task of demonstrating that section 19(c) is not "not
applicable" to him. In reaching this curious conclusion, the Court appears to
have ignored several factors which may justify placing on the government the
burden of proving the applicability of section 19(d) before the petitioner is
declared ineligible for relief under section 19(c).18
Since deportation proceedings are of a civil rather than criminal nature, 19
13 Although the proceedings were commenced prior to the enactment of the statutes add-

ing Communist affiliation to the violations in section 19(d), the petitioner was subject to the
provisions of the subsequent enactment. For other cases where legislation has resulted in
deportation for an alien's acts committed prior to the enactment of the statute, see Marcello
v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302 (1955), and Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522 (1954).
14 363 U.S. at 408. See text at note 36 infra.
15 363 U.S. at 411. See note 28 infra.
16 Good moral character, as interpreted under the 1917 Act, was "an amorphous term,
and its orbit was charted by assessing the current mores of the community." GORDON &
ROSENFELD, op. cit. supra note 3, § 7.1. Moral excellence was not demanded; adherence only
to the moral standards of the average person was required. Matter of C-, 3 I.N. 833 (1950).
17 See note 10 supra.
18 Counsel for the alien petitioner asserted that the party claiming the exception to a
general body of law must demonstrate the applicability of the exception to the present proceedings, relying on Javierre v. Central Altagracia, 217 U.S. 502 (1910), and Schlemmer v.
Buffalo, R. & P. Ry., 205 U.S. 1, 10 (1907). The Court, however, declined to rule that the
parenthetical reservation in 19(c) was such an exception to the remainder of the section.
See text at note 4 supra.
19 United States ex rel. Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 U.S. 149 (1923).
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aliens have been charged with the burden of establishing their right to remain
in the United States where unlawful entry has been alleged. 20 But where an
alien has been charged with deportation based upon his conduct subsequent
to a lawful entry, it had previously been held that a presumption of innocence
obtains, and, under the due process clause, the burden is on the government to
2
demonstrate the reasons for deportation. 1
The Kimm decision places upon the alien, for the first time, the burden of
proving non-deportability for acts subsequent to a lawful entry. The Court
seems to explain this result by pointing out that deportability involves the loss
of rights while discretionary relief is a privilege ;22 and those seeking the privilege must prove eligibility therefor. 23 Although, admittedly, the relief itself is a
privilege, applicants have, by statute, been granted the right to a determination
of eligibility for that privilege. 24 Any alien who is not deportable under section
19(d) is entitled to a positive determination of eligibility by proving good
moral character. If the prior lawful entry cases which held that the government must sustain the burden of proving deportability for activities subsequent to entry 25 are correct, then all aliens against whom such proof has not
been brought are not deportable under 19(d). They, therefore, have a statutory
right to an affirmative determination of eligibility by establishing the requisite
good moral character. Yet the Kimm result requires, in addition, that nondeportability under section 19(d) be established by the alien-a result seemingly inconsistent with prior cases involving conduct subsequent to lawful
entry, and not justifiable merely by asserting that a privilege rather than a
right is involved.
In view of the overwhelming significance attributed to one administrative
regulation, 26 a further basis for analysis of the Supreme Court's reasoning may
be provided by a collateral regulation of the Immigration and Naturalization
Service. This regulation, describing the procedure for granting the privilege of
voluntary departure, enabled the administrative officer to exercise the authority conferred upon him by section 19(c) in favor of "aliens charged with being
subject to deportation upon any ground other than those set forth in 19(d).
"27

20 Werrmann v. Perkins, 79 F.2d 467 (7th Cir. 1935).
21 Hughes v. Tropello, 296 Fed. 306 (3d Cir. 1924); GORDON & ROsENFELD, op. cit. supra

note 3, § 5.10(b).
22 363 U.S. at 408.
23 Cf.Lerner v. Casey, 357 U.S. 468 (1958); Beilan v. Board of Pub. Education, 357 U.S.
399 (1958). But cf. Slochower v. Board of Higher Education, 350 U.S. 551 (1956).
24 GoRDoN & ROSENFELD, op. cit. supra note 3, § 7.1(b).
25 See text at note 21 supra.
26 See text at note 12 supra.
27 15 Fed. Reg. 7636 (1949) (emphasis supplied): "Voluntary departure; special proce-

dure. a) Notwithstanding any other provisions of this part,

.. .

the hearing officer, at any
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Kimm had been "charged with being subject to deportation" upon a ground
not set forth in 19(d). One would normally conclude that Kimm, therefore,
was among those in whose favor the immigration officials could grant relief if
the statutory requirement of good moral character was fulfilled. If this collateral regulation was to be meaningful, it would seem to have been an attempt to remove considerations of deportability under 19(d) where such deportability was never charged. The Kimm decision, however, precludes such an
interpretation.
The Court's ruling might be defended by asserting that this collateral regulation was only a restatement of the statute and, therefore, the meaning of the
regulation depended upon the interpretation of the statute. 28 After the Kimm
decision, the regulation meant that those charged with 19(d) violations were
immediately precluded from relief, and that all others had to rebut the presumption that they are deportable under 19(d), in addition to establishing
good moral character. If everyone who applied for discretionary relief had to
prove non-deportability under section 19(d), the application for relief automatically charged him, in effect, with deportation under that section. Until
this presumptive charge was disproved, an applicant would not be eligible to
have discretion exercised in his favor. The words "aliens charged with being
subject to deportation upon any ground other than set forth in 19(d)" thus
come to mean "aliens who have proved that they could not be deported for a
ground set forth in 19(d)." The problems of such a construction are readily
apparent.
Finally, it should be noted that alternative grounds were available upon
which the petitioner's request for discretionary relief might originally have
been denied without increasing the burden of proof imposed upon an alien to
establish statutory eligibility. It is well established that the Attorney General,
at his discretion, may choose to deny relief to eligible applicants. 29 Such discretion is an administrative matter, not judicially reviewable 30 unless an abuse of
discretion is alleged. 31 Where the reasons for denying relief to an eligible pertime during the hearing, and before the record of hearing is submitted to the Commissioner,
may exercise the authority conferred upon the Attorney General by section 19(c)(1) of the
Immigration Act of 1917... to permit an alien to depart from the United States to any
country of his choice at his own expense if (1) the alien is charged with being subject to de-

portation upon any ground other than those set forth in section 19(d) of the Immigration
Act of February 5, 1917, as amended .. "
28 It is interesting to note that if the regulations had been consistently read as mere restatements of the statute, the burden of proof levied in the regulation applied by the Court
would go only to the proof required by the statute: Petitioner ". . . must prove good moral
character .. " See dissent by Mr. Justice Brennan, 363 U.S. at 411, 414 n.3.
29 United States ex rel. Hintopoulos v. Shaughnessy, 353 U.S. 72 (1957).
30 United States ex rel. Bruno v. Sweet, 235 F.2d 801 (8th Cir. 1956); DAvis, ADMnIsTRATlvE LAW 842-43 (1951).
31Cf. United States ex rel. Hintopoulos v. Shaughnessy, 353 U.S. 72 (1957).
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son are neither arbitrary nor capricious, abuse of discretion will not be
found.32 In the Kimm case, the hearing officer denied relief as an exercise of his
discretionary powers. The Board of Immigration Appeals, in another case, has
held that an alien's refusal to answer questions on the ground that his answers
might be self-incriminating demonstrates that he is not a desirable resident in
whose favor discretionary relief should be granted. 33 It is not likely that a
denial of relief as an exercise of the Attorney General's discretion could be
termed an abuse of that discretion where, as in Kimm, the petitioner refused to
cooperate in determining the facts which were to govern the disposition of his
petition. 34 This question was not before the Court, however, because the interpretation given to the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals was
that there had been no exercise of administrative discretion. 35
On the other hand, the Supreme Court, in reaching its decision, might have
relied on the inadequacy of the petitioner's demonstration of moral character. 36 Under

similar circumstances, relief has been denied to an alien who re-

fused to answer questions regarding his activities during the period of asserted
good moral character. 37 The rationale for such a result appears to be that recalcitrance of this nature places an alien outside the ambit of the good moral
character requirement.
The Immigration Act of 1917 and the amendments thereto were substantialy repealed by the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952. While Kimm
was decided under the 1917 Act,38 most cases will henceforth be determined
32 Id. at 77.

33 In the Matter of M-, 5 I.N. 261 (1953).

34

Discretionary rulings denying relief to eligible applicants have been judicially affirmed
despite seemingly slight grounds for denial. The failure of an alien to avail himself of the
privilege of voluntary departure within the stipulated time period has been the basis for
rejection of a second application for relief. United States ex rel. Bartsch v. Watkins, 175
F.2d 245 (2d Cir. 1949). A deportable seaman's petition has been rejected so that other alien
sailors would be deterred from attempting to transgress the immigration laws by clandestine
entries. United States ex rel. Ciannamea v. Neely, 202 F.2d 289 (7th Cir. 1953). But where
the alien's violation was the result of an inadvertent error caused by differing dates on a
permit and a visa, the denial of relief has been held an abuse of discretion. Hegerich v. Del
Guercio, 255 F.2d 701 (9th Cir. 1958).
35 See text at note 7 supra.
36 But see dissent by Mr. Justice Douglas, 363 U.S. at 408.
37 See Jimenez v. Barber, 226 F.2d 449 (9th Cir. 1955), where a stay of deportation was
ordered after the petitioner had been ruled ineligible for discretionary relief because of his
refusal to answer questions regarding memberships, associations, and beliefs during the
period in which good moral character had been asserted. At the subsequent hearing, the
court affirmed the administrative finding. 235 F.2d 922 (9th Cir. 1956).
38 The savings clause of the 1952 Act provided that cases such as Kimm, pending on the
effective date, should be decided under the old act. The petitioner may have been able to
prove eligibility for voluntary departure if his case had come under the 1952 Act. Section
244(e) includes a provision that persons who have been found deportable for membership
in subversive groups can demonstrate eligibility for voluntary departure by meeting more
stringent requirements of duration of residency and good moral character. 66 Stat. 214,
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under the new statute. Whatever may be the future application of this case in
the interpretation of the provisions of the new act, 39 the rationale which the
Court adopted in reaching its conclusion is open to question in the light of
prior rulings on the burden of proof in deportation cases.
8 U.S.C. § 1254(e). Also, subversive affiliation is not included within an enumeration of acts
which preclude a finding of good moral character. 66 Stat. 168, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f) (1958).
39

The 1952 Act enables the Attorney General to "permit any alien under deportation
proceedings, other than an alien within the provisions" of certain paragraphs which list
particular violations, to depart voluntarily if the required good moral character has been
demonstrated. 66 Stat. 214, 8 U.S.C. § 1254(e) (1958). It can reasonably be concluded that,
to sustain the burden of proving the non-applicability of the exception, a petitioner need
prove only that he is an alien not "under deportation proceedings ...within the provisions"
of the excepted sections. If he is to be forced to show non-deportability on the excepted
grounds, his deportation proceedings must be brought within the provisions of the statute
which state those grounds. Cf. In the Matter of T-, 5 I.N. 459 (1953).

LONG STANDING AS TEST To DETERMINE VALIDITY OF REVENUE RULINGS

In a tax refund suit the Government may raise any defense which a private
party would be entitled to assert.1 This prerogative has included the defense
that a ruling issued by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue or a regulation
promulgated by the Secretary of the Treasury, on which the taxpayer's claim
is based, is invalid. 2 Cory Corp. v. Sauber3 suggests that the Government may
not successfully assert this defense when the ruling or regulation in question is
one of long continued and uniform application, even though the Court may
disagree with the propriety of the Service interpretation.
Plaintiff corporation, a manufacturer of refrigeration equipment, sold two

air-conditioning units, one in May of 1954, the other in August of 1955. Under
section 3405(c) of the 1939 Internal Revenue Code and section 4111 of the
1954 Code applying to self-contained air-conditioning units, 4 the district direc1 "It was generally supposed that the collection of taxes and consequent litigation presented issues no different in kind from those reflected by an ordinary private suit in which the
outcome depends on the meaning of statutory language." Eisenstein, Some IconoclasticReflections on Tax Administration, 58 Hxv. L. Rav. 477, 506 (1945). See Dobson v. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 489 (1943).
2E.g., United States v. Leslie Salt Co., 350 U.S. 383 (1956); Higgins v. Commissioner,
312 U.S. 212 (1941); Estate of Sanford v. Commissioner, 308 U.S. 39 (1939); Manhattan
General Equipment Co. v. Commissioner, 297 U.S. 129 (1936). The approval of such a
defense was established in the famous case of Couzens v. Commissioner, 11 B.T.A. 1040

(1928).
3363 U.S. 709 (1960).
4 The relevant parts of the 1939 Code under which the first sale was made are as follows:
"Section 3405. Tax on mechanical refrigerators, quick-freeze units, and self-contained airconditioning units. There shall be imposed on the following articles ... sold by the manufacturer, producer, or importer a tax equivalent to 5 per centum (10 per centum in the case
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tor assessed on each sale a ten percent manufacturer's excise tax. The corporation filed a claim for refund to determine the taxability of some 50,000 similar
units. It relied on published Service rulings which construed the provisions as
applying only to household-type units and construed such units as those having one or less "total motor horsepower." 5 In the district court the taxpayer
maintained that "total motor horsepower" as used in the rulings meant total
actual horsepower; the Government urged that the term referred to rated
horsepower or nominal horsepower. 6 The units had an actual horsepower
greater than one, but had a nominal rating of only three-quarters. The court
interpreted the rulings as referring to actual horsepower, thus holding that the
units were exempt from taxation.
In the court of appeals the Government urged that the rulings, as construed
by the lower court, were contrary to the intent of the statutes and, therefore,
7
void. The Seventh Circuit accepted this argument.
The Supreme Court, however, held that the Commissioner's rulings were
valid. It found that "there is indeed evidence that the less-than-one horsepower test was designed to draw the line between household and commercial
types of air-conditioning equipment." 8 The Court observed:
The commissioner consistently adhered to the horsepower test for more than 10
years, and Congress did not change the statute though it was specifically advised
in 1956 that that was the test which was being applied. We cannot say that such a
of articles subject to tax under subsection (c)) of the price for which sold: ... (c) Air Conditioners.-Self-contained air-conditioning units."
The second sale was made under the 1954 Code. "Subchapter B-Household Type Equipment... Part I-Refrigeration Equipment. Section 4111. Imposition of Tax. There is hereby imposed upon the sale of the following articles... by the manufacturer, producer, or
importer a tax equivalent to the specified percent of the price for which sold:... Articles
Taxable at 10 Percent-Self-contained air-conditioning units."
5 S.T. 934, 1948-2 CuM. BuLL. 180; Rev. Rul. 54-462, 1954-2 CuM. BULL. 410.
6 Actual horsepower is that which a motor will deliver continuously under its full normal
load. Rated horsepower is that which is determined by computation of the breakdown torque
of the motor, in this case by applying the tests of the National Electrical Manufacturers
Association. Nominal horsepower is that which is arbitrarily assigned to a motor by the
manufacturer and has little, if any, relationship to the actual horsepower capacity of the
motor. In this case, the nominal horsepower of the motors was three-quarters, while the
actual and rated horsepower exceeded one.
7 Cory Corp. v. Sauber, 266 F.2d 58, 62 (7th Cir. 1959), rehearingdenied,267 F.2d 802
(1959). In lieu of the horsepower test, the court substituted the "housewife test": "An air
conditioner is of the household-type when it is made to meet the needs of a household. If a
housewife enters a store of an air conditioner dealer and expresses a desire to buy an air
conditioner for her home, she will be furnished with an air conditioner of the householdtype, i.e. one adapted to the home space which she seeks to air condition. Such an air conditioner is the type mentioned in subparagraph (c) of the sections of the code now under
discussion." Ibid.
8 363 U.S. at 711.
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construction was not a permissible one.., especially where it continued without
deviation for over a decade. 9
Whenever the Court is called upon to construe a statute, its determination
of the statutory meaning is automatically retroactive to the date of the statute's
enactment.10 This retroactivity is the logical result of the concept that the
Court simply gives effect to the congressional intent which was present at the
date of the statute's enactment." This retroactive determination ordinarily involves no unfairness to a litigant when the Court construes a statute which has
not previously been interpreted by an administrative agency. Here the litigant
is aware of the statute's indefinite content. But when the Court determines the
content of a Code provision which previously has been interpreted by the
Service, it is dealing not with an unresolved question, but with an established
interpretation-at least as to those to whom the Service interpretation was addressed. In this situation, invalidation of the Service interpretation, with its
consequent retrospective determination of tax liability, may often result in
unfairness to the taxpayer who has relied upon the ruling or regulation.12 The
question presented to the Court is under what circumstances shall the administrative interpretation be overturned or sustained, or phrased conventionally,
what weight shall be given to the administrative interpretation in determining
the meaning of the statute.
A long line of cases indicates that little, if any, weight will be accorded
Service rulings of the Commissioner, as distinguished from regulations (and
Treasury Decisions) of the Secretary of the Treasury or his delegate.13 Whereas regulations set forth general policy and procedure of the Service, rulings
4
determine the taxability of a particular transaction or series of transactions.'
9 Id. at 712. Mr. Justice Clark, dissenting (with whom the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice
Black joined), maintained that the tax applied to all self-contained units, not merely those of
the household-type. Id. at 714. Mr. Justice Frankfurter dissented in a separate opinion. Id.
at 712.
10 This factor is pointed out by Mr. Justice Frankfurter, dissenting, in Cory.
11United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936). This position that the Court is doing nothing
more than expressing legislative intent present at the time of the statute's passage is a gross
oversimplification. See Western Union Tel. Co. v. Lenroot, 323 U.S. 490 (1945); Estate of
Sanford v. Commissioner, 308 U.S. 39 (1939). See also Eisenstein, supra note 1, at 509;
Radin, A CaseStudy in Statutory Interpretation:Western Union Co. v. Lenroot, 33 CALiF. L.
REV. 219 (1945).
12 See Lesavoy Foundation v. Commissioner, 238 F.2d 589 (3d Cir. 1956). See also Griswold, A Summary of the Regulations Problem, 54 HARV. L. REv. 398, 408-19 (1941); 1
DAvIs, ADmmusRATvE LAW § 5.09 at 347 (1958).
13 E.g., Higgins v. Commissioner, 312 U.S. 212 (1941); Biddle v. Commissioner, 302 U.S.
573 (1938); Helvering v. New York Trust Co., 292 U.S. 455 (1934); Sims v. United States,
252 F.2d 434 (4th Cir. 1958). Mr. Justice Clark, dissenting in Cory, observed: "Finally,
these rulings do not have the force of regulations, and, as petitioners admit, they cannot
'overrule a statute.'" 363 U.S. at 717.
14 Only the more important rulings are published in the Internal Revenue Bulletin; the
remainder take the form of private letters. For a discussion of Service procedure in regard to
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Each issue of the Internal Revenue Bulletin states that "rulings ... have none
of the force or effect of Treasury Decisions and do not commit the Department to any interpretation of the law which has not been formally approved
and promulgated by the Treasury." In view of this cautionary statement, the
Court has often refused to give rulings any weight.15 These decisions have led
one commentator to remark that "as a practical matter, such rulings do not
mean very much if either the Bureau or taxpayer chooses to disregard them."16
Another line of cases indicates that the form which Service interpretations
take does not affect the degree of authoritative force which will be accorded
them. 17 Cory appears to reinforce this approach. The Court, declining to comment on the point that mere rulings were involved, treated the rulings as it
would regulations. This seems to be the better reasoned approach: to draw
distinctions based solely on form is highly questionable and arbitrary.B
The Court has formulated three criteria which tend to give the Service interpretations greater weight or authoritative effect: (1) when the interpretation
was formulated contemporaneously with the enactment of the statute, 19 (2)
when the statute which the ruling or regulation interprets has been re-enacted
by Congress with the interpretation in effect, 20 and (3) when the interpretation
is of long-standing and uniform application. 21 Although contemporaneous
and re-enactment may serve as a guide to congressional intent, neither bears
the issuance of rulings, see Sugarman, Federal Tax Rulings Practice, 10 TAX L. REv. 1
(1954); Tannenbaum, How to Obtain Treasury DepartmentRulings, 33 TAXES 346 (1955).
15 See cases cited, supra note 13.
16 Eisenstein, supra note 1, at 480.
17

E.g., Corn Products Refining Co. v. Commissioner, 350 U.S. 46 (1955); Helvering v.
Wilshire Oil Co., 308 U.S. 90 (1939); Estate of Sanford v. Commissioner, 308 U.S. 39 (1939).
18 As Dean Griswold has pointed out, "Bureau practice is Bureau practice, and when it
clearly appears and has been long-continued, it should be given effect regardless of the form
in which it appears." Griswold, supra note 12 at 418, n. 60.
19 E.g., United States v. Leslie Salt Co., 350 U.S. 383 (1956); Norwegian Nitrogen Prod.
Co. v. United States, 288 U.S. 294 (1933); Edwards' Lessee v. Darby, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.)
206 (1827).
20 The "re-enactment doctrine" may be traced to United States v. G. Falk & Brother,
204 U.S. 143 (1907). The classic statement of the rule is found in Helvering v. R. J. Reynolds
Tobacco Co., 306 U.S. 110, 115 (1939): "Under the established rule Congress must be taken
to have approved the administrative construction and thereby to have given it the force of
law."

The fictitious theory upon which the doctrine is based has been roundly criticized. See
Brown, Regulations, Reenactment, and the Revenue Acts, 54 HARv. L. Rav. 377 (1941);
Feller, Addendum to the RegulationsProblem, 54 HARv. L. REv. 1311 (1941); Griswold, A
Summary ofthe RegulationsProblem, 54 HAv. L. REv. 398 (1941); Paul, Use and Abuse of
Tax Regulations in Statutory Construction,49 YALE L. J. 660 (1940); Alvord, Treasury Regulations and the Wilshire Oil Case, 40 CoLUM. L. REv. 252 (1940).
21 E.g., United States v. Leslie Salt Co., 350 U.S. 383 (1956); Commissioner v. Estate of
Sternberger, 348 U.S. 187 (1955); Norwegian Nitrogen Prod. Co. v. United States, 288 U.S.
294 (1933).
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on the question of unfairness by retroactive statutory construction. Thus, it
has been argued that the third is the only criterion that should be considered
by the Court, and that once the Service interpretation has been in effect for
22
several years and has been consistently applied, it should not be overturned.
The argument is that invalidation of long continued determinations of taxability destroys the fundamental goals of certainty, predictability and reliability,
and that retroactive determination of tax liability "violate[s] fundamental
American concepts of fairness and justice .... ,,23
It seems clear that it is not duration of an interpretation itself which should
call for the Court's approval of the ruling or regulation, but the detrimental
retroactive effect to the taxpayer which results from invalidation. Accordingly,
when the Court states that it will not overturn an administrative interpretation
which has "continued without deviation for over a decade," 24 it is stating that
it will not sanction the retroactive determination of taxability which would
follow from a holding of invalidity. In many instances, however, the Court has
overturned long-standing Service interpretations. 25 And the Service has issued
interpretations retroactive in effect with the Court's approval. 26 In Automobile
Club of Michigan v. Commissioner2 7 the Court indicated that although the
Commissioner has authority to issue retroactive interpretations, they would
not be upheld if such retroactive determination constituted abuse of discretion.2 8 Thus, the Commissioner may issue a retroactive ruling only when he
22
Griswold, supra note 20 at 408-18. See also Surrey, The Scope and Effect of Treasury
Regulations Under the Income, Estate, andGift Taxes, 88 U. PA. L. REv. 556, 574-76 (1940).
Cf. Lesavoy Foundation v. Commissioner, 238 F.2d 589 (3d Cir. 1956).
23
Williams, Retroactivityin the FederalTax Field, 1960 So. CALIF. TAX INsTrrTUT 79,128.

24 363 U.S. at 712.
25
E.g., Social Security Board v. Nierotko, 327 U.S. 358 (1946); Koshland v. Helvering
298 U.S. 441 (1936); Manhattan Gen. Equipment Co. v. Commissioner, 297 U.S. 129 (1936).
26
Couzens v. Commissioner, 11 B.T.A. 1040 (1928) firmly established the power of the
Commissioner and Secretary to issue interpretations retroactive in application. See also Manhattan Gen. Equipment Co. v. Commissioner, supra note 25, and cases collected in 1 L. Ed.
2d 2051.

27 353 U.S. 180 (1957).

28 See Lesavoy Foundation v. Commissioner, 238 F.2d 589 (3d Cir. 1956); H.S.D. Co. v.
Kavanagh, 191 F.2d 831 (6th Cir. 1951); Woodworth v. Kales, 26 F.2d 178 (6th Cir. 1938);
Gugginheim v. Rasquin, 28 F. Supp. 322 (E.D.N.Y. 1939), rev'd on other grounds, 110 F.2d
371 (2d Cir. 1940), aff'd, 312 U.S. 254 (1941). But see, Knapp-Monarch Co. v. Commissioner,
139 F.2d 863 (8th Cir. 1944); Stearns Coal & Lumber Co. v. Glenn, 42 F. Supp. 28 (W.D.
Ky. 1941).
Congress has expressly delegated the authority to interpret the Code to the Secretary and
the Commissioner in section 7805(a) of the 1954 Code. Recognizing that retroactive determinations of taxability may often produce inequitable results to the taxpayer, Congress also
has authorized the Secretary and the Commissioner to issue regulations and rulings prospective in application. The present provision is section 7805(b): "Retroactivity of Regulations
or Rulings-The Secretary or his delegate may prescribe the extent, if any, to which any
ruling or regulation, relating to the internal revenue laws, shall be applied without retroac-
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does not violate the discretionary power delegated to him by Congress. Issuing
a retroactive ruling or regulation by the Service or Treasury has the same practical effect as holding a ruling or regulation invalid by a court. It is suggested,
then, that the Government may challenge a long-standing Service interpretation of the Code in court only when a Service ruling or regulation, retroactive
in application, could be issued by the Service to supersede the original interpretation. The test of validity or invalidity of a ruling or regulation now becomes whether the result of a holding of invalidity would produce a retroactive result sufficient to constitute an abuse of discretion.
Two examples may serve to illustrate this conclusion. In example one, 29 a
Code provision states that Xis taxable. Xis composed of A's and B's; i.e., X
is an entity which may be ascertained without reference to the Code or Treasury regulations. The Commissioner issues a ruling stating that Xincludes only
A's. Several years later he issues a ruling stating that X includes B's as well,
and applies this interpretation retroactively. It seems that this second ruling
would not be considered an abuse of discretion; by definition, B's should have
been taxed from the outset. These interpretations may be described as purely
interpretive. Because the Code provision is specific, the practical application
of the statute by the Service should involve no element of discretion. Therefore, the Government could successfully challenge the validity of the first ruling in court. Here the court would apply the rubric that the Commissioner is
not bound by a mistake of law.
In the second example, 30 a Code provision similar to that in example one
states that Yis taxable. However, Ymay be composed of C's and D's;i.e., Yis
an entity which has no meaning or definition outside of the Code or Treasury
regulations. The Commissioner issues a ruling stating that Y includes only
C's. He subsequently issues a new ruling including D's in the taxable class, and
applies the construction retroactively. The Commissioner's action may now be
deemed an abuse of discretion. The rulings here may be termed quasi-legislative:31 the first interpretation also determines the content of the statute. The
tive effect." A similar provision appeared in the Revenue Act of 1921, § 1314, 42 Stat. 314.
The 1934 provision was accompanied with this congressional statement: "[I]n some cases
the application of regulations, Treasury Decisions, and rulings to past transactions which
have been closed by taxpayers in reliance upon existing practice, will work such inequitable
results that it is believed desirable to lodge in the Treasury Department the power to avoid
these results by applying certain regulations, Treasury Decisions, and rulings with prospective effect only." H.R. Rep. No. 704, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 38 (1934).
29 Cf. Automobile Club of Michigan v. Commissioner, 353 U.S. 180 (1957) ("nonprofit
clubs" for pleasure and relaxation).
30 Cf. Cory Corp. v. Sauber, 363 U.S. 709 (1960) ("household-type air conditioners");
Universal Battery Co. v. United States, 281 U.S. 580 (1930) (automotive "parts and accessories"). In Cory, petitioner-taxpayer asserted that "household-type"had no generic meaning in the industry. Brief for Petitioner, pp. 14-15.
31Interpretive rulings and regulations may create "new law" and thus contain legislative
aspects. See 1 DAvis, ADmiNrsTRATrvE LAW § 5.09 at 347-54 (1958).
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interpretation necessarily involves an aspect of discretion on the part of the
Commissioner. The later retroactive expansion of the taxable class is inconsistent with the original discretionary determination of the class. It follows
that the Government could not successfully attack the validity of the first permissible ruling in court by urging a second permissible interpretation, although the court may agree that the second is a more desirable one.
In the second example, unfairness to the taxpayer who has arranged his
affairs in accordance with the Service interpretation seems to outweigh the
desire to tax to the full extent authorized by Congress. However, unfairness to
the taxpayer in example one may be equally harsh. In this situation, the only
protection accorded the taxpayer is the statute of limitations3 2 and the general
33
Service policy of honoring the validity of rulings and regulations.
It has been argued that to completely protect the taxpayer who has relied on
the Service interpretation, the Government should be estopped from denying
the validity of the ruling or regulation.3 4 There is at least one situation where
application of equitable estoppel may not be sound.3 5 The Service has interpreted a Code provision to mean that only A's are taxable. After the interpretation has been in effect for a substantial period of time, one of the class of
A's brings a suit, maintaining that under the statute only B's are taxable. The
lower court agrees, holding that the correct interpretation of the Code at the
time of enactment was only B's are taxable. B's now bring suit urging that the
first court erred, and that the correct interpretation is only A's are taxable.
In this second suit should the Government be estopped from urging the "correct" interpretation as held by the first court, and thereby denying the validity
of the original Service interpretation? If so, there will be inconsistent holdings
in the district courts. The remainder of the class of A's may now bring suit
32 The statute of limitations may prove to be a hollow safeguard, for it does not start to
run until a return is filed by the taxpayer. Thus, if a taxpayer relies on a ruling stating that he
is subject to no tax in respect to a certain matter, thereby filing no return, the statute will not
run. Automobile Club of Michigan v. Commissioner, 353 U.S. 180 (1957).
33 The Service has set forth this policy in Rev. Rul. 54-172, § 12.05, 1954-1 CuaM. BULL.
401. The Treasury Department has yet to issue any definitive statement of its policy as respects retroactivity in regulations. See Sugarman, supra note 14.
3
4Berger, Estoppel Against the Government, 21 U. Cmu. L. Rav. 680 (1954). The doctrine
of equitable estoppel does not apply to the Government. This immunity has often been
criticized by the courts. See Walker Hill Co. v. United States, 162 F.2d 259, 263 (7th Cir.
1947); Prettyman, J., dissenting in Stockstrom v. Commissioner, 190 F.2d 283, 289 (D.C.
Cir. 1951).
In this connection, note Mr. Justice Frankfurter's dissent in Cory where he argues that
the taxpayer would be protected from retroactive judicial determination of the content of the
Code provision by § 1108(b) of the Revenue Act of 1926, c. 27, 44 Stat. 9, 114, which would
produce the same effect as estoppel. "No tax shall be levied, assessed, or colected... on
any article sold or leased by the manufacturer,... if at the time of the sale or lease there
was an existing ruling, regulation, or Treasury decision holding that the sale or lease of such
article was not taxable, and the manufacturer... parted with possession or ownership of
such article, relying upon the ruling, regulation, or Treasury decision."
35 Cf. Estate of Sanford v. Commissioner, 308 U.S. 39 (1939).
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relying on the first holding, correctly asserting that if that decision is not applied to them, unfair discrimination within a class of taxpayers will result. If
the class of A's is successful, the result is that the Treasury will have no revenue
from either A's or B's for the taxable period involved. If the primary goal is the
protection of taxpayers from retroactive changes in the law while maintaining
revenues, perhaps the solution in this situation as well as example one, above,
is the exercise by the courts of the prerogative to apply an interpretation of a
36
statute prospectively only.

Application of the long-standing test to permissible Service interpretations
such as those in Cory produces the desirable results of uniformity and stability
in tax administration. By approaching the question of unfairness in this manner, however, the Court must resolve the difficult question whether the Code
provision definitely establishes the taxable class or creates a class which must
be defined by the Service or Treasury. If the latter, the Service interpretation
may then be considered a permissible construction of the statute and will not
be invalidated if in effect for a substantial period; if the former, a Service
interpretation not in harmony with the statute will be invalidated, even though
the interpretation has been in effect for many years and its invalidation may
produce detrimental retroactive effects to the taxpayer.
36 This position is advanced by Professor Davis. I DAvIs, op. cit. supra note 31, at 352.
See Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (1954): "[Iln adopting a new test, we
invoke our inherent power to make the change prospectively. The rule we now hold must be
applied on the retrial of this case and in future cases."

